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ABSTRACT 
The optimal design of executive compensation is one of the primary issues in the area of 
corporate governance and has been investigated in considerable detail in the academic literature 
over the past three decades. The underlying assumption behind the design of optimal compensation 
schemes is that the executives of the firm have more information on the firm’s projects and cash 
flows than the shareholders. In the presence of symmetric information, since the shareholders can 
completely distinguish the executive’s effort from bad luck or other extraneous factors, there is 
little need to motivate the executive beyond a flat salary. In the presence of asymmetric 
information, the shareholder faces two problems: One, to select the right type of agent (the adverse 
selection problem) and two, to motivate the agent to work hard once selected (the moral hazard 
problem). All executive compensation schemes represent trade-offs between these two agency 
problems.  
In this survey, in the first section, I start by discussing the theory of executive 
compensation. Why do firms pay executives? I distinguish two major approaches. The first arises 
from the theory of optimal compensation contracting and focuses on the composition of pay. It 
argues that the composition of pay is set to attract good executives (to solve the adverse selection 
problem) and motivate them to work hard (the moral hazard problem). The second approach 
focuses on the level of pay. It argues that managers have a considerable degree of power in setting 
their own wages, and in particular, use their power to extract excessive pay or rents from the 
shareholders. In the second section, I discuss the evidence on both the composition and level of 
pay and how it has changed over time, treating each component pay separately. I also discuss the 
composition of pay in countries around the world and in specific industries. In the third section, I 
describe who decides pay composition and levels. Finally, in the fourth section, I conclude by 
examining how the structure of pay has real consequences for firms.
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last half century, the subject of executive compensation has received extensive 
academic attention. This attention has dramatically increased over the past two decades. From 
1959 to 2015, a search on Scopus reveals the existence of over 1,300 published articles on 
executive compensation. From 1959 to 1991, there was relatively little attention paid to this topic, 
with just over 25 articles listed as published on Scopus over this period. In striking contrast, the 
growth has been nearly exponential since 1991 with 109, 544, and 657 articles on executive 
compensation published over the periods from 1992-2000, 2001-2010 and 2011-2015 respectively. 
This trend is illustrated in figure 1.  
Though the magnitude of research on executive compensation appears daunting, the broad 
pattern is relatively easy to discern. Academic research on executive compensation can roughly be 
classified into two streams that examine either the composition of pay or the level of pay 
respectively. Specifically, they either examine how a particular component of pay is able to solve 
economic issues of selection or motivation of executives, or examine why the level of pay is 
different from the optimal level suggested by economic models respectively.  
The overall trend in academic research also shows a second pattern. It appears closely 
related to the evolution of top executive pay documented in Frydman and Saks (2010, Figure 1). 
Frydman and Saks (2010) document that executive compensation was relatively flat from the end 
of World War II to the mid-1970s, even though firms grew considerably during that time. In 
addition, the magnitude and determinants of the correlation between wealth of executives and the 
performance of the firms they managed (pay-to performance sensitivity) did not change much over 
the fifty-year period from 1930-1980. In contrast, both pay and the pay-to-performance sensitivity 
of top executive pay expanded dramatically over the subsequent couple of decades, accompanied 
by a simultaneous increase in academic articles on this topic. The explosion in pay in the 1990s 
was almost entirely driven by the payment of stock options and the growth rate over the past fifteen 
years has been much lower, with pay only now approaching the levels of 2000 and with a changed 
composition to pay in prior decades. 
What accounts for this striking coincidence between the increase in executive pay, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) pay in particular, and the simultaneous increase in academic research? 
While it is difficult to narrow down the explanation for executive compensation growth to any 
single factor, we can note that the explosion of academic interest occurred concurrently with two 
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factors: the growth of economic models to analyze incentive mechanisms and the easy availability 
of data, specifically, the availability of the COMPUSTAT Executive Compensation Database 
(Execucomp) that provided information on executive compensation for all the S&P500, Mid-Cap 
400 and the Small-Cap 600 companies. These firms (comprising the S&P1500) constitute more 
than 80% of market capitalization of US public firms. Prior to these two events, articles published 
on executive compensation were largely practitioner articles, published in journals such as 
Business Research with almost no influence on subsequent research. In the 1980s, the evolution 
of information economics and the development of screening and signaling models led to the first 
modern papers on executive compensation. albeit still with relatively small samples.  The essence 
of these papers lay in the development of principal-agent models in the mid-1970s.  
The principal-agent issue is of importance for all firms where the ownership of the firm is 
separated from corporate control, an issue documented by Berle and Means (1932) in firms going 
back as far as the beginning of the twentieth century. If managers are self-interested and if 
shareholders cannot perfectly monitor them (or cannot even hire the right type of manager), 
executives are likely to pursue their own well-being at the expense of shareholder value. In 
particular, there are two types of principal-agent problems, adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The adverse selection problem arises because shareholders are seeking the perfect executive to 
manage the firm and attempt to choose the manager with the ideal blend of different attributes –
risk-aversion, effort aversion, and innate skill. However, managers know significantly more than 
shareholders whether they possess these attributes in the proportions desired by the shareholders. 
Hence the adverse selection problem lies in attracting the right type of candidate. Assuming that 
this is possible, the shareholders then face the moral hazard problem. Even though ex ante the 
manager may be the correct type of manager, ex post after being hired, the manager may choose 
to shirk, invest in undesired projects, or extract excess perquisites from the firm.  
It is also important to realize that adverse selection can also arise in the presence of 
symmetric information where neither the manager nor the shareholder has the information on the 
potential quality of the firm-manager match. For example, while the manager may indeed work 
hard, the effectiveness of the effort may be linked to firm characteristics – some types of firms will 
not match well with the manager though the manager will not necessarily know this before she 
joins. Alternatively, changes in macroeconomic or industry conditions unanticipated by both 
parties may mean that any degree of managerial effort will not result in shareholder value. The 
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optimal contract should therefore be able to distinguish an ex post moral hazard problem from an 
ex ante symmetric uncertain information problem.  
As noted above, the literature on executive compensation largely takes one of two 
approaches. The first and earlier stream examines the composition of pay. For example, an optimal 
compensation package for a CEO might consist of a combination of a cash salary and bonus, an 
option package (perhaps becoming exercisable over a number of years), a stock grant package 
(perhaps restricted in some manner), a severance package, a golden parachute package that comes 
into play if the firm is acquired, and a pension plan. Why should the optimal plan be so 
complicated? The optimal contracting approach draws on principal-agent theory to argue that pay 
should address both moral hazard and adverse selection. In the example above, the cash salary and 
bonus have no incentive effects once paid (since they are in the form of cash, which is time 
invariant). Hence, to motivate the manager to continue to work hard for the shareholders, she is 
paid in options. The options become exercisable at some point in the future at an exercise price 
that is fixed today. If she shirks, her options drop in value. However, if the options are deep out of 
the money, they become largely useless for motivational purposes, so stock grants are used to 
provide motivation in these circumstances. If the manager takes risks, she is likely to be fired, so 
she takes less risk than the shareholders (who have limited liability) would wish. Hence, an optimal 
package would also have severance pay to incentivize the manager to take more risks. However, 
taking too much risk would create wealth transfers from the bondholders to the shareholders. If 
the bondholders anticipate this transfer, the cost of debt of the firm would increase. Therefore, the 
manager is also compensated with a pension plan that acts like inside debt, persuading the manager 
to reduce the incidence of potential shareholder-bondholder conflicts. Finally, to persuade the 
manager not to resist (too hard) if the firm receives an acquisition offer, the package might also 
contain a golden parachute that is triggered if the firm is acquired. 
The first category of theoretical models examines the role of pay in resolving information 
uncertainty on the level of unobserved effort, specifically how pay evolves over time. 
Shareholders, boards, and managers do not know the ability of the managers to manage a particular 
firm because managerial ability depends both on the manager’s intrinsic nature and on her match 
with the firm and extrinsic factors (such as macroeconomic factors). They learn about this ability 
by observing the manager over time and their changing beliefs affect the optimal structure of pay.  
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A second category of models in this stream examine the ability of compensation plans to 
either elicit managerial effort in general, or exert effort to achieve a particular outcome (increase 
risk or undertake a specific corporate event such as an acquisition). These models typically pick a 
particular component (such as the levels of incentive compensation, severance pay, or pensions) 
and test how the component addresses the moral hazard and the adverse selection problems, with 
significantly more attention being paid to the former than the latter.  
The reason for this asymmetric degree of attention is straightforward. In either case, the 
counterfactual needs to be determined (who would have been hired and how much she would have 
been paid in the absence of moral hazard or adverse selection). The counterfactual for moral hazard 
involves identifying a group of firms that differed in the degree to which moral hazard played a 
potential role - firms that are different in the cross-section on one or two characteristics that are 
believed to affect pay. Examples include firms with differing levels of corporate governance, firms 
that were affected differently by regulation, and so on. This is reasonably straightforward to do 
under a set of justifiable assumptions. Identifying the counterfactual for adverse selection is 
considerably more difficult since the econometrician has to construct a set of alternative executives 
who might have been hired in the place of the actually hired executive had circumstances been 
different. This is considerably harder.  
The cross-sectional evidence is reasonably clear however. While the overall structure of 
pay (described above) has remained roughly constant over time, the importance of each type of 
component has waxed and waned over time – but in a manner consistent with economic theory. 
For example, while the decision to reward and the actual composition of the package each 
executive is ultimately made by the board, there is significant variation in stock option grant 
vesting periods and patterns. This suggests that boards actively choose vesting terms depending 
on firm and executive characteristics, rather than adopting boilerplate terms. Vesting schedules are 
longer in growth firms where lengthening the executive’s investment horizon is more important. 
Similarly, severance pay is positively related to the distress risk of the firm and the risk aversion 
of the executive. Younger executives with little human capital of their own are more likely to 
receive explicit contracts and better terms. Firms with high distress risk, high takeover probability, 
and high return volatility are significantly more likely to revise their severance contracts. 
Importantly, there also appears to be a consistent increase in uniformity about how executives are 
paid that transcends national, political, and cultural differences. The cross-country evidence is 
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consistent with executives being paid in the UK, Europe, China, Canada and other countries for 
much the same economic rationales as studies on US executives. 
The second stream of research, developed in the early 2000s, in contrast, focuses on the 
level of pay. The idea is that once in post, managers enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy and 
power and hence extract excess rents from shareholders beyond levels that compensate them for 
the degree of risk they are exposed to and the effort they put in (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002, 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). If the managers face losses, they extract rents ex post – by manipulating 
information, hiding losses or manipulating contracts. These papers implicitly argue that the 
explosion of pay in the 1990s was largely due to an increase in the payment of option pay. Option 
pay has an attractive feature – it is difficult to understand for the average shareholder. Cash in 
contrast, is easy to value. Hence, the explosion of pay in difficult-to-value options not only had 
the (desirable) effect of incentivizing the manager to work hard on behalf of the shareholders (as 
the first stream of literature argues) but also (undesirably) increased the ability of the managers to 
award themselves high levels of pay, higher than that justified by their effort or ability.  
The problem with this latter stream, is that while plausible, it is difficult to determine what 
the optimum level of pay should be if we do not measure what managers should be paid for 
particular tasks and how important the tasks are. A common approach is to compute pay relative 
to a benchmark, either a peer group of firms, a peer group of executives, or a model based on firm-
characteristics. However, if a manager is paid well above her benchmark, does that mean that she 
is excessively paid? It is unclear. Computing the optimal level of pay involves evaluating the 
manager’s responsibilities and what pay is appropriate for those responsibilities, a very difficult 
task. For example, a number of papers in the second half of the 2000s, argued that, if firms compete 
for scarce managerial talent, since larger firms are able to pay more, the rapid increase in 
compensation is correlated with the rapid increase in the size of the typical firm in the market, 
even though the dispersion in talent may not be very large (Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Similarly, 
another group of papers argue that the market for executives has changed over time with different 
types of skill sets in demand (network connections or social factors, for example) and this has 
influenced executive pay (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004). Simply put, papers in the rent extraction 
stream of literature suffer from a joint-hypothesis problem akin to papers examining market 
efficiency.  
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This does not mean that all is lost for this stream, however. The papers in this stream also 
document significant managerial misbehavior around compensation awards. For example, 
managers facing a shortfall in pay have been shown to manipulate earnings, misstate financial 
statements, or back-date their pay awards. You do not need a benchmark model to argue that pay 
incentives may also cause these managers to behave opportunistically. 
Finally, there is also a complex interplay between the composition and the level of pay that 
is, to a large extent, affected by regulation. While a number of these regulations were aimed at the 
levels of pay, they affected the composition of pay. For example, stock options were almost never 
used until the 1950s when restricted stock options were introduced following a reform of tax 
legislation. Since income tax rates were extremely high at the time, this had an immediate impact 
on compensation structure. After 1992, the Clinton administration taxed fixed compensation in 
excess of $1 million that was not performance related. The cash salary component of CEO pay 
packages were largely restricted to this amount following this rule but the amount paid in the form 
of performance related option pay increased strikingly. However, since plain vanilla call options 
on the firm’s stock with the strike price set equal to the stock price on the grant date did not have 
to be expensed, options granted to the CEOs were largely vanilla options. The Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards SFAS 123(R), changed the rules on the vesting terms of stock 
option grants, requiring firms to expense the fair value of option grants over their vesting periods, 
and causing a decline in stock options in favor of (first) restricted shares and (then) performance 
shares (restricted shares vesting on the achievement of performance hurdles and not simply the 
passage of time). In all these cases, the managers have significantly higher incentives to keep the 
level of their pay constant by changing the structure of pay, than the shareholders for whom the 
firm may form a small fraction of their portfolios. 
As in numerous surveys on executive compensation over the past two decades, including 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997), Murphy (1999), Abowd and Kaplan (1999), and Murphy 
(2013), I start with discussing the theoretical approaches on pay. As noted above, I distinguish 
between research that analyzes the composition of pay and research that analyzes the level of pay. 
In the later sections, I will place a larger emphasis on what the recent literature has shown on the 
determinants of executive pay. In particular, since the largest part of the research on executive 
compensation is devoted to CEO pay, in this survey, I will also tend to emphasize research on 
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CEO pay. However, I will draw parallels between compensation paid to CEOs and those to other 
top executives in the firm. 
I. THE THEORY OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
In this survey, I will use the word theory in a broad sense – both describing formal 
mathematical models and less formal qualitative hypotheses that nevertheless fit into a wider 
framework. As noted above, that framework largely consists of two parts – an optimal contracting 
approach and a rent extraction approach. The optimal contracting approach largely focuses on the 
composition of pay. According to this approach, executive compensation is designed by 
shareholders (either directly or indirectly through boards, as I will discuss in the third section) to 
increase shareholder value. Much of this literature draws on standard principal-agent theory (for 
example, Hölmstrom, 1979) to determine the optimal structure of compensation. In these papers, 
the principal may be unaware of the agent’s type, the agent may be unaware of the match between 
principal and agent, or the principal may be unaware of the agent’s effort, given the type. I will 
first discuss models that use the structure of compensation to resolve uncertainty as to the agent’s 
type. As discussed below, these models are related to the adverse selection problem but are not 
exactly the same. The second and third set of papers focus on mechanisms to induce the agent to 
induce effort in general (solve the moral hazard problem) or induce effort for specific purposes. 
The fourth set of papers focus on mechanisms that measure whether the manager has indeed 
expended the effort and renegotiate contract terms accordingly. The fifth set focuses on managerial 
perceptions of compensation mechanisms and the final set focuses on the level of pay, arguing that 
managers seek excessive levels of pay (rents) and hence earn compensation which is unrelated to 
(or even negatively related to) shareholder value.  
In particular, the final, rent-extraction approach, typically draws on the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) framework to argue that compensation schemes are designed to address the 
principal-agent problem, in particular, the moral hazard problem. According to Jensen and 
Meckling, managers are prone to agency costs, pursuing their own objectives instead of 
maximizing shareholder value. The major difference between the optimal contracting approaches 
and the rent extraction approach is that the latter does not deny that managers are paid for effort or 
for certain activities. Instead, it argues either that the level of compensation is too high for the 
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activities that managers perform or that managers manipulate compensation mechanisms away 
from the optimal levels. 
 
THE RESOLUTION OF INFORMATION UNCERTAINTY 
 
The first major problem firms face is to determine the ability of the executive. Standard 
principal–agent theory, beginning with Hölmstrom (1979), predicts that the ability of the principal 
(board or shareholders) to observe the agent’s (manager) efforts influences the type of 
compensation paid. If the manager’s efforts are easily observed and verifiable, the optimal contract 
pays a manager a fixed salary and charges her for sub-optimal behavior. In contrast, if the 
manager’s actions are unobservable, then the principal needs to link the manager’s wealth to 
productive outcomes such as the value of the firm. Contracts should be based on any signal that 
has incremental information on the level of (unobserved) effort the CEO is exerting. 
Therefore, the role of pay in resolving information uncertainty on the level of unobserved 
effort forms the first category of theoretical models I discuss. These models focus on explaining 
the evolution of pay for the same executive. This strand of theoretical papers shares the core idea 
that shareholders and boards may not know the ability of the executives ex ante. They learn about 
this ability by observing the manager over time and their changing beliefs affect the optimal 
structure of pay. In this class of models, the information is asymmetric – the manager knows her 
own abilities and effort levels better than the shareholders do. 
However, the ability of the manager is a function that is dependent on two factors – her 
intrinsic ability (her risk-aversion and her propensity to exert effort) and the degree to which her 
ability matches the firm’s needs. Hence, while a manager may be aware of her intrinsic ability, she 
herself may not be aware of how well her ability will translate into effective shareholder value 
creation since the latter is dependent on firm-specific information that the manger may not have. 
Similarly, macroeconomic conditions may prevent a manager from performing regardless of how 
much effort she puts in. So it is important to remember that designing a compensation contract is 
not solely a question of the firm designing a compensation contract that induces the manager to 
tell the truth about her intrinsic ability. In other words, some of the information may be uncertain 
but not asymmetric. 
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To understand the differences between the two types of models, consider two of the earliest 
theoretical papers on executive compensation. In Eaton and Rosen (1983), shareholders are unable 
to obtain information on the current level of effort of their executives. They may receive ex post 
information on executive performance, but that information may be noisy. There is no matching 
problem in this paper in that the executives expend effort but the effectiveness of managerial effort 
is not related to firm characteristics. The executive is interested solely in maximizing her utility of 
consumption while minimizing effort. Shareholders will therefore attempt to tie compensation 
characteristics to the informativeness of the signals available on managerial effort because tying 
compensation to a “noisy” indicator exposes the executive to greater income variability. Given the 
risk aversion of the executive, this implies that the expected level of compensation must then be 
higher to attract a given executive. When future indicators of executive performance are more 
informative than indicators presently available, firms will prefer to delay compensation.  
In contrast, the model in Harris and Hölmstrom (1982) is driven by symmetric information. 
While there is uncertainty on managerial abilities, managers and firms are both imperfectly 
informed on ability and learn gradually by observing the manager’s output over time. However, 
since output and ability are not perfectly correlated, this learning process results in random 
fluctuations of perceived ability over time. Long-term implicit contracts protect risk averse 
managers from wage changes induced by fluctuations in perceived productivity. If firms are risk 
neutral, the contract will entail a downward rigid wage, under which the managers’ wages will 
never fall. The wage is not fully rigid however, since managers can quit to accept higher offers 
from the market. The threat of quitting will force the wage to be bid up whenever the market wage 
is higher than the current wage. Hence wage contracts can simply be interpreted as a minimum 
wage guarantee which is equal to the market value of the manager at the time of contracting. Under 
this model, managers cannot commit to staying with the firm when the value of their outside 
options exceed the value of their current compensation contract. 
In an extension of the Harris and Hölmstrom model, Ai and Li (2015) note that there is 
another type of limited commitment involved in the optimal compensation design - shareholders 
cannot commit to undertaking negative net present value (NPV) projects. Under these types of 
optimal contracts with limited commitment, CEO compensation is history-dependent. The type of 
limited commitment influences the relation between historic performance and compensation. In 
particular, limited commitment on the manager side implies that CEO compensation is an 
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increasing function of the historical highest level of firm size even after controlling for the current 
size of the firm. In contrast, limited commitment on the shareholder side implies that CEO 
compensation is an increasing function of the historical lowest level of firm size. The intuition is 
that if a firm’s value is driven toward zero by a sequence of negative productivity shocks, 
shareholders optimally reduce CEO compensation to keep the firm value nonnegative (because 
they cannot commit to negative NPV projects). Simultaneously, optimal risk sharing requires that 
CEO pay stays constant unless the limited commitment constraint binds. As a result, subsequent 
positive shocks do not affect CEO compensation. In this case, CEO compensation is determined 
by the historical worst performance of the firm where the current level of compensation is set. 
Banker, Darrough, Huang and Plehn-Dujowich (2012) argue that past performance 
provides signals of the CEO’s ability. They differentiate between two components of cash 
compensation: fixed salary (based on signals already observed) and contingent bonus (based on 
signals of current performance observed after contract agreement) and posit that salary and bonus, 
although jointly determined, play two different roles in solving agency problems in the presence 
of both adverse selection and moral hazard. Intuitively, by making compensation contingent on 
performance, the bonus induces effort and rewards better ability types. To screen on ability, the 
sensitivity of bonus to performance needs to differ across types so that agents of higher ability 
command higher information rents. Salary and bonus together provide the agent with his 
reservation utility and information rent. Thus, an optimum compensation structure trades off 
productive efficiency with information rent extraction. They find that salary (bonus) is positively 
(negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. 
Taylor (2013) also models how learning about a CEO’s ability over time affects the wage 
dynamics, specifically why the level of CEO pay responds asymmetrically to good and bad news 
about the CEO’s ability. Suppose that after a year of high profits, shareholders update their beliefs 
about their CEO’s ability. As a result, the CEO’s perceived contribution to next year's profits 
increases by $20 million. If the CEO obtains a $10 million raise the following year, then the CEO 
captures half of the $10 million surplus and shareholders the remaining half. Taylor measures these 
surpluses from learning, and how CEOs and shareholders split them. In his model, both CEO and 
shareholders gradually learn the CEO’s ability, defined as the CEO’s contribution to firm 
profitability, by observing the firm’s noisy profits and an additional latent signal. Stock prices, 
return volatility, and changes in the level of CEO pay respond endogenously to news about CEO 
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ability. Taylor estimates the CEO’s share of positive surpluses (from good news) and negative 
surpluses (from bad news) from a structural estimation approach. The average CEO captures 
approximately half of the surpluses from good news, implying CEOs and shareholders have 
roughly equal bargaining power. In contrast, the average CEO bears none of the negative surplus 
from bad news, implying CEOs have downward rigid pay.   
The downward rigid pay is consistent with Harris and Hölmstrom (1982). Risk-averse 
CEOs accept significantly lower compensation in return for the insurance provided by downward 
rigid pay. However, Harris and Hölmstrom predict that workers capture 100% of the surplus from 
good news, because their workers can always threaten to take their skills to another firm at no cost. 
Taylor’s structural model estimates suggest that the average CEO’s actual outside employment 
options are not as strong as Harris and Hölmstrom assume. CEOs’ share of positive surpluses is 
significantly higher in the subsample with more institutional ownership, implying that strong CEO 
bargaining power is not inconsistent with strong governance. The CEOs’ share of positive 
surpluses is also higher in subsamples with insider CEOs and heterogeneous industries, potentially 
because their firms have fewer potential replacement CEOs and hence less bargaining power. 
Finally, the CEOs’ share of positive surpluses is positively related to the number of similarly sized 
firms in the industry, which Taylor uses as a proxy for CEOs’ outside employment options.  
Finally, Laux (2012) relates the issue of revelation of CEO ability to the type of investment 
undertaken by the firm and to the vesting policies for the options granted to CEOs. Investment in 
short-term projects has beneficial effects in that it provides early feedback about CEO talent, which 
leads to more efficient replacement decisions. Granting stock options with long vesting periods 
implies that if the CEO is fired at an interim date, she will forfeit her options because they have 
not yet vested. Consequently, a long vesting horizon biases the CEO in favor of remaining with 
the firm. This is beneficial for the firm from an effort incentive perspective because the threat of 
losing her position and forfeiting unvested options provides the CEO with strong incentives to 
work hard. But at the same time, the threat of option forfeiture distorts the CEO’s investment 
decision toward short-term projects. The CEO knows that the board will rely on short-term results 
to update beliefs about managerial talent when making the replacement decision. To reduce the 
probability of being fired and forfeiting unvested options, the CEO has to impress the board and 
boost its perception about her ability. The CEO can achieve this by allocating excessive resources 
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to short-term projects. Thus, in the presence of potential CEO turnover, long vesting terms link 
CEO pay not only to long-term but short-term performance, encouraging short-termism. 
There is some empirical evidence that is consistent with the information resolution 
hypotheses. Henderson and Frederickson (1996) measure the level of CEO compensation in four 
industries (chemicals, high-tech equipment, natural resources and conglomerates) where 
shareholders are likely to find it especially difficult to measure CEO effort. They find that CEO 
compensation is indeed higher in firms whose diversification strategy, approach to technology, 
and top management team structure places particularly high information-processing demands on 
their CEOs and hence are likely to be difficult for shareholders to evaluate.  
Consistent with Harris and Hölmstrom (1982), Harris and Helfat (1997) argue that 
differences in pay are driven by lack of information executives have on the matching process. 
When they switch firms, executives forego the future value of their firm-specific skills in their old 
firms, and also bear risk connected to the lack of firm-specific skills in their new jobs. To induce 
an executive to switch firms, therefore, the firm may have to pay a premium up front to an external 
successor. They also argue that outside-of-industry external successors will earn greater initial 
compensation than within-industry external successors, as compensation for the return that 
outside-of- industry successors forego to their old industry- specific skills and for risk arising from 
lack of industry-specific skills in their new jobs.  
Contrasting with these two papers, in a more recent paper, Riachi and Schwienbacher 
(2013) examine the effect of corporate asset-backed securitization (ABS) on managerial 
compensation. ABS helps improve the effectiveness of executive compensation by securitizing 
those assets whose performance does not correlate with CEO effort. Hence, corporate performance 
becomes a better signal of managerial effort after the securitization of non-correlated assets. Riachi 
and Schwienbacher find that CEO compensation indeed increases after securitization of corporate 
assets in particular, by increasing short-term accounting components (bonuses). This is somewhat 
consistent with Eaton and Rosen (1983). If equity based signals of managerial effort become 
relatively less informative after securitization, firms should increase the relative level of short-
term signals and reduce the level of performance based compensation. However, firms do not 
appear to do the latter. Securitization does not appear to affect equity-based components of the 
CEO’s performance-based compensation. 
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THE INDUCEMENT OF EFFORT IN GENERAL: THE ROLE OF DELTA  
 
How should the firm induce effort? Cash salary and bonus have no incentive effects once 
paid (since they are in the form of cash, which is time invariant). Hence, to motivate the manager 
to exert effort, she needs to be paid in some form of equity-dependent compensation. Therefore, 
the second category of theoretical models examines the composition of executive compensation – 
the proportion in the form of cash, stock, or options. Varying these proportions of cash, stock, and 
options in the pay contract changes the sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation to firm performance, 
the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of the CEO’s contract. This is usually also termed the delta 
of the compensation contract.  
The earliest empirical papers appeared to provide evidence that managers have relatively 
low PPS. In an enormously influential article, Jensen and Murphy (1990a) collected data on 2,500 
CEOs in 1400 publicly held companies from 1974-1988, and argued that top executives in that 
period were not receiving record salaries and bonuses. While cash compensation had increased 
over the prior fifteen years, CEO levels were approximately the same as they were 50 years ago. 
Much more important, annual changes in executive compensation did not appear to reflect changes 
in corporate performance. Specifically, for the median CEO in the 250 largest public companies, 
they argued that a $1,000 change in shareholder value corresponded to a change of just 6.7 cents 
in salary and bonus over a two-year period. They also argued that CEO compensation appeared to 
show little relationship with firm performance. In particular, CEO stock incentives (stock 
ownership) were significantly greater in the 1930s than in the 1980s. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
estimated larger pay-performance sensitivities and document that the pay-performance sensitivity 
has grown since 1980 because of increasing ownership of stock and stock options. However, the 
puzzle at the time was why CEO pay did not seem very sensitive to the performance of the firm.  
Going back to Hölmstrom (1979), one possibility is that the relative informativeness of the 
stock-performance signal is lower for riskier firms. In such firms, managers should therefore not 
be compensated with contracts with high PPS. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) use the variation 
in stock return volatility across firms to test whether executives at riskier firms indeed have lower 
pay-performance sensitivities. They find that the PPS of a manager’s compensation decreases in 
the overall variance of the firm’s returns. The pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms 
with the least volatile stock prices is significantly greater than the pay-performance sensitivity for 
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executives at firms with the most volatile stock prices. However, firms do not appear to take 
advantage of other measures that can improve informativeness. For example, evaluating the 
performance of executives against those in other firms (relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
measures) would appear to incorporate the benefits of risk sharing while being more informative 
on CEO effort. However, Aggarwal and Samwick find little evidence that firms use RPE in 
executive compensation, suggesting that executive compensation contracts are not always set to 
resolve information asymmetry. 
Cao and Wang (2013) and Jin (2002) also measure the sensitivity of CEO pay to the 
variability of firm performance, but go on to separate firm risk into idiosyncratic and systematic 
risks. Cao and Wang focus on the idiosyncratic risk component while Jin focuses on systematic 
risk. Cao and Wang note that, in a market where there is competition for CEOs, the CEO can 
privately observe the idiosyncratic shock ahead of the shareholders and choose to quit the firm. 
Each firm has an incentive to design contracts to increase the probability of retention. Thus, 
changes in market conditions can affect PPS by affecting the severity of competition for CEOs. 
By switching from one firm to another, a CEO can change the amount of idiosyncratic risk to 
which he is exposed, but not aggregate systematic risk since all firms face the same systematic 
risk. PPS should therefore depend on these two types of risks differently.  
Specifically, the firm offers an incentive contract that can be contingent on its output and 
the aggregate shock (which is publicly observable), but not directly on the idiosyncratic shock and 
the CEO’s effort. The CEO decides whether to accept the offer after observing the idiosyncratic 
shock. If he quits, he can search for a new job. Due to competition among firms, a CEO’s outside 
option depends on the probability of getting a new job and the compensation at the new job. 
Because the idiosyncratic shock is the CEO’s private information, the base wage cannot be made 
contingent on such a shock. The CEO will choose to stay to obtain the high payoff when the 
idiosyncratic shock is high, and will quit to insulate himself from the low payoff when the shock 
is low. In this setting, it is optimal for the firm to set PPS below one to get part of the high surplus 
when the idiosyncratic shock is high and compensate for the low payoff when the CEO quits. 
However, the PPS can also be affected by aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. An increase in the risk 
(either aggregate risk or idiosyncratic risk) increases the firm’s expected profit conditional on 
retention, which increases the firm’s incentive to retain the CEO. However, when the value of the 
CEO’s outside option is high, the probability of retaining the CEO is low. Therefore, it is optimal 
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for the firm to increase retention probability by increasing the base wage and reducing PPS. The 
opposite holds when the risk decreases. Thus, overall, PPS is negatively related to aggregate and 
idiosyncratic risks if the value of the CEO’s outside option is positive.  
In contrast, Jin (2002) focuses on systematic risk, arguing that CEOs might not be able to 
hedge firm-specific price movements (which may also be illegal), but can adjust their exposure to 
market risk through trading of the market portfolio. He shows theoretically that when CEOs can 
trade the market portfolio, the optimal incentive level again decreases with idiosyncratic risk but 
is unaffected by systematic risk. Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) note, however, that if the CEO 
can trade the market portfolio, she has an incentive to increase systematic risk in place of 
idiosyncratic risk. They find that the sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation to the volatility of its 
stock, its vega, gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms’ total risk by increasing systematic 
risk but not idiosyncratic risk. They argue that stock options might not always encourage managers 
to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with 
systematic risk are available as an alternative. Similarly, Akron and Benninga (2013) connect 
executive compensation with hedging. In their paper, instead of quitting the firm (as in Cao and 
Wang, 2013), CEOs can hedge idiosyncratic price movements in the stock by hedging on the 
product market, specifically through the use of commodity futures contracts. When the hedging 
instrument’s pricing includes a risk premium, hedging is costly to shareholders, while being 
costless to the manager. In this scenario, increased equity-linked compensation might result in 
excessive managerial corporate hedging, which diverts corporate value from the shareholders to 
the manager. They argue that shareholders can reduce the value diversion to managers by reducing 
the PPS or by putting restrictions on the extent of hedging activities of executives. This is 
somewhat consistent with Riachi and Schwienbacher (2013) (who find that asset-backed 
securitization increases short-term bonuses but not the level of incentive pay) though the two 
perspectives are different. 
Empirically, Sloan (1993) examines the role of accounting earnings in top executive 
compensation contracts and shows that earnings-based incentives help shield executives from 
market-wide factors in stock prices. Earnings reflect firm-specific changes in value, but are less 
sensitive to market-wide movements in equity values. As a result, the inclusion of earnings-based 
performance measures in executive compensation contracts helps shield executives from 
fluctuations in firm value that are beyond their control. Baber, Kang, and Kumar (1998) present 
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empirical evidence that compensation committees consider not only current period earnings 
surprises but also their persistence into the future when rewarding managers based on earnings. 
They argue that compensation committees take persistence into account to solve the horizon 
problem that managers typically have much shorter horizons than shareholders. Persistence based 
measures encourage managers to look beyond the current-period earnings and thus extend 
managers’ decision horizons, without sacrificing the use of earnings as a contracting vehicle. 
Consistent with their hypothesis, they also find that relative weights assigned to persistence are 
greater for CEOs who are approaching retirement - individuals who are likely to face relatively 
short decision horizons.  
Milbourn (2003) and Jayaraman and Milbourn (2012) take a different approach. They also 
examine how the pay sensitivity of the CEO is affected by the informativeness of stock prices. In 
Milbourn (2003), prices are informative as to the CEO’s ability or reputation. In Jayaraman and 
Milbourn (2012), the stock’s liquidity affects the informativeness of prices. The interesting feature 
of these models is that the informativeness of the price signal depends on an ex ante assessment of 
the CEO’s ability. As in Harris and Hölmstrom, Milbourn develops a theory of stock-based 
compensation contracts for CEOs of firms where shareholders do not have perfect information on 
the CEO’s ex ante ability. In the model, the effectiveness of stock-based pay depends directly on 
how much shareholders can infer about the value of the CEO’s efforts, which is affected in 
equilibrium by her perceived ability.  However, since the CEO’s true underlying ability is 
unobservable, market participants form beliefs over CEO ability and update them according to 
Bayes’ rule as new information is observed. Milbourn defines reputation as this Bayesian 
assessment of ability.  
Shareholders initially have a CEO of unknown ability managing their firm. The firm 
generates a single, noisy, terminal cash flow that depends on who is the CEO in place at the end 
of the game. The model characterizes the optimal (second-best) compensation contract offered to 
the incumbent CEO. Critical to the model is the feature that the firm has an opportunity to replace 
the incumbent CEO before the end of the game, but this has direct implications for the optimal 
contract. In the model, the stock price is realized after the contract is offered to the CEO, but before 
the date at which the firm will make its retention/dismissal decision. Given the fact that the stock 
price represents the expected cash flow that will be earned in the future, the possibility that the 
CEO will be fired and replaced with a randomly drawn CEO from the labor pool affects the stock 
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price. The reason is that the firm’s terminal cash flow depends on the ability of the firm’s CEO in 
place at the end of the game. Therefore, the stock price naturally reflects the probability that the 
incumbent CEO will be fired and replaced in the future.  
This is where perceptions of CEO ability (ex ante reputation) play an important role. The 
likelihood that the CEO will be retained in the future is increasing in the assessment of his ability 
at the time the compensation contract is offered. If the shareholders believe that the CEO has high 
ability, the CEO is more likely to be retained until the end of the game. This is reflected in the 
stock price which thereby offers a more informative contracting mechanism. In contrast, if the 
initial assessment of the incumbent CEO’s ability is quite low, the likelihood of ultimately being 
retained in the future is also low. The stock price again reflects this fact and consequently puts 
more weight on the expected contribution to be made by the replacement CEO, as opposed to the 
incumbent CEO. This reduces the relative informativeness of the stock price as a measure of the 
incumbent’s contribution. 
Hence, according to the Milbourn model, the optimal stock-based pay sensitivity is 
increasing in the a priori reputational assessment of the CEO. If shareholders think that the 
incumbent has high ability, the stock price is more reflective of the incumbent CEO’s contribution 
increases and the optimal contract can be made more sensitive to the firm's stock price. 
Analogously, as the incumbent CEO’s reputation falls, the stock price more heavily weights the 
value of a potential replacement, thereby minimizing its sensitivity to the incumbent CEO’s effort 
choices. Given this lack of responsiveness, the reliance on stock-based compensation is optimally 
smaller for CEOs with lower reputations. 
Jayaraman and Milbourn (2012) build on the same idea – that the informativeness of stock 
prices affects the compensation composition but instead of reputation influencing the 
informativeness of the price, Jayaraman and Milbourn argue that stock liquidity plays the same 
role. They find that as stock liquidity goes up, the proportion of equity-based compensation in total 
compensation increases while the proportion of cash-based compensation declines. They attribute 
this relation to two effects. First, because executives value liquidity, greater stock liquidity 
increases their preference for stock-based compensation relative to cash-based compensation. 
Second, as stock liquidity increases, the reduced trading costs encourage informed traders to 
impound more information about the manager’s actions in the stock price. These increases in stock 
price informativeness result in greater reliance being placed on stock prices in PPS relative to other 
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performance metrics such as earnings. Hence, the CEO’s PPS is increasing in the liquidity of the 
stock.  
While stock-based compensation induces managers to exert productive effort, on the 
negative side, it also gives them incentives to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent 
performance. When misrepresentation is possible, Goldman and Slezak (2006) show that the 
equilibrium PPS is lower than it would be in the absence of the possibility of manipulation. PPS 
increases in the detection probability (i.e., the likelihood that manipulation will be detected ex-
post). For example, firms with more complex business operations, and therefore lower detection 
probabilities, will have lower PPS. Policy reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that 
increase the penalty and detection probabilities of misrepresentation reduces the need within the 
firm for the incentive contract to control manipulation. As a result, the principal, now focusing 
more on effort, increases the PPS, which increases the manager’s incentive to misrepresent 
performance.  
Similarly, Peng and Röell (2014) model optimal executive compensation in a setting where 
managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices but where the manager’s 
manipulation propensity is uncertain. In particular, the strength of incentives is determined by the 
product of the elasticity of pay to the stock price and the elasticity of the stock price to reported 
firm performance. Thus, even if pay is very sensitive to the stock price, incentives for effort may 
be weak if the stock price is unresponsive to reported performance—which would be the case if 
investors suspect that performance yardsticks are inflated to an uncertain degree and therefore 
unreliable. Hence, an increase in manipulation uncertainty usually calls for pay to be more 
sensitive to the short-term stock price. Thus, for firms, industries, or CEO traits for which the 
degree of manipulation is more uncertain, higher powered incentive contracts are likely to emerge. 
For example, startup firms and high-tech, high-growth, intangible asset–intensive industries 
typically feature extremely stock price-sensitive pay with generous use of options. Similarly, 
younger managers, who do not have a track record regarding the degree to which their reports are 
inflated, similarly receive more option-based pay (in contrast, ex ante uncertainty about their skills 
generate less use of options). The key difference between the two models is the uncertainty of 
manipulation costs. In Goldman and Slezak (2006), managers have the same propensity to 
exaggerate reported performance. Since the investors are fully aware of the true state of the 
company, manipulation does not affect the accuracy of stock market price discovery. In Peng and 
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Röell (2014), uncertainty about the degree to which reports are inflated imposes an additional 
source of risk on investors, resulting in less informative stock prices and less effective contracting, 
even in settings where the direct costs of manipulation are modest. 
 
THE PROVISION OF SPECIFIC INCENTIVES 
 
Incentive provision models examine the incentives of managers to carry out explicit tasks 
(as opposed to expending effort in general). One of the most popular strands in this area of research 
investigates the incentives provided for the managers to undertake risky projects. Central to this 
strand is the idea is that shareholders are risk-neutral and hence need to provide incentives for risk-
averse managers to take on risk. The entire previous section was devoted to the idea that 
compensation policy can be used to manage the slope of the relation between managerial wealth 
and stock price (PPS, or the delta of the executive’s incentives), which means that shareholders 
can induce managers to take actions that increase equity value.  
Managing this slope is, however, insufficient to control the shareholder-manager agency 
conflict. A higher delta can mean that managers will work harder or more effectively because 
managers share gains and losses with shareholders. But another effect of increased delta is to 
expose managers to more risk. To the extent that managers are undiversified with respect to firm-
specific wealth, they are exposed to more risk than diversified shareholders. Accordingly, it is 
possible that managers will forgo some positive net present value (NPV) projects if those projects 
are very risky. 
INCENTIVIZING MANAGERS TO INCREASE RISK: THE ROLE OF VEGA 
Hence, beyond the slope of the relation, shareholders also need to manage the convexity of 
the relation between stock price and managers' wealth.  The convexity, or curvature, of the wealth-
performance relation is the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to the volatility of equity value (the 
manager’s compensation vega). One of the earliest and most heavily cited papers in this area is 
Guay (1999). Using compensation data for 278 corporate CEOs, Guay finds that stock options, but 
not common stockholdings, significantly increase the convexity of the relation between managerial 
wealth and the stock price. Guay measures convexity as the change in the value of managers’ stock 
options and stockholdings for a given change in stock-return volatility. Cross-sectionally, this 
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sensitivity is positively related to firms' investment opportunities. This result is consistent with 
managers receiving incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from 
underinvestment in valuable risk-increasing projects is greatest.   
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) build on Guay by examining whether ESOs provide managers 
with incentives to invest in risky projects in a sample of oil and gas producers between 1992-1997. 
Specifically, Rajgopal and Shevlin show that the coefficient of variation of future cash flows from 
exploration activity (a proxy for exploration risk) increases with the sensitivity of the value of the 
CEO’s options to stock return volatility (ESO risk incentives). ESO risk incentives also exhibit a 
negative relation with oil price hedging in a system of equations, where ESO risk incentives and 
hedging are allowed to be endogenously determined.  
Guay (1999) shows that when vega is the dependent variable, there is a positive association 
between vega and firm size, investment opportunities, and R&D intensity. Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen (2006) investigate the opposite side of the coin. They examine if vega (controlling for 
delta) influences the investment and financial policies and hence determines the riskiness of the 
firm. The issue is that causality works both ways. Hence, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen use a set of 
simultaneous equations to examine the effect of investment policy on the choice of delta and vega 
in the managerial compensation scheme, and the effect of delta and vega on investment policy. 
They document a strong relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt 
policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO delta and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk 
on the managerial compensation scheme, higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility 
(vega) means that the CEO implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more 
investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. Riskier policy 
choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return 
volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta.  
Low (2009) takes a different approach to the same question. Instead of using simultaneous 
equations, she uses an exogenous shock. Specifically, she uses the mid-1990s changes in the 
Delaware takeover regime that increased anti-takeover protection for Delaware-incorporated 
firms. She finds that managers of these firms, on average, decrease firm risk by 6%. She also shows 
that the risk reduction destroys shareholder value. The increased sensitivity of CEO portfolio value 
to stock return volatility helps align managerial risk-taking behavior with shareholders’ interests, 
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as most of the risk reduction occurs among firms with low CEO vega values. Finally, firms appear 
to take active steps in countering the adverse effects of the regime shift by increasing CEO vega. 
Researchers have also gone deeper into specific industries. For example, Chen, Steiner, 
and Whyte (2006) examine the relation between option-based executive compensation and market 
measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks during the period 1992-2000. This period is 
interesting because it coincides with a number of regulatory changes. For example, the Federal 
Reserve Board first permitted a bank to sell stocks through a subsidiary in 1990. While the stock 
market operations were initially limited to 10% of the company’s total revenue, this ceiling was 
lifted to 25% in 1996. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Act permitted bank holding companies (BHCs) to 
operate in multiple states. Finally, the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 allowed 
banks to fully expand into the securities and insurance businesses. Chen, Steiner, and Whyte argue 
that these changes altered the level and structure of executive compensation in the banking 
industry. Following deregulation, they show that banks have increasingly employed stock option-
based compensation. As a result, the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and 
the stock of option-based wealth also induces risk-taking.  
In a variant on incentives to take risk discussed in this section, Bolton, Scheinkman, and 
Xiong (2006) introduce another motivation for optimal compensation contracts to emphasize 
short-term stock performance at the expense of long-run fundamental value. In their multi-period 
agency model, investors have heterogeneous beliefs. Stock prices may deviate from underlying 
fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This speculative component arises from 
an option to sell the stock in the future to potentially overoptimistic investors. As a result, an 
optimal compensation contract may emphasize short-term performance incentives to induce 
managers to pursue actions that increase the speculative component in the stock price. Egger and 
Radulescu (2014) empirically test the Bolton et al. model in a sample of over 8,500 directors and 
up to 1,677 companies between 2004-2008. Using vesting time as a measure of the short-term 
performance weighting in CEO compensation and various alternative measures of the extent of 
speculation, they find that vesting time decreases with more intensive speculation. 
INCENTIVIZING MANAGERS TO UNDERTAKE CORPORATE EVENTS 
Another popular strand of research investigates if compensation is used to affect the CEO’s 
incentives to undertake particular corporate events. Compensation that is tied to the general 
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performance of the firm may not be optimal for a firm that is making a takeover bid or facing one. 
In these circumstances, a CEO has enormous influence over the outcome. Moreover, for a target 
firm in particular, acquisitions are also linked with executive turnover, while bidders may be driven 
by agency issues.  
Beginning with acquiring firm CEOs, Zhao (2013) examines how providing an acquiring 
firm CEO with an explicit employment contract affects acquisition outcomes. He finds that among 
large acquisitions made by S&P 500 CEOs between 1993 and 2005, over half of the acquirer CEOs 
have explicit contracts. An explicit CEO contract is more likely to be granted when the firm is 
more susceptible to takeovers or has recently underperformed, when the CEO has less power, less 
experience, and larger uncertainty about her capability, and when board monitoring is more 
effective, suggesting that contracts provide insurance for managerial human capital or protection 
against opportunistic behavior of the board. Zhao also finds that definite term rather than at-will 
contracts, longer contract duration, long-term equity incentives in annual compensation, and 
accelerated stock and option vesting provisions in severance package are associated with larger 
acquirer value creation. He argues that fixed term and longer duration contracts provide greater 
protection to managers, thereby motivating long-term, risky, value-creating investments. 
Similarly, Fich, Starks, and Yore (2014) also find that chief executive officers (CEOs) are 
rewarded for their deal-making activities, not just in acquisitions but also in joint ventures, 
strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and spin-offs. Using compensation 
committee reports from 400 randomly selected deal-making firms and 400 randomly selected non-
deal-making firms, they document that performance-based justifications are mentioned 
significantly less often in the reports of deal-making firms. Instead, the boards of these companies 
cite their CEOs’ deal-making activities or leadership skills to explain their compensation decisions, 
implying that CEOs are rewarded, at least in part, on the basis of entering deals. In a sample of 
acquiring U.S. banks, Hagendoff and Vallascas (2011) show that CEOs with higher pay-risk 
sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers (as measured by the Merton distance to default 
measure). Their findings are driven by acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank 
deregulation had expanded banks’ risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the 
largest banks (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most 
from shifting risk to other stakeholders).  
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Finally, Yim (2012) demonstrates that acquisitions are accompanied by large, permanent 
increases in CEO compensation, creating strong financial incentives for CEOs to pursue 
acquisitions earlier in their career. Yim argues that young CEOs will be particularly motivated to 
pursue acquisitions when the anticipated financial benefits are large. She finds that the age effect 
on acquisition activity is stronger among firms where the CEO can expect a large compensation 
response to acquisitions, and where the CEO has the power to favorably influence post-acquisition 
compensation. 
Turning to target firm CEOs, Heitzman (2011) investigates the determinants and 
consequences of granting equity to the target’s CEO during deal negotiations in a sample of 
completed deals. These negotiation grants likely reflect information about the acquisition, benefit 
from the deal premium, and provide more timely bargaining incentives. Heitzman finds that CEOs 
are more likely to receive equity during negotiations to persuade them to negotiate effectively for 
the target, particularly when the target has more bargaining power. This suggests that boards use 
equity to enhance bargaining incentives for CEOs with the most influence over deal price. He finds 
no evidence that they have material adverse effects on shareholders. 
EX POST EFFORT MEASUREMENT  
Ex ante compensation design models are incomplete without examining how shareholders 
actually measure output ex post and revise executive compensation based on the level of effort 
they believe the manager has expended. Examining how the level and structure of compensation 
changes following performance is a larger topic, so I will only briefly touch on these papers here, 
discussing this stream of research further in the last section. With a few exceptions, most of them 
are purely empirical.  
As an example of these papers, Matsunaga and Park (2001) examine the effects of missing 
quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEO’s annual bonus. They find that CEO annual cash 
bonuses significantly decline when the firm’s quarterly earnings fall short of the consensus analyst 
forecast or the earnings for the same quarter of the prior year, for at least two quarters during the 
year, suggesting that the firms punish managers who do not expend effort. However, firms can 
also adjust compensation upwards if the executive has expended effort but the firm has not 
performed well for reasons beyond the executives’ control. As an example, Chidambaram and 
Prabhala (2003) examine firms that reprice their executive stock options.  
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Firms typically offer two major explanations for repricing. One is that deep-out-of-the-
money options no longer provide any meaningful incentives to executives (Hall and Murphy, 
2000), so it is necessary to revise the strike price downward. A second argument, especially cited 
by high-technology companies, is that repricing is needed to retain key executives. Executives will 
leave if options are so underwater that they are no longer a material part of the compensation 
contract. Chidambaram and Prabhala find that repricing firms tend to be smaller, younger, rapidly 
growing firms that experience a sudden deep shock to growth and profitability. They are also more 
concentrated in the technology, trade, and service sectors and have smaller boards of directors, 
appearing to suggest that the principals also do not punish managers who perform poorly for 
reasons outside their control. Interestingly, repricers have abnormally high CEO turnover rates, 
implying that despite the repricing, they do not appear to be able to retain executives. 
From a theoretical perspective, Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) show that repricing 
does not always weaken managerial incentives ex ante. In their model, interim information 
becomes available on the state of the world after the initial compensation contract is set. Will it be 
optimal for the principal to agree to amend the original contract to reflect the new information? 
The tradeoff is that the ability of the principal to renegotiate ex post can have a negative impact on 
the initial effort of the manager. However, it allows the principal a greater ability to influence 
continuation outcomes. Acharya, John and Sundaram find that allowing some resetting is almost 
always optimal. The relative advantages of resetting diminish with greater ability of managers to 
influence the resetting process, greater relative importance of external factors on stock 
performance, and lower costs of replacing incumbent managers. 
Another interesting question that has been investigated is who does the actual monitoring 
of managerial effort. Mobbs (2013) examines board monitoring when a credible CEO replacement 
is on the board. Inside directors whose talents are in greater demand externally, as reflected by 
their holding outside directorships, are more likely to become CEOs, and their presence is 
associated with greater forced CEO turnover sensitivity to accounting performance and CEO 
compensation sensitivity to stock performance. Mobbs argues that certain insiders strengthen 
board monitoring by serving as readily available CEO replacements and contradicts the 
presumption that all insiders are under CEO control. Andres, Fernau, and Theissen (2014) 
investigate the opposite issue – whether former CEOs serve as monitors. In the German two-tiered 
system of corporate governance, it is not uncommon for CEOs to become the chairman of the 
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supervisory board of the same firm upon retirement. As a member of the supervisory board, the 
former CEO must monitor his successor and former colleagues and is involved in setting their pay. 
Andres, Fernau, and Theissen analyze a panel covering 150 listed firms over a 10-year period and 
find that firms in which a former CEO serves on the supervisory board pay their executives more, 
consistent with a leniency bias. 
What happens if firms do not monitor? There are some consequences but they do not appear 
extremely significant. Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber (2012) study whether outside directors are held 
accountable for poor monitoring of executive compensation by examining the reputation penalties 
to directors of firms involved in the option back-dating (BD) scandal of 2006-2007. They find that, 
at firms involved in back-dating, significant penalties accrued to compensation committee 
members (particularly those who served during the BD period), both in terms of votes withheld 
when up for election and in terms of turnover, especially in more severe cases of BD. Interestingly, 
however, directors of back-dating firms did not suffer similar penalties when they sat on boards at 
non-back-dating firms, raising the question of whether reputation penalties for poor oversight of 
executive pay are large enough to affect the ex-ante incentives of directors.  
EXECUTIVE PERCEPTIONS OF COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
The next strand of papers analyze how executives value the compensation schemes 
provided to them by principals. It argues that though compensation, in particular options, may 
indeed be awarded to incentivize managers to work hard, in practice, undiversified executives 
value these options at much lower values than the equivalent Black-Scholes or market value the 
options cost the firm.  
Feltham and Wu (2001) argue, for example, that there is a sharp distinction between the 
market value of options and the incentive value of options in contracts that use market price as the 
performance measure. They use two models to examine the relative cost to investors of using stock 
versus options to induce a given level of effort by a risk and effort averse manager. They show 
that if the manager’s effort has little or no effect on a firm’s operating risk, then the cost of 
incentive risk is less using stock rather than options. However, this result is reversed if the 
manager’s effort has a significant impact on the firm’s operating risk.  
Muelbroek (2001) also argues that, to properly align incentives using equity-linked 
compensation, the firm’s managers must be exposed to firm-specific risks, but this concentrated 
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exposure prevents optimal portfolio diversification. Because undiversified managers are exposed 
to the firm’s total risk, but rewarded (through expected returns) for only the systematic portion of 
that risk, managers will value stock or option-based compensation at less than its market value. 
Empirically, she derives a method to measure this deadweight cost, which she shows can be quite 
large: managers at the average NYSE firm who have their entire wealth invested in the firm value 
their options at 70% of their market value, while undiversified managers at rapidly growing, 
entrepreneurially-based firms, such as Internet-based firms, value their option-based compensation 
at only 53% of its cost to the firm. Her estimates prompt questions of whether compensation plans 
in such firms are weighted too heavily towards incentive-alignment to be cost effective. Similarly, 
Hall and Murphy (2002) employ a certainty-equivalence framework to analyze the cost, value, and 
PPS of non-tradable options held by undiversified, risk-averse executives. They derive “executive 
value” lines, which they term as risk-adjusted analogues to Black-Scholes values and show a sharp 
distinction between “executive value” and “company cost”. Murphy (2002) also argues that firms 
perceive options as inexpensive ways to compensate managers. Till 2005, options could be granted 
without any cash outlay and without incurring an accounting charge. However, though the market 
value of option grants is disclosed in footnotes, Murphy argues that managers are fixated on the 
accounting consequences of alternative compensation practices and hence perceive granting 
options as a cheap form of compensation. 
Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005) use a large database on Employee Stock Option (ESO) 
exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility-based model for 
measuring how differences in exercise behavior affect option values and incentives. They then 
compare option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations to those computed 
from models used to value tradable options. Consistent with prior research, they show that the 
subjective values of the options are uniformly lower than the corresponding objective values and 
that the difference is increasing in stock-price volatility. Early exercise of employee stock options 
is widespread with exercise occurring a little over two years subsequent to vesting and more than 
four years prior to expiration on average. However, while early exercise is common, it is not 
uniform. Options are exercised earlier in firms with higher dividend yields, high stock price 
volatility, and following unexpected stock price run-ups. They argue that their results are 
consistent with parameterizations of utility maximizing models of exercise behavior, which predict 
that a risk-averse employee, for diversification purposes, will exercise their options earlier the 
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greater the volatility of the underlying stock-price. Although employees forgo a substantial amount 
of option life due to early exercise, options tend to be deep in the money when exercised. Thus, 
conditional on exercise, executives appear to capture a large fraction of the remaining Black-
Scholes option value. 
Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibrate the standard principal-agent model with constant 
relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U.S. CEOs. Their model 
predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have lower base 
salaries and receive additional shares in their companies. These contracts would reduce average 
compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility to CEOs. 
They conclude that the standard principal-agent model typically used in the literature cannot 
rationalize observed contracts.  
 
RENT EXTRACTION 
 
The rent extraction approach argues that managers seek rents and hence earn compensation 
that is unrelated to (or even negatively related to) shareholder value. This field of research started 
developing in the mid-1990s. Prior to that period, most papers came down in favor of 
compensation being designed to reduce agency conflicts. For example, Lewellen, Loderer, and 
Martin (1987) empirically investigate whether corporate executive pay packages reduce agency 
costs between shareholders and managers. While the sample size is small, consisting of the five 
highest-paid executives in each of 49 large American manufacturing companies over the period 
from 1964 – 1973, this paper represents one of the first rigorous investigations into executive 
compensation and hence has been heavily cited in the subsequent literature. Lewellen, Loderer, 
and Martin show that the components of senior executive pay vary systematically across firms in 
a manner consistent with firms controlling for limited horizon and risk exposure problems.  
However, in the mid-1990s, a number of papers argued that because of the level of 
information they control regarding their own performance, managers have an outsize ability to 
manipulate their own pay. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) argue that there are several reasons 
to expect firms not to follow optimal compensation practices. For example, managers have 
considerable influence over the director appointment process. The CEO often formally serves on 
the nomination committee for the board. Even when the CEO does not sit on the nominating 
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committee, he still retains influence on the nomination process, potentially using his power and 
influence to encourage the appointment (and reappointment) of independent directors who are not 
likely to challenge his compensation. Similarly, apart from unusual circumstances when the board 
needs to fire the CEO and hire a suitable replacement, directors are expected to support the CEO. 
Those who cannot do so in good faith are expected to step down. Board meetings and processes 
are characterized by an emphasis on courtesy, politeness, and deference to the CEO. This also 
implies that independent directors are typically unlikely to confront an effective CEO regarding 
his pay and perquisites. They may believe for example, that their effort and scrutiny are better 
focused on policy matters, or believe that they are not as knowledgeable about compensation issues 
as the management or the compensation consultant. Social dynamics also play a role in reducing 
objections to executive compensation programs. For example, compensation committee chairmen 
who are appointed after the CEO takes office tend to reciprocate by awarding higher CEO 
compensation.  
There are several channels through which executives can affect their own pay. Linking to 
the previous sections, managers can affect the broad level of pay, they can change the sensitivity 
of pay under certain circumstances, they can change the timing of pay, they can pay themselves to 
undertake particular corporate events, or they can ask for compensation not to engage in particular 
types of opportunistic activities. I will discuss each in turn in this section.  
First, managers can affect the broad level of pay. Under the optimal contracting approach, 
pay is set by a board of directors that aims to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the rent 
extraction approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm’s length in devising executive 
compensation arrangements but because executives have power to influence their own pay, they 
use that power to extract rents. In trying to camouflage this rent extraction activity, they sometimes 
choose inefficient but opaque pay arrangements that have the potential to reduce shareholder value.  
In one of the earliest and most heavily cited papers in this area, Yermack (1995) analyzes 
stock option awards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a 
Black-Scholes approach, he tests whether stock option performance incentives are associated with 
explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. He also examines whether the mix of 
compensation between stock options and cash pay can be explained by factors such as corporate 
liquidity, tax status, or earnings management. He finds some (limited) evidence that firms use 
option awards optimally. Specifically, firms in highly regulated industries are less likely to use 
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stock options, firms are more likely to provide stock incentives when accounting returns are noisy 
(making managers difficult to monitor), and firms facing internal liquidity problems shift the mix 
of pay away from cash salaries to options. However, stock option incentives are not reduced when 
CEOs hold large fractions of firm equity, stock options are not used for CEOs nearing retirement 
to motivate them to maintain high levels of investment, and option incentives are not higher in 
firms with growth opportunities. Overall, Yermack concludes that by and large, CEOs have a 
considerable degree of power in setting their own levels of pay.   
Combs and Skill (2003) test the rent extraction against the optimal contracting approach 
by examining a sample of key executives (CEOs, presidents and board chairs) who die unexpected 
deaths (the result of a plane crash or heart attack, for example). They eliminate observations in 
which shareholders could have predicted the death (in which the obituary contained wording such 
as “after a brief illness,” or “cancer”). The idea is that if a powerful CEO is entrenched and can 
exercise power in setting his own compensation, the CEO’s unexpected death means that 
shareholders have the opportunity of replacing the CEO with a lower-cost non-entrenched CEO 
and hence, share prices should rise. They find some evidence of the managerial power approach – 
when more powerful (and better paid CEOs) die unexpectedly, the firm earns positive abnormal 
returns. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) build on the rent extraction argument by offering specific 
examples of mechanisms through which managers may be able to set their own pay. Examples of 
these mechanisms include the power-pay relationship between managers and shareholders, the use 
of compensation consultants, the use of stealth compensation which is difficult to understand, and 
the use of gratuitous use of golden parachutes and other goodbye payments to departing executives. 
They argue, for example, that managers have more power to affect their own pay when the board 
is relatively weak or ineffectual; there is no large outside shareholder; there are few institutional 
shareholders; or managers are protected by antitakeover arrangements. Examples of stealth 
compensation include option plans that fail to filter out windfalls due to industry and general 
market trends that are completely unrelated to managerial performance, setting option exercise 
prices at the money rather than out-of-the-money, and allowing managers freedom to unwind 
equity incentives.  
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find empirical evidence consistent with the Bebchuk 
and Fried conjectures. They examine whether the level of CEO compensation is related to the 
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quality of the firm’s corporate governance. The answer is yes. Both board characteristics and 
ownership structure appear related to the level of CEO compensation, after controlling for standard 
economic determinants of the level of CEO compensation, including proxies for the firm’s demand 
for a high-quality CEO, contemporaneous firm performance, and firm risk. For example, CEO 
compensation is higher when the CEO is also the board chair, the board is larger, and when outside 
directors are appointed by the CEO. CEO compensation is also higher when outside directors are 
older and serve on more than three other boards. CEO compensation declines when the CEO’s 
ownership stake goes up and when there is an external blockholder (who owns at least 5% of the 
equity) present. They argue that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency 
problems and that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation. 
Second, managers can change the sensitivity of their pay to firm outcomes under certain 
circumstances, for example, when firm outcomes are poor. Gaver and Gaver (1998) examine the 
role of alternative earnings components in the CEO cash compensation function. They find that 
cash compensation is significantly positively related to above the line earnings, as long as the 
results are positive. Compensation is shielded from the effects of above the line losses. Similarly, 
non-recurring transactions that increase income flow through to compensation, but non-recurring 
losses do not. They find this effect for gains and losses that arise both from extraordinary 
transactions, discontinued operations, and non-recurring items that do not qualify for below the 
line presentation. In all these cases, gains appear to flow through to compensation, but losses do 
not. The classification of the gain or loss on the income statement is of relatively little importance. 
Similarly, Garvey and Milbourn (2006) argue that managers have incentives to emphasize 
benchmarking against market movements only when the benchmark is down. They find 
significantly less pay for (bad) luck (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than 
when it is up. The effect is stronger when corporate governance is weaker. In addition, executives 
switch between fixed-number and fixed value option grants when the market is up. Fixed-number 
granting policies give an executive the same number of options every year. Thus, if the stock price 
goes up, the executive receives a more valuable grant as well as a capital gain on her outstanding 
options. This granting policy automatically strengthens pay for luck. But since executives prefer 
weaker pay for luck when luck turns out to be bad, they switch to fixed-value policies when luck 
is bad. Fixed-value option granting policies increase the number of options granted when the stock 
price has fallen in an attempt to maintain the total value of the grant. The usual justification made 
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by the firms is to reduce the prospect of unwanted turnover. Garvey and Milbourn argue that 
compensation seems more concerned about retention risk when luck is bad than with overpayment 
risk when luck is good.  
Third, they can time their compensation to fortuitous moments. Bebchuk, Grinstein, and 
Peyer (2010) study the relation between opportunistic timing of option grants and corporate 
governance failures, focusing on “lucky” grants awarded at the lowest price of the grant month. 
They find that opportunistic timing is correlated with managerial power, occurring more frequently 
when there is a lack of a majority of independent directors or when there is a long-serving CEO. 
They find that grants to independent directors also appear to be opportunistically timed and that 
lucky grants to independent directors are associated with more CEO compensation. This timing is 
not a by-product of simultaneous awards to executives or of firms’ routinely timing all option 
grants; and CEO compensation. Finally, rather than being a substitute for other forms of 
compensation, gains from opportunistic timing are awarded to CEOs with larger total 
compensation from other sources.  
Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) go further. They argue that executives have incentives to time 
their communications of inside information to the market during the period just prior to the date 
of their stock-option grant so as to reduce the exercise price of their options. Specifically, by 
releasing bad news before the grant date, they benefit from temporary stock price decreases before 
the grant date and by stock price increases after the grant date. They find a statistically significant 
abnormal decrease in stock prices during the 10-day period immediately preceding the grant date 
in a sample of CEOs. It is important to note that the bad news has to be transitory in that executives 
do not have an incentive to permanently decrease the stock price or to harm the firm’s reputation 
in the long-term. However, it is not clear how executives can manage this balancing act of releasing 
bad news which is purely transitory, so I would view these results as indicative, not conclusive.  
Similarly, Devos, Elliott, and Warr (2015) argue that firms time stock option grants to 
occur on or before stock split announcement dates. This is beneficial for the CEO since stock split 
announcements usually generate positive abnormal returns. In their sample, 80% of CEO stock 
option grants are timed to occur on or before the split announcement date. They also find 
significantly higher levels of insider selling immediately after compared to before the split 
announcement and the opposite effect for stock buying activity by CEOs. The overall amount of 
trading around splits is four times greater than the trading in the prior year for the same calendar 
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time period. Together with the granting behavior, Devos, Elliott, and Warr (2015) interpret this 
evidence as consistent with the hypothesis that, on average, CEOs behave opportunistically around 
the announcement of stock splits. 
Fourth, they can simply lie about when the compensation was awarded. Executive options 
are usually granted at-the-money, i.e., the exercise price of the options is set to equal the market 
price of the underlying stock on the grant date.  Because the option value is higher if the exercise 
price is lower, executives prefer to be granted options when the stock price is at its lowest.  
Backdating the option date before the actual award date allows executives to choose a past date 
when the market price was particularly low, thereby inflating the value of the options. Yermack 
(1997) first documented that stock prices tend to increase shortly after option grants to CEOs.  As 
in the third case above, he attributed this pattern to grant timing, whereby executives would be 
granted options before predicted price increases. Lie (2005) showed that back-dating was 
considerably more prevalent than documented by Yermack. Moreover, the overall stock market 
performed worse than normal immediately before the grants and better than normal immediately 
after the grants. Unless corporate insiders can predict short-term movements in the entire stock 
market, Lie’s results argued more in support of the back-dating explanation than the opportunistic 
grant explanation. Heron and Lie (2007) took advantage of an SEC requirement in August of 2002 
that option grants must be reported within two business days to examine the stock price pattern 
around employee option grants. Because this regulation places strong restrictions on when grants 
must be reported, if backdating explains the stock price pattern around option grants, the price 
pattern should diminish following the new regulation. Heron and Lie find that the stock price 
pattern becomes much weaker after the new reporting regulation took effect, significant evidence 
that backdating explains most of the prior price patterns around option grants. 
Fifth, CEOs can behave opportunistically when faced with significant corporate events. In 
an earlier section, I noted that firms provide incentives to executives to persuade them to undertake 
particular events such as acquisitions. Executives can also extract rents either after resisting events 
that hurt them but benefit shareholders, or they can extract rents during the process of carrying out 
the events. For example, as I note earlier, acquisitions are usually accompanied by a degree of 
target manager turnover, and hence managers either try to resist the takeover or extract rents during 
the process. Heitzman (2011) for example, finds that CEOs are likely to receive equity incentives 
to negotiate for the target in a sample of completed acquisitions. But can CEOs prevent a firm 
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from receiving an offer in the first place? Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) argue that 
they can. They examine managerial incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments 
(ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. They document that antitakeover 
measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable 
option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
this difference increases following ATA adoption.  
Similarly, once a merger announcement is made, CEOs have incentives to negotiate for 
themselves instead of for the firm. Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) study benefits received by 
target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. They document that certain target CEOs 
negotiate large cash payments in the form of special bonuses or increased golden parachutes. These 
negotiated cash payments are positively associated with the CEO’s prior excess compensation and 
negatively associated with the likelihood that the CEO becomes an executive of the acquiring 
company. Target shareholders receive lower acquisition premiums in transactions involving 
extraordinary personal treatment of the CEO.  
Acquirer CEOs can also undertake mergers to obtain personal benefits of control, for 
example, through empire-building, instead of maximizing shareholder value. Wright, Kroll, and 
Elenkov (2002) argue that in firms with vigilant monitors (characterized by the presence of a larger 
number of analysts following the firm, high institutional ownership and high independence of 
board members), the returns earned by the acquiring firm in an acquisition will explain changes in 
CEO compensation. In firms with passive monitors, increased corporate size (proxied by sales) 
due to an acquisition will explain compensation changes. They find evidence of both rent-seeking 
and empire-building in a sample of acquisitions over the 1993-1998 period. 
Finally, rents can also be extracted by managers to compensate them for not indulging in 
certain activities. One example is insider trading. Roulstone (2003) investigates how executive 
compensation is affected by the presence of firm-level insider-trading restrictions. Using a trading-
window proxy for the existence of such restrictions, he argues that insiders will demand 
compensation for these restrictions and that firms will need to increase incentives to restricted 
insiders. He finds that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation 
relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. 
Furthermore, these firms use more incentive-based compensation and their insiders hold larger 
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equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. Denis and Xu (2013) extend 
this result to an international context. They analyze levels of top executive compensation and the 
use of equity-based incentives for a broad set of executives at U.S. and non-U.S. firms based in 41 
different countries. For the foreign firms, they restrict their sample to firms with American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) in 2006, because these firms are required to file Form 20-F with the 
SEC, providing them with standardized compensation data at the firm level for all the sample 
firms. Denis and Xu find that the use of equity incentives is significantly greater in countries with 
stronger insider trading restrictions, and these higher incentives are associated with higher total 
pay. They also find significant increases in top executive pay and the use of equity-based incentives 
in the period immediately following the initial enforcement of insider trading laws.  
 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
 
Now that we have discussed the purposes which pay is supposed to address, we need to 
discuss how pay is actually structured. I begin by discussing the structure of executive 
compensation both in the US and across the world. There are several components to executive pay. 
The first component is composed of incentives that are paid to executives while they continue to 
work for the firm. This set comprises cash salaries, bonuses typically awarded and paid out within 
the same year, incentive grants, and perquisites. Bonuses are generally paid in cash, but some are 
also paid in company stock. The second component is composed of pay that is granted to the 
executives when they retire, typically consisting of deferred compensation and pension plans. The 
final component is composed of pay that is granted to executives when their contracts are severed 
before retirement age. This overall structure has remained constant over time though the 
importance of each type of component has waxed and waned over time. 
 
THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF COMPENSATION 
 
Frydman and Saks (2010) provide the first comprehensive documentation of the long-run 
trends in executive compensation. Since its inception in 1934, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has required public corporations to disclose the compensation of their top 
executives in 10-K reports and proxy statements. From these filings, Frydman and Saks construct 
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a panel dataset of top officer compensation at the fifty largest firms (ranked in 1940, 1960 and 
1990) from 1936 to 2005.  
Frydman and Saks (2010) document that firms did not appear to use long term bonuses in 
any significant manner till the mid-1950s. The main components of compensation before this 
period were salaries and current bonuses. Long-term bonuses, usually based on the firm’s profits 
with payments in either cash or stock over a certain number of years, became significant in the 
1960s. Stock options were almost never used until the 1950s when restricted stock options were 
introduced following a reform of tax legislation. Since income tax rates were extremely high at the 
time, this had an immediate impact on compensation structure. More than 40% of the firms 
analyzed by Frydman and Saks (2010) introduced restricted stock option plans in the five years 
after this reform. However, grants were relatively infrequent and only increased in significance for 
total compensation in the 1980s. Frydman and Saks also analyze pay to a wide group of top 
executives apart from the CEO and show that the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation to the 
average pay of the other two highest-rated officers of the firm was about 1.4 prior to 1980. This 
ratio has risen from the 1980s to the 2000’s.  
Though the structure of CEO pay was changing over time, the level of pay was still 
relatively flat. As noted earlier, Jensen and Murphy (1990a) argued that top executives in the 1980s 
were not receiving record salaries and bonuses. While cash compensation had increased over the 
prior fifteen years, CEO levels were approximately the same as they were 50 years ago. In addition, 
annual changes in executive compensation did not appear to reflect changes in corporate 
performance.  
The situation changed dramatically after the 1990s. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) analyze 
the growth of US executive pay after the Jensen and Murphy paper, during the period 1993 - 2003. 
They use Execucomp large sample data to document that over this period, pay grew significantly 
faster than the increase that could be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry 
classification. They show that, had the relationship of compensation to size, performance, and 
industry classification remained the same in 2003 as it was in 1993, mean compensation in 2003 
would have been only about half of its actual size. They also show that during the 1993 - 2003 
period, equity-based compensation increased considerably in both new-economy and old-economy 
firms, but equity based compensation did not substitute for a reduction in non-equity 
compensation. The aggregate compensation paid by public companies to their top-five executives 
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during the considered period added up to about $350 billion, and the ratio of this aggregate top-
five compensation to the aggregate earnings of these firms increased from 5 per cent in 1993-1995 
to about 10 per cent in 2001-2003. Kaplan (2008) documents that US CEO compensation increased 
from approximately one hundred times the median household income in 1993 to more than two 
hundred times the median household income in 2006. 
 What accounts for the dramatic increase in executive compensation in the 1990s? Bebchuk 
and Grinstein do not come to any conclusions but suggest several possible explanations. Examples 
of these explanations were the effect of the bull market on market price of executives, increases in 
executive mobility and turnover, increased option use and board confusion on the economic value 
of options, changes in entrenchment levels, and changes in other governance factors. None of these 
explanations seem very satisfactory in explaining the apparently permanent increase in CEO pay 
levels. 
Conyon (2014) documents a more recent evolution in the patterns of US executive 
compensation and governance. While the focus of his paper is whether independent compensation 
committees and boards affects CEO compensation, in table 1 of his paper, he does document the 
level and structure of executive compensation in 2012. He finds that executive pay contracts 
contain significant equity incentives. Incentives account for approximately a quarter of total CEO 
compensation and this issue is approximately constant across the firms he studies. The majority of 
CEO incentive compensation comes in the form of stock options and restricted stock, accounting 
for nearly half of total incentives. While stock options remain an important part of executive pay, 
the use of restricted stock has become more important in the past few years.  
How do these different forms of compensation tie to the theoretical motivations discussed 
in the first section? As discussed previously, standard principal – agent theory (Hölmstrom, 1979) 
predicts that the ability of the principal (board or shareholders) to observe the manager’s efforts 
influences the type of compensation paid. If the manager’s efforts are easily observed and 
verifiable, the optimal contract pays a manager a fixed salary and charges her for sub-optimal 
behavior. In contrast, if the manager’s actions are unobservable, then the principal needs to link 
the manager’s wealth to productive outcomes such as the value of the firm. One of the easiest ways 
to do this is by the use of options and restricted stock. 
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INCENTIVE PLANS: OPTIONS AND RESTRICTED STOCK 
 
How are options and restricted stock used by firms to compensate managers? Kole (1997) 
was one of the first papers to examine the variation in the types and terms of compensation 
contracts in a sample of 371 of the Fortune 500 firms in 1980. She compiled information from 
annual proxy statements and compensation plan registration statements to document the 
availability and terms of awards for stock option plans, stock appreciation rights plans, restricted 
stock arrangements and long-term performance plans at the time. Stock options plans were usually 
staggered plans, typically vesting after a minimum period of 12 months and only a proportion 
available for exercise in equal installments over the next few years. Boards sometimes awarded 
stock appreciation rights (SARs) together with option grants. The tandem SAR enabled a manager 
to earn the appreciation on the underlying stock as an alternative to buying and then selling the 
share, costlessly converting an in-the-money option into cash equal to the market price of the share 
less the option’s exercise price. Restricted stock awards gave managers a fixed quantity of shares 
with restrictions on resale or transfer. They also typically incorporated a forfeiture clause that 
invalidated the award if the executive quit or was fired before the restriction period lapsed. The 
restriction lapsed for some fraction of an award after a minimum period of employment and the 
remainder of that award was vested in accordance with a predetermined schedule. In general, 
restricted stock conveyed all the privileges of ownership, including dividends and voting rights 
from the time of the award until executive sold the shares. Finally, long–term performance plans 
set performance goals, usually in terms of accounting measures such as the growth in earnings-
per-share over a specified horizon (usually from 3 to 5 years). If the performance objectives were 
met, the earned awards were distributed in cash, equity, or a combination of the two. Performance 
plans paid in equity were different from performance plans paid in cash. Like equity awards, 
performance share plans tied the executive’s award to the appreciation of the firm’s share price 
over a specified period. In contrast, performance cash plans granted fixed awards that do not vary 
with the stock price.  
Kole uses a cross-sectional examination of shareholder-authorized compensation 
arrangements to show that the terms of stock option and restricted stock plans, and the flexibility 
afforded the board of directors in negotiating with managers, vary systematically with the 
characteristics of the assets being managed. For example, the market-to-book ratio of the firm is a 
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significant predictor of stock option plans while the R&D-to-book ratio predicts incidence of 
restricted stock arrangements. Controlling for firm size, if the founding family participates in 
management, it significantly reduces the likelihood of establishing most types of equity awarding 
plans. Kole interprets this as due either to the fact that there is less formal or explicit contracting 
in family firms or because there is less reliance on equity compensation in family farms due to the 
already high level of management stock ownership. However, the level of managerial ownership 
per se has little effect on the availability of plans. Finally, Kole documents that firms that are 
larger, more diversified, and more research intensive usually build at least some flexibility into the 
process of contracting on executive pay. For example, although most remuneration plans direct 
boards to identify and reward key decision-makers, the assessment of which employee is key and 
how much to reward each key employee is ultimately made by the board. Similarly, within a given 
menu of approved plans, the actual composition of the package is decided by the board. Finally, 
at the time of grant, the board holds decision rights over the actual terms of the equity awards. The 
benefits of this flexibility are higher for research intensive firms when new parts are continually 
evolving from developmental to market stages. It is less important in routine businesses where 
activities do not vary much over time. Most of the broad features of these compensation plans are 
still valid today though specific details have changed. 
One example of a specific compensation component that has changed is the term over 
which options are vested. These are contractual provisions that, as Cadman, Rusticus, and Sunder 
(2013) show, appear to be shaped by accounting standards and other economic factors. Their paper 
examines the effect of accounting standards, specifically the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards SFAS 123(R), on the vesting terms of stock option grants. This statement applied to all 
fiscal years starting June 2005 and required firms to expense the fair value of option grants over 
their vesting periods. In addition, firms are required to amortize the fair value of a cliff vested grant 
equally over the vesting period, creating a wedge between when the option expense is recognized 
and when it is available to be exercised. For example, the firm must expense 50% of the option 
grant annually if the option vests at the end of two years which is identical to the expense 
recognition of a grant that vests annually over two years. In this case, a switch from cliff-vesting 
options to equally vesting options better aligns the vesting pattern with the expense recognition. 
Similarly, longer vesting terms can benefit firms with significant growth opportunities and 
considerable information asymmetry between managers and shareholders by extending the life of 
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equity incentives and investment horizons of the managers. However, CEOs typically prefer 
shorter vesting terms because of forfeiture risk in case of early departure, in addition to equity and 
liquidity risk. 
Cadman, Rusticus and Sunder document significant variation in stock option grant vesting 
periods and patterns, suggesting that boards actively choose vesting terms, rather than adopting 
boilerplate terms. Consistent with financial reporting incentives influencing contract design, they 
find that firms simultaneously lengthen vesting periods and alter vesting patterns after the adoption 
of SFAS 123(R). In particular, firms that grant cliff-vesting options before the adoption of SFAS 
123(R) respond most significantly to mandated option expense recognition by extending vesting 
times and simultaneously switching equal vesting patterns. The changes in vesting patterns are 
consistent with firms trying to defer recognition of the option expense, while limiting the 
incremental risk imposed on the CEO. Vesting schedules are also longer in growth firms where 
lengthening the executive’s investment horizon is more important. Firms with more powerful 
CEOs and weaker governance grant options with shorter vesting periods. 
Thanks to the annual payment of options, executives end up with a range of options that 
are exercisable at different points in time. What is the overall level of incentives that the executive 
is given? To answer this question, Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2014) develop a measure 
of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby 
quantifying the extent to which compensation is short-term. This measure, similar to the duration 
measure for bonds, is computed as the weighted average of the vesting periods of the different 
components of executive pay. The weight of each component is a fraction of that component in 
the executive’s total compensation package. The authors find, similar to prior research, that the 
vesting periods of both stock and option grants range between 3 to 5 years, and vest over time 
rather than cliff-vesting. They document, however, that there is a significant correlation between 
pay duration and firm characteristics. For example, executive pay duration is correlated with 
project and asset duration - industries with longer duration projects (such as defense and utilities) 
offer longer duration pay. Overall, pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, 
more long-term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. 
Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings-increasing accruals.  
 The executive stock option plans described above involve the grant of plain vanilla call 
options on the firm’s stock with the strike price set equal to the stock price on the grant date and a 
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typical maturity of 10 years (as described in Murphy, 1999). However, firms are increasingly 
granting non-traditional executive options that differ from traditional options in one or more ways. 
Are these options likely to create increased value for shareholders? Johnson and Tian (2000) 
examine the value and incentive effects of six non-traditional option plans: premium options, 
performance-vested options, repriceable options, purchased options, reload options, and indexed 
options. In a premium option, the strike price is set so that the option is out of the money when 
granted. Performance–vested options are not exercisable unless the stock price rises to a specified 
level, usually well above the stock price on the grant date. Repriceable options are similar to vanilla 
options except that their strike prices can be reset to lower levels if the stock price falls. The 
executive pays a specified fraction of a purchased option’s strike price when the option is granted. 
The executive exercises the purchase option by paying the remainder of the strike price. If the 
executive fails to exercise, the pre-paid fraction is forfeited. The executive can exercise a reload 
option by paying the strike price with shares he or she already owns and then receiving new options 
granted to replace the exercised options. Finally, the strike price of an indexed option moves with 
a predefined benchmark such as an industry or a market-wide stock index. Johnson and Tian find 
that these variations differ significantly in their values and incentives provided. With reasonable 
parameter values, four options have lower value than a traditional option when granted. Holding 
option value constant, five (indexed, premium, purchased, performance-vested and reload) options 
create stronger incentives than traditional options to increase stock price, five (indexed, premium, 
performance-vested, repriceable, and reload) create stronger incentives to increase risk, and three 
(premium, purchased, and performance-vested) create stronger incentives to reduce dividend yield.  
 Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2013) focus in particular on one type of non-traditional option 
plan: index options. Index options differ from vanilla options in three ways. The underlying asset 
in an indexed option has a lower volatility and a lower drift rate and indexing increases the strike 
price of the option. The first effect generates benefits of sharing and improves incentives because 
reducing volatility reduces the probability that in-the-money options expire out-of-the-money and 
therefore increases the options delta. The other two effects reduce incentives because they raise 
the performance benchmark. Overall, the paper finds that the benefits from indexing the strike 
price of options are small, and fully indexing all options would increase compensation costs by 
50% for most firms. Hence, the relative lack of use of index options in compensation plans may 
not be inefficient from the standpoint of increasing shareholder value. 
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Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) study another type of non-traditional option: 
repriceable options. Although executive stock options are typically issued with fixed terms, firms 
sometimes reset the terms of these previously issued options. As discussed earlier, firms typically 
claim that repricing is necessary to prevent the flight of talented executives following a drop in the 
stock price. The authors quantify the valuation effect of resetting, specifically, the impact on the 
value of the option of the possibility of the terms of the option are reset during the option’s life. In 
a sample of over 30,000 person-year observations between 1992-1995 (gathered from 
Execucomp), they find the vast majority of options are reset at-the-money, resulting, on average, 
in the strike price dropping 40%. Only two of the 806 reset options in their sample had their strike 
prices raised from their original levels; all the remaining 804 had their strike prices lowered. Their 
valuation model suggests that resetting has only a small impact on the ex-ante value of an option 
award, but the ex-post gain can be substantial. Overall, resetting has a strong negative relation with 
firm performance and firm size even after correcting for industry performance. Brenner, 
Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) note however, that while resetting appears to be a windfall for 
poorly performing managers, they find little evidence that proxies for agency costs explain why 
resetting occurs.  
Finally, Li and Wang (2016) document the increasing use of another type of incentive 
compensation package that is replacing the use of option grants. They find that the percentage of 
S&P 500 firms that adopt multi-year accounting-based performance (MAP) incentives has more 
than doubled from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008. The average annualized target payout from 
the plans is around $2.2 million, roughly twice the CEO’s base salary, exceeding the $1.67 million 
average target pay of traditional bonus plans. In recent years, they argue that the expected payouts 
from MAP incentives have exceeded those of option grants and have become the most significant 
component of CEO compensation for firms with MAP incentives. MAP contracts evaluate 
managers based on sets of pre-determined accounting-based targets over multi-year performance 
periods (generally three years), with no payment being made if the manager fails to achieve the 
minimum performance criteria. The performance criteria can be based on earnings, sales, cash 
flows, or efficiency measures like economic value added (EVA). About 20% of the MAP plans 
documented in their sample use relative performance evaluation (RPE) to evaluate firm accounting 
performance against peer groups. The expected payout from MAP plans can be cash-based (about 
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42%), equity-based (55%), or both (3%), with companies increasingly granting equity-based MAP 
plans after 2002. 
What do stock option plans for non-executive employees look like? Core and Guay (2001) 
examine determinants of non-executive employee stock option holdings, grants, and exercises for 
a broad sample of 756 Execucomp firms during 1994-1997. Non-executive employees are defined 
as all employees other than the five most highly compensated executives identified in the proxy 
statements. They find that instead of just being paid to top management, options are also granted 
extensively to non-executive employees. On average, while the number of options outstanding to 
all employees is about 7% of shares outstanding, non-executive employees typically hold about 
two-thirds of these options. Firms that pay non-executives option incentives are firms with high-
growth opportunities and firms where human capital is important as a factor of production. Not 
surprisingly, these firms substitute stock option compensation for cash compensation when they 
face cash flow constraints and the costs of raising external capital are greater.  
 
SEVERANCE PAY 
 
Severance payouts are payouts made to executives when they leave the firm. These 
payouts, especially to those who have been fired from poorly performing firms, have typically 
attracted a great deal of attention in the popular press. However, from the point of view of academic 
research, the incidence and terms of ex ante severance agreements negotiated by executives and 
their relation with ex post payouts are more important topics than simply documenting egregious 
payouts to a set of poorly performing executives. 
A severance agreement is a contractual agreement between the executive and the company 
which specifies the executive’s benefits and obligations in the event that the executive leaves the 
firm. For executives, a breach of contract severance agreement specifies all benefits and payments 
(lump sum payments, bonuses, vesting of options, additional pension rights) to be made to an 
executive in the event the firm breaches the contract with the executive. Typically, breaches of 
contract occur when the firm terminates the executive without cause or the executive leaves for 
good reason. The common definition of “cause” is either failure to perform the designated duty or 
misconduct that hurts the firm. Voluntary terminations for “good reason” are also eligible for 
severance pay. “Good reason” usually includes a change of duty, diminution of pay, or relocation. 
43 
These contracts are sometimes referred to as golden handshakes though there is still a considerable 
lack of clarity as to the precise meaning of the term.  
Rau and Xu (2013) conduct the first large-scale cross-sectional analysis of severance pay 
contracts, documenting the incidence and terms of over 3,600 explicit severance contracts in 
equilibrium across the population of firms listed on Execucomp in 2004. They show that around 
68% of the firms list explicit severance contract terms with their executives. These severance 
contracts typically list up to three sets of benefits. The most common set of benefits are those 
related to explicit cash payments – describing the minimum and maximum number of years 
severance will be paid after the executive is terminated from the firm. Next is a set of benefits 
describing how long executives can continue to be covered by medical and life insurance after they 
are terminated. Least common is a set of benefits describing the payment of legal fees, 
outplacement, and other perks.   
What role does severance pay play in the overall compensation arrangement? As noted 
above, apart from the severance pay arrangement, the executive’s incentive contract typically 
contains both cash components (salary and bonus) and equity-based components (stock and 
options). As noted in the first section, the two primary incentives relevant for shareholders are 
incentives to increase the stock price (i.e., portfolio delta) and incentives to take risk (i.e., vega). 
Because the cash component of executive incentive contracts in the US is typically temporally 
invariant and unrelated to the evolution of the firm’s stock price, it is less likely to incentivize the 
CEO to increase the stock price. Severance pay complements the incentives provided by options 
in the optimal compensation contract. This is because the risk-taking incentives generated from 
the executive’s option holdings can be mitigated by the possibility of job termination when 
performance is poor. For example, when the adverse consequences from job termination are 
extremely large, the executive will not want to take on additional risk even with large option 
holdings. Therefore, severance pay should be used by the firm as a supplementary incentive device 
to motivate risk taking. 
Theoretically, Ross (2004) notes that a convex fee schedule (such as those provided by 
options) does not necessarily lead to lower risk aversion for managers. The overall effect of option 
compensation on executive risk aversion can be either negative or positive, resulting in either more 
or less risk taking. Since severance pay offers a payoff similar to a digital barrier put option, it is 
nonnegative, convex, and has a largely invariant payoff triggered by relatively low firm 
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performance, thereby inducing more risk taking. Similarly, Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2014) analyze 
firm incentives to grant severance pay to compensate for the prospects of job loss for the executive. 
Job termination can be triggered by poor firm performance under either internal shareholder 
pressure or external takeover activities. The threat of job termination is equivalent to a short 
position in a digital barrier put option that is concave in firm performance. The concavity in the 
implicit fee schedule reduces the executive’s incentives to take risk. In this context, termination 
costs are equivalent to negative severance pay. Contingent on the same triggering event (job 
termination), severance pay mitigates or overturns the concavity and increases the executive’s risk-
taking incentives. Admittedly, severance pay also reduces managerial incentives to exert effort, 
but these disincentives can be controlled through other compensation mechanisms such as stock 
ownership. Van Wesep and Wang (2014) argue that a combination of high performance targets 
and severance is optimal in that the high performance target can screen for good managers while 
severance can keep poor managers from taking negative NPV risks. 
Rau and Xu (2013) argue that the adverse consequence from job termination is especially 
large for younger executives because, once fired and without an established track record, it takes 
more time for younger executives to find another job with similar pay. Therefore, severance pay 
should be negatively related to executive age. Similarly, the likelihood of executive job termination 
should also play an important role in determining the grant of severance pay. Because severance 
pay aims at mitigating the adverse effects of the threat of job termination, a greater likelihood of 
termination (either through distress risk, an increase in takeover probability, or being employed at 
a firm with greater performance volatility) should lead to a higher incidence and magnitude of 
promised severance payments. Hence severance pay should be positively related to the distress 
risk, the ex ante takeover probability and the return volatility of the firm. Consistent with these 
hypotheses, they find that younger executives are more likely to receive explicit contracts and 
better terms. Firms with high distress risk, high takeover probability, and high return volatility are 
significantly more likely to enter into new or revised severance contracts.  
Yermack (2006b) examines golden handshakes, which he defines as ex post separation 
payments made when CEOs leave their firms.  In a sample of 179 exiting Fortune 500 CEOs, he 
finds that more than half pay and the mean separation package is worth $5.4 million. Crucially, 
the large majority of severance pay in Yermack’s sample is awarded on a discretionary basis by 
the board of directors and not according to terms of an employment agreement. CEOs who retire 
45 
voluntarily receive less severance than CEOs who are forced out, perhaps because the former 
obtain benefits from continued board service. This result is not unambiguous, however. Rau and 
Xu (2013) and Goldman and Lee (2015) also contrast the details of the ex ante severance contracts 
and the ex post separation pay given to S&P 500 chief executive officers (CEOs) upon departing 
from their companies, focusing on what determines whether or not a CEO receives separation pay 
in excess of the amount specified in the severance contract. Rau and Xu (2013) find evidence that 
the contracts are largely paid out as per the original contract terms and not renegotiated ex post by 
powerful managers. This result is also broadly consistent with Goldman and Huang (2015) who 
find that a majority of CEOs get severance pay in accordance with their severance contracts, 
though there are cases when CEOs earn pay significantly in excess of their contracts. Specifically, 
discretionary separation pay is given to about 40% of departing CEOs and is, on average, $8 
million, which amounts to close to 242% of a CEO’s annual compensation. Rau and Xu (2013) 
show that excess severance pay is typically granted to CEOs when the CEO leaves the firm 
following a period of poor general economic conditions. In other words, firms compensate CEOs 
for losses in ex ante contract amounts that are likely to be driven by factors that are largely out of 
the CEO’s control. Goldman and Huang also find that discretionary separation pay positively 
correlates with weak internal governance in cases of voluntary CEO turnover but not when the 
CEO is forced out. Discretionary pay is also higher when the CEO has a non-compete clause in 
her ex ante severance contract. 
A specific form of a breach of contract severance agreement is a contingent agreement that 
occurs within a limited time after a specific corporate event, typically a change in control (CIC) of 
the company. A change-in-control situation is typically specified in the severance agreement as a 
transfer of the firm’s ownership over a certain percentage, a merger or consolidation, a major 
change in board composition or the liquidation of the firm. Within a limited period (typically two 
or three years) after the change in control, an executive can leave the firm if the new firm breaches 
the contract with the executive, usually for the same reasons (good reason or without cause) as for 
the non-contingent agreement (double-trigger contracts). Some contingent contracts are however, 
single-triggered, with the executive receiving the benefits as soon as the change in control occurs, 
regardless of whether the executive’s contract is terminated. Both types of contingent contracts are 
sometimes called golden parachutes, though there is some ambiguity about the term.  
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There is mixed evidence on whether golden parachutes are associated with increases in 
shareholder value. While Lambert and Larcker (1985) document that the adoption of a golden 
parachute is associated with a significantly positive security market reaction, Lefanowicz, 
Robinson, and Smith (2000) show that the presence of a golden parachute reduces incentives of 
target firm managers to negotiate for higher acquisition gains in completed acquisitions. The most 
recent evidence is provided by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2014) who find that, in contrast to 
Lefanowic, Robinson, and Smith (2000), golden parachutes are associated with higher expected 
acquisition premiums. Also inconsistent with Lambert and Larcker (1985), they find that firms 
that adopt golden parachutes earn negative abnormal stock returns both during and subsequent to 
the period surrounding their adoption. Lambert and Larcker argue that golden parachutes are 
adopted when managers have private information of a high likelihood of acquisition. In contrast, 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang argue that golden parachutes change managerial incentives, making 
acquisitions more attractive to them. 
Offenberg and Officer (2014) note however, that golden parachutes do not comprise the 
totality of change-in-control payments. For the median CEO of firms listed in the S&P SmallCap 
600 index in 2009, they document that golden parachute payments are only 46% of total change-
in-control compensation. They also show that newly earned compensation (as opposed to 
accelerated vesting of lagged incentive pay) makes up approximately half of total change-in-
control payments for the median CEO, and these two components of severance pay are positively 
correlated. Furthermore, change-in-control payments do not appear to impede takeover offers or 
affect takeover premiums. Overall, the jury is still out on whether these types of contractual 
incentives benefit or hurt shareholder value. 
PENSIONS 
 
Another relatively unexplored component of executive compensation is inside debt. 
Executives in the US typically receive promises from their firms to pay them fixed sums of cash 
in the future after they leave the firm. The most common form of these debt-like payments to 
executives are defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) 
and Sundaram and Yermack (2007) are the first papers to empirically study CEO pension 
arrangements. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) study a sample composed of CEOs of S&P500 firms 
who left their positions in 2003-2004 and CEOs who are at retirement age in that period. Sundaram 
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and Yermack (2007) study CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms in the 
period between 1996 and 2002. Both papers show that pensions constitute a significant component 
of overall compensation for many CEOs. For example, for CEOs in the 61–65 age group, 
Sundaram and Yermack show that the pension component of overall compensation is on average 
40% larger than the base salary and is 23% of the size of equity compensation. In addition, the 
importance of the pension component of compensation increases monotonically with age. As a 
consequence, the balance between debt and equity incentives for CEOs shifts away from equity 
and toward debt as they grow older. For instance, Sundaram and Yermack show that 7% of the 
CEOs in their sample who are between the ages of 51 and 55 have debt-to-equity ratios exceeding 
their company’s debt-to-equity ratios, but for CEOs in the 61–65 age group, this rises to 21%. 
Annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and 
about 13% for older CEOs (aged 61-65). Finally, they show that inside debt has real firm 
consequences. CEOs with high debt incentives manage their firms conservatively and pension 
compensation influences patterns of CEO turnover and cash compensation. 
Edmans and Liu (2011) offer a theoretical justification for the use of debt as efficient 
compensation. They argue that inside debt is a superior solution to the agency costs of debt than 
the solvency-contingent bonuses and salaries proposed by prior literature, since its payoff depends 
not only on the incidence of bankruptcy but also firm value in bankruptcy. Granting the manager 
equal proportions of debt and equity is typically inefficient. In most cases, an equity bias is desired 
to induce effort. However, if effort is productive in increasing liquidation value, or if bankruptcy 
is likely, a debt bias can improve effort as well as alleviate the agency costs of debt.  
 
PERKS 
 
Yet another way in which executives can extract compensation is through the use of 
executive perquisites. The term “perquisite” can represent several types of employee benefits 
including time off without pay, executive services, nonperformance awards, healthcare, survivor 
protection, and retirement coverage. Rajan and Wulf (2006) examine the widespread view that 
executive perks exemplify agency problems in that managers misappropriate a firm’s surplus 
through the use of perks. Accordingly, firms with high free cash flow, operating in industries with 
limited investment prospects, should offer more perks, and firms subject to more external 
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monitoring should offer fewer perks. Their panel includes a sample of more than 300 publicly 
traded U.S. firms over the years 1986 to 1999, collected from a confidential compensation survey 
conducted by Hewitt Associates, a leading human resources consulting firm specializing in 
executive compensation. Perks covered by the Hewitt survey are primarily executive services (e.g., 
company plane, chauffeur service, financial counseling), with only a few classified as 
nonperformance awards (e.g., loans) and healthcare (e.g., hospital examination). Rajan and Wulf 
classify perks into three packages: travel perks (access to the company plane, chauffeur service, 
and a company car to the CEO), club membership perks (country, lunch, and health club 
memberships) and financial counseling perks (financial planning, tax preparation, and estate 
planning). Perks are quite common – Rajan and Wulf find that the CEO has access to the company 
plane in 2/3 of the firm-years, enjoys chauffeur service in about little more than a third of the cases, 
and receives a company car in over half the firm-year. Almost half the firms offer country club 
and lunch club memberships to their CEOs, and about a fifth offer health club memberships. 
Finally, individual financial counseling for the CEO is quite common: 70% obtain financial 
planning assistance, 65% tax preparation, and 59% estate planning. However, despite the ubiquity 
of perks, they find little evidence that agency explanations drive the awarding of perks. Perks are 
offered in situations in which they enhance managerial productivity. For example, larger firms are 
more likely to offer perks because the manager’s times are more valuable. Similarly, firms located 
far from airports are more likely to offer the use of a company plane. A chauffeur service is more 
efficient for CEOs who face longer commute times. 
A contemporaneous paper by Yermack (2006a) also studies perquisites of CEOs, focusing 
specifically on personal use of company planes, in a panel of 237 large companies over the period 
1993 to 2002. He obtains data for aircraft ownership and proximity to airports from databases 
maintained by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Yermack finds that firms that 
disclose this managerial benefit earn average shareholder returns that underperform their market 
benchmarks by more than 4% annually. Around the date of the initial disclosure, he finds that 
firms' stock prices drop by an average of 1.1%. He also finds no significant associations between 
CEO perquisites and their compensation or percentage ownership, but variables related to personal 
CEO characteristics, especially long-distance golf club memberships, have significant explanatory 
power for personal aircraft use. Overall, Yermack suggests that the use of company planes, 
inconsistent with Rajan and Wulf (2006), indeed represents the existence of agency problems. 
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NON-MONETARY BENEFITS: QUALITY OF LIFE 
 
Finally, a part of executive compensation may also accrue in the form of non-monetary 
benefits. Deng and Gao (2013) examine the effects of nonmonetary benefits on overall executive 
compensation from the perspective of the living environment at the firm headquarters. Their 
quality-of-life measure is an index provided by Morgan Quitno Press, a research and publishing 
company that ranks cities and states in the US. Morgan Quitno measures quality of life from 
various aspects, including crime rates, cost of living, unemployment rates, education systems, 
household income, weather, and infrastructure. Based on a large compensation data set from 1993 
to 2008, they find that companies in polluted, high crime rate, or otherwise unpleasant locations 
pay higher compensation to their chief executive officers (CEOs) than companies located in more 
livable locations. The difference in compensation is also economically significant. A CEO working 
in the least livable state (Mississippi) receives 10% higher compensation than a CEO in the most 
livable state (Minnesota), after controlling for conventional firm and CEO characteristics. Deng 
and Gao also find that the premium in pay for quality of life is stronger when firms face tougher 
competition in the managerial labor market, when the CEO is hired from outside, and when the 
CEO has short-term career concerns. Overall, they conclude that the geographic desirability of the 
corporate headquarters serves as a substitute for CEO monetary pay. 
 
NEGATIVE COMPENSATION: CLAWBACK PROVISIONS  
 
The structure and amounts of executive compensation have also been affected by 
regulatory policy, particularly following periods of economic or financial crisis. In particular, in 
the beginning of the 21st century, a number of financial scandals including those at Enron, 
WorldCom, and MCI among others, prompted a provision in acts such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 (SOX), that stipulate the “clawing back” or recovering the incentive compensation paid to 
the CEO and the chief financial offer (CFO) if an accounting restatement is attributed to willful 
misconduct. Specifically, SOX section 304 states that the CEO and CFO must reimburse their 
company for any bonuses or incentives received in the year prior to filing a restatement of earnings 
that is a result of accounting misconduct. In addition, corporate clawback provisions have been 
recently adopted in executive compensation contracts requiring executives to return incentive-
based pay when the measures used to arrive at compensation are later found to be based on 
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incorrect or fraudulent data. By doing so, clawback provisions serve as a form of negative 
compensation – they allow the firm to recoup compensation to the extent it is determined that 
corporate performance goals were not actually achieved, thereby reducing the incentives of 
managers to engage in the manipulation of earnings. 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) document whether adopting a clawback provision in 
executive compensation contracts affects stock prices in a hand-collected dataset for 246 firms 
with clawback provisions and a control sample of non-adopting firms (matched through a 
propensity-score-matching algorithm). They find that the shareholders of adopting firms earn 
statistically significant positive stock-valuation returns relative to their propensity-score-matched 
peers. Further, firms with previous financial restatements have the largest economic gains, 
suggesting that a clawback policy can be effective at curtailing incentives for earnings 
manipulation. The authors examine whether the bid-ask spread narrows for these firms after the 
adoption of clawback provisions. The find that it does, suggesting that these provisions contribute 
to improving the transparency of the reporting environment and a reduction in financial reporting 
risk. In contrast, non-restating firms experience no change in the spread. Finally, Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia find no evidence that clawback provisions entail costs in the form of higher CEO 
compensation following adoption nor do they influence the design of compensation contracts.  
 
PAY FOR OTHER EXECUTIVES 
 
What does the pay for other employees in the firm look like? The list of papers discussing 
pay for other executives is relatively sparse relative to the literature on CEOs, since obtaining data 
on pay levels is relatively difficult.  In this sub-section, I discuss papers that have examined the 
structure of compensation for divisional CEOs, for the CFO, for the tax director, and for non-C-
suite managers.  
Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) obtain compensation data from the confidential 
compensation files of a human resource consulting firm and examine whether the structure of 
compensation for the divisional CEO is related to subsequent innovative activity (measured using 
patent data) within the division, and whether the divisional CEO’s compensation is structured as a 
function of the expected innovation opportunity set facing the division. They find some evidence 
that the proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive relation with 
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future innovation, but no evidence that this proportion is positively related to the expected 
innovation opportunity set. 
Apart from the CEO, another specific executive whose compensation has been examined 
is the CFO. Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, Kim, Li and Zhang 
(2011) examine the relation between equity incentives and crash risk for both CEOs and CFOs. 
The question they investigate is whether information flow is likely to be manipulated by managers 
to increase the short-term share price at the expense of increasing the long-term crash risk. They 
posit that CFOs should have a greater ability to manipulate sophisticated financial information and 
show that the sensitivity of the CFO’s option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and 
positively related to the firm’s future stock price crash risk. In contrast, they find only weak 
evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. The link 
between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive 
industries and those with a high level of financial leverage. 
Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker (2012) use a proprietary data set with detailed executive 
compensation information (including on members of the tax department) to examine how the 
incentives of yet another executive, the tax director, is related to the use of GAAP and cash 
effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. Tax directors fill at least 
three roles. They are responsible for compliance. Since multinational firms are typically required 
to file thousands of tax forms annually, it is not unreasonable to infer that compliance is the tax 
director’s primary duty. In addition, they may serve as advisors to the firm’s senior executives by 
providing expertise in minimizing the tax cost of the firm's operating, financing, and investing 
activities. Finally, they can be charged with actively pursuing tax planning opportunities by 
generating investment opportunities where the net present value of the project derives solely from 
tax benefits. Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker find that the incentive compensation of the tax 
director is strongly negatively related to the GAAP effective tax rate, but appears unrelated to other 
tax attributes. They argue that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax 
expense reported in the financial statements.  
Finally, a set of papers, typically in the organizational behavior or strategy literature, 
examines the pay for other non C-suite managers in the firm. These studies appeal to fairness 
grounds in arguing that the pay for other managers in the firm are affected by the pay to the top 
management. For example, Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006) propose that top management 
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firms do consider norms of fairness when setting pay. They use data from surveys conducted from 
1981 to 1985 by a compensation consulting company. The human resource departments of around 
120 firms were asked to provide data on approximately 120 individuals at different hierarchical 
levels in the organization. Individual-level data included base compensation, annual bonus, salary 
(base plus bonus), years of education, firm tenure, job tenure, and whether the individual had 
international responsibilities. In their sample, over- or underpayment of the CEO cascades down 
to lower organizational levels. It also appears that CEOs use their own power not only to increase 
their own salaries, but also those of their subordinates. They argue that an implication of such a 
process may be that the overpayment of a top executive has higher costs than have previously been 
realized. They also find some evidence suggesting that employees use the CEO pay as a key 
referent in determining whether their own situation is “fair”, and this influences their reactions to 
their own compensation. More specifically, when lower-level managers are underpaid relative to 
the CEO - that is, underpaid more than the CEO or overpaid less - they are more likely to leave 
the organization. Andersson and Bateman (1997) also demonstrate this same effect in a scenario-
based experiment on the causes and consequences of cynicism in the workplace. They find that 
high relative levels of executive compensation, poor organizational performance, and harsh, 
immediate layoffs generate cynicism in white-collar workers. Furthermore, cynicism relates 
negatively to intentions to engage in organizational citizenship and to intentions to comply with 
requests to engage in unethical behavior.  
 
COMPENSATION ACROSS FIRM TYPES AND INDUSTRIES 
 
Prior research has investigated executive compensation in both public and private firms as 
well in particular industries. In this section, I discuss compensation arrangements at specific firm 
types – family firms, private firms, and firms in specific industries. I begin with an important 
category of public firm - the family firm. 
FAMILY FIRMS 
Executives in family firms can have both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives to manage 
the firm. The pecuniary motives in the agency relation should not be as important for family 
executives. If the manager is related to the family, she is more likely to trade higher job security 
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for lower earnings. In addition, family CEOs are also more likely to be emotionally attached to the 
firms than their professional counterparts would have been, so the agency contract should be less 
transactionally-oriented than for equivalent professional managers. Finally, family CEOs are 
unlikely to compete in the external market, so that they are less free to choose the best offer among 
the alternatives open to them. This “family handcuff” lessens the need to reward family CEOs with 
pay packages that are comparable to those of professional executives. All these reasons imply that 
family executives should be willing to accept lower remuneration in return for their services. 
In one of the most heavily-cited papers in this area, Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and 
Makri (2003) examine a hand-collected sample of 253 family-controlled firms over the four-year 
period 1995-98. They classify a firm as family-controlled if two or more directors had a family 
relationship and family members owned or controlled at least 5 percent of the voting stocks. Two 
individuals were considered to have a family relationship if they were members of the same 
descendant group (father, mother, sister, brother, son, daughter, spouse, in-laws, aunts and uncles, 
nieces and nephews, and cousins). They find that family-member CEOs of family-controlled firms 
receive lower total income than outsider CEOs, increasingly so as family ownership concentration 
increases. At the same time, their pay tends to be more insulated from risk and more sensitive to 
systematic (less controllable) business risk. This relationship becomes stronger in the presence of 
institutional investors, who are more likely to enforce an optimal contract for the CEO taking 
family concerns into consideration. They also become stronger for R&D-intensive firms, though 
here the specialized nature of the innovation process means that outsider CEOs can demand a 
premium for working for the family, not that family CEOs are paid less. Later papers have found 
similar results in other settings and countries. For example, Croci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2012) use 
a sample of European family businesses to show that the CEO’s total compensation is lower when 
there is greater family ownership, indicating that family owners who hold a large portion of shares 
in a firm can constrain managerial rent-seeking activities. 
However, family owned firms typically have many family owners. What happens if there 
are potential conflicts among family members? Cheng, Lin, and Wei (2015) explore how conflicts 
between the controlling founder of a firm and her family members affects executive compensation 
in China. Most family firms in the Chinese market are relatively small firms at early stages of 
development and are characterized by closely held ownership structures that involve a large 
amount of interaction between family members. In addition, Chinese family firms operate in an 
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environment with weak investor protection. Cheng, Lin, and Wei argue that if there is a controlling 
family owner, the owner will be able to monitor the executives well. Hence the level of 
compensation is likely to be lower. However, if other family owners also control the firm, they 
can offer outside executives higher salaries to compensate them for the risk they bear in working 
for a conflicted family firm and to incentivize the executives to facilitate outside tunneling 
activities. Consistent with these hypotheses, they find that the ownership by a controlling family 
owner is negatively correlated with the level of executive compensation and has a positive effect 
on pay-for-performance sensitivity. However, the ownership of other family members is positively 
associated with executive compensation and has a negative effect on pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. When the quality of corporate governance is low and when other family members hold 
excess control rights in the firm, the unfavorable effect of other family members is more striking. 
Yet another type of family firm is a family firm with multiple classes of shares. Amoako-
Adu, Baulkaran, and Smith (2011) compare executive compensation in dual class firms with that 
in single class companies with concentrated control. Although both samples of companies have 
agency problems associated with concentrated control, dual class companies have additional 
problems associated with controlling shareholders holding smaller equity positions. They show 
that family members in executive positions in dual class companies are paid significantly more 
than those of single class companies with concentrated control. The excess is in the form of 
incentive compensation (bonuses and stock options). They argue that the higher compensation is 
given to prevent dual class executives from taking advantage of their higher voting leverage.  
PRIVATE FIRMS 
There is comparatively little research on private firms owing to the paucity of data. One 
exception is Wasserman (2006) who examines executive compensation using a unique data set of 
1,238 executives from 528 private technology companies. He uses data from a private-company 
compensation survey conducted annually by Ernst & Young (an accounting firm), Hale and Dorr 
(a law firm), and J. Robert Scott (an executive search firm). Each year these firms compile a list 
of American private technology companies that draws from the membership lists of regional and 
state-wide technology councils, the VentureOne database of companies that have raised venture 
capital, the firms’ own client lists, and recommendations by private-company investors. The 
principal inducement for completing the survey is the promise of a copy of an unabridged, 
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published Compensation Report, which is not available to non-participants. Survey questions 
cover company founding, dates on which key product development milestones were passed, 
financing history, backgrounds of the members of the top management team, executive 
compensation, and the composition of the board of directors. Wasserman contrasts agency theory 
with stewardship theory in explaining the pattern of executive compensation at these firms. In 
contrast to agency theory (which suggests that the interests of opportunistic, self-interested agents 
conflict with those of principals), stewardship theory suggests that executives’ interests are aligned 
with company interests and that executives are thus more intrinsically motivated than agency 
theory implies. Though deriving precise empirical implications is understandably difficult, 
Wasserman does argue that stewardship theory is more likely to be applicable to young new 
ventures and agency theory to more mature new ventures. Executives inclined to behave as 
stewards (founders) are likely to be willing to accept less compensation than executives at the same 
level who are motivated by agency considerations (non-founders). Wasserman finds significant 
differences between founder-stewards and non-founder agents but these differences apparently 
diminish with company growth, and increasing outside rounds of financing. Given the potential 
for endogeneity, these results are best viewed as indicative. 
PAY IN SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES 
There is a considerable amount of literature on pay structures in specific industries, 
especially information technology (IT), the banking sector, the real estate sector, the insurance 
sector, the hospitality sector, and most interestingly, the non-profit sector. Each of these industries 
has peculiarities that render them interesting to study. For example, because of the lack of objective 
operating data, and the lack of information on the market potential of new business models, there 
is significant information asymmetry and uncertainty in the valuation of new firms in emerging 
industries. Information asymmetry increases the risks of both adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Hence, beyond Wasserman (2006), the IT industry has attracted a great deal of attention 
because it is an industry characterized by the necessity for large investments in risky growth 
opportunities where outcomes are unpredictable and idiosyncratic. In addition, there is high 
demand for talented individuals, leading to high employee turnover. Consequently, it is also 
characterized by particular forms of executive compensation, in particular, the aggressive use of 
employee stock options to compensate executives and other employees. Anderson, Banker, and 
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Ravindran (2000) investigate whether the greater use of stock options in the IT industry is unique 
to the industry or whether it can be explained on the basis of general economic relationships that 
apply to firms in all industries. They document that the shares of both bonus and option pay 
increase with performance and that the pay level and the extent of incentive pay positively affect 
firm performance. They identify economic factors such as the sensitivity of growth opportunities 
to managerial effort (moral hazard, proxied by sales growth, market-to-book ratios, and dividend 
payout ratios), ease of attracting talented executives (adverse selection, proxied by age), ability to 
measure firm performance (proxied by volatility) and ownership that may influence the use of 
options in general. They then show that there are significant differences in these factors between 
IT and other industries and, while much of the greater use of options by IT firms is explained by 
the economic factors, significant residual differences remain, suggesting that the IT industry is 
indeed different from other industries. 
To explain why there is a difference between IT firms and other firms, Ittner, Lambert, and 
Larcker (2003) use survey data collected by iQuantic Inc. in 1999 and 2000 to examine the 
determinants of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt 
employees of “new economy” firms. They find that the determinants of equity grants are 
significantly different in new versus old economy firms. Employee retention objectives, which 
new economy firms rank as the most important goal of their equity grant programs, have a 
significant impact on new hire grants, but not subsequent grants. Overall though, they still do not 
have a conclusive explanation for the difference between IT firms and others.  
Murphy (2003) extends the Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) results by analyzing data 
over a longer time period (1992-2001) including the effect of the 2000 market crash on stock-
based pay in new economy firms. Murphy argues that that decisions over options are made based 
on the ‘‘perceived cost’’ of options rather than on their economic cost. Because, at the time, firms 
could grant options without spending cash or incurring an accounting charge, the perceived cost 
to the firms was much lower than the economic cost. Perceived-cost considerations are likely to 
be more important in typical new economy firms than in old economy firms. Basically, since there 
was so much information asymmetry in IT firms anyway, the stock market valuation of these firms 
were dependent on the degree of hard financial information (on earnings, sales, or profits) 
available. IT firms were reluctant to pay compensation in forms that would affect the magnitudes 
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of the limited financial ratios they were able to disclose, which may explain the increased use of 
option-based pay in these firms. 
Sanders and Boivie (2004) argue however that the intensity of stock-based financial 
incentives serve as signals of the new firms’ potential valuation differences, hence causing a higher 
firm market valuation at the firm’s initial public offering (IPO). The claim of causality is probably 
too strong in this context because the analysis is largely an equilibrium analysis - based on standard 
OLS regressions of firm value at the IPO on a number of governance factors including stock-based 
pay by the management team. 
Finally, an unusual take on the IT industry is provided by Wang (2010) who examines what 
happens to organizations that chase the hottest IT fashions. An IT fashion is a transitory collective 
belief that a particular information technology (such as data warehousing, enterprise resource 
planning, or customer relationship management) is new, efficient, and at the forefront of practice. 
Using data collected from published discourse and annual IT budgets of 109 large companies for 
a decade, Wang (2010) finds that while firms whose names were associated with IT fashions in 
the press did not have higher performance, they had better reputations and higher executive 
compensation in the near term. The dependent variable is CEO salary and bonus however, not the 
level of stock incentives, so it is difficult to understand what Wang’s results are telling us. Do 
CEOs extract more compensation after obtaining press coverage? Do the fashions cause higher 
pay? It is unclear. 
Banking is also an interesting area to examine because it has been heavily regulated, 
especially after the recent financial crisis. Bhagat and Bolton (2014) study the executive 
compensation structure in the largest 14 U.S. financial institutions (“Too-Big-To-Fail” TBTF 
banks) during 2000–2008 (i.e. before the financial crisis), and compare it with that of CEOs of 37 
U.S. banks that did not seek or receive Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds from the 
U.S. Treasury. Their paper is aimed as a rejoinder to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who focus on 
the large losses experienced by CEOs of financial institutions via the declines in the value of their 
ownership in their company's stock and stock option during the crisis and conclude that bank CEOs 
and senior executives could not nor did not foresee the extreme high risk nature of some of the 
bank's investment and trading strategies. Essentially, Bhagat and Bolton examine the CEO’s 
purchases and sales of their bank’s stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these CEOs 
incur due to their banks’ share price declines in 2008 for banks that were ex post classified as a 
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TBTF institution or an institution that did not seek TARP funding. They find that CEOs in the 
TBTF banks engaged in significantly more discretionary stock sales than CEOs in the No-TARP 
banks and conclude that incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated 
with excessive risk-taking by banks. It is important to remember that the classification of firms 
into TBTF and TARP occurred after the trading behavior, so unless the firm executives knew their 
firms would eventually be classified as too big to fail, we cannot really conclude that the 
discretionary stock sales by TBTF bank CEOs reflect rent extraction behavior (as Bhagat and 
Bolton conclude). 
The third area analyzed in the literature is that of insurance companies, specifically 
property-liability insurers. There are two types of property-liability insurers – those that are 
widely-held (publicly-held insurers) those that are closely-held (privately-held insurers). Closely-
held private insurers should involve more direct monitoring of management by owners and less 
reliance on contracts that link management compensation to explicit performance measures. Ke, 
Petroni, and Saffieddin (1999) examine executive pay in a relatively small sample of property-
liability insurers, both private and public. They argue that significant differences in ownership 
concentration should be associated with different pay-to-performance sensitivities. They find that 
objective accounting measures are less associated with compensation of CEOs of closely-held 
insurers than with compensation of CEOs of widely-held insurers. Specifically, they find a 
significant positive association between return on assets and the level of compensation for 
publicly-held insurers and no relationship for privately-held insurers. They argue that within 
closely-held firms, CEO compensation is less likely to be based on objective measures like 
accounting information and more on subjective measures. 
A fourth area is that of real estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs have by and large 
replaced the syndicated real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), which were the predominant type 
of real estate investment vehicle in the 1980s. Most RELPs were managed by their sponsors, who 
typically held a 1 percent general partnership interest but whose compensation derived primarily 
from asset-based or property-income-based management contracts. In contrast, REITs are 
managed by external advisors who charge three types of fees. The primary type of fees is based on 
total assets under management. Other contracts specify fees as a percent of property-level income 
(rental income minus property expenses) or as a percentage of transactions volume (e.g., purchases 
and sales of properties, or issuance of mortgages). Advisors often receive more than one type of 
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compensation. For example, in internally managed REITs (where internal staff make asset and 
liability management decisions), executive compensation is typically in the form of salary and 
performance incentives based on corporate-level rather than property-level cash flows. The key 
difference between the two types of managerial arrangements is that external advisors are 
compensated based on metrics other than shareholder wealth. For example, they are compensated 
as a percentage of assets, as a percentage of property-level cash flows, or as a combination of the 
two. Capozza and Seguin (2000) briefly examine the compensation paid to external advisors in 
REITs. Capozza and Seguin argue that if the compensation structure is based on a metric not 
related to shareholder wealth, it creates a conflict of interest between advisors and investors since 
managers now have incentives to increase the asset base by issuing debt even if the interest costs 
are unfavorable. Their paper does not investigate differences in compensation structure or 
incentives since their primary research question is to investigate why externally managed REITs 
underperform their internally managed counterparts. So for the purposes of this survey, their paper 
is useful in providing details of compensation structure in real estate vehicles.  
The fifth specific industry examined in the prior literature is that of hospitality firms (such 
as hotels). Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan (2000) use time-series data for 6 years from 18 hotels 
managed by a hospitality firm to analyze how nonfinancial measures (such as customer 
satisfaction, employee satisfaction, productivity, product quality, and market share) impact firm 
performance. They find that the hotel industry typically uses some form of incentive pay for both 
its managers and for its hourly employees. The maximum bonus typically ranges between 30 and 
70 percent of the base salaries for managers. Because a large percentage of the business in the 
hotel industry is from repeat customers, customer service is a very important aspect of this 
industry. Hence incentive programs are based both on profit and nonfinancial measures such as 
quality of rooms and food, safety, guest satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and other specific 
objectives. While the incentive programs at major hotel chains differ in target setting, maximum 
bonus as a percentage of salary, and weights placed on financial and nonfinancial performance 
measures, all of them typically emphasized the importance of nonfinancial measures. For example, 
individual hotel managers’ compensation included a base salary and a bonus based on financial 
measures such as operating profit, revenues, or costs. The bonus paid to a manager was bounded 
above by a percentage of the base salary, where the bound depended on rank in the organization 
and eligibility. The general manager of a hotel could earn a proportion of his base pay as bonus by 
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achieving profit goals. In addition, a portion of the bonuses of key managers within a hotel was 
based on individual performance measures for his area of responsibility. For example, while 
operating profit was the basis for a major component of bonus, a significant portion of the general 
manager’s bonus was based on subjective evaluation, a portion of the chief engineer’s bonus was 
based on energy costs, and a portion of the sales director’s bonus was based on room revenues and 
so on. As for the real estate industry, the major point of interest in the paper is the detail provided 
on the structure of contracts in the hospitality industry. 
The final sector I discuss here is the non-profit sector. Though the non-profit sector is 
relatively large (5.5% of GDP and 9% of employment in 2010), there is little evidence on 
compensation practices at non-profits. In addition, due to the absence of shareholders, the 
nonprofit sector is characterized by weaker monitoring mechanisms and potentially more severe 
agency problems relative to their for-profit counterparts. Newton (2015) studies the relationship 
between CEO compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in large U.S. 
nonprofits. He takes advantage of recent IRS data on governance practices at nonprofits, 
specifically, the redesigned Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990, Return of Organization 
Exempt from Income Tax, which large nonprofits were required to file beginning in tax year 2008, 
to construct a sample of over 5000 non-profits. He finds that both the CEO-to-employee relative 
pay ratio and the consumption of perquisites are significantly negatively related to an index of 
nonprofit governance quality. Furthermore, he finds a significantly negative relationship between 
CEO-to-employee relative pay and multiple measures of nonprofit performance. In another paper 
that looks at a specific type of non-profit organization, a hospital, Brickley and van Horn (2002) 
examine the incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) in a large sample of nonprofit hospitals 
over the fiscal years 1991–1995 and compare them to for-profit hospitals. The information on the 
annual salary and bonuses of nonprofit hospital CEOs is obtained from a computerized database 
of IRS filings of nonprofit organizations (IRS Form 990, Part V). They find no evidence that 
nonprofit hospitals provide explicit incentives for their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. 
Instead, as in for-profit hospitals, annual compensation adjustments for CEOs of nonprofit 
hospitals are strongly related to financial performance (as measured by return on assets).  
However just as in for-profit firms, excess CEO compensation at these non-profits has a 
negative impact on inflows by donors (equivalent to shareholders in publicly listed firms). Balsam 
and Harris (2014) show that supporters reduce donations to nonprofits subsequent to disclosure of 
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high executive compensation. Their evidence is consistent with large, sophisticated donors actively 
seeking out and reacting to compensation information made available in IRS Form 990, while 
smaller donors react to compensation disclosures in the media. Balsam and Harris find a stronger 
negative relation in nonprofits classified as more charitable, and a weaker relation in nonprofits 
that provide services to their donors.  
 
INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE OF COMPENSATION 
 
In addition to varying across industries, the structure of compensation also varies by 
country. What explains this variation? The extant literature has taken one of two approaches. The 
first approach is based on hard quantifiable factors that are different across countries. As an 
example, Weimer and Pape (1999) develop a descriptive taxonomy of systems of corporate 
governance. The taxonomy is based upon eight characteristics: in whose interests is the firm 
managed (shareholders or institutions), the structure and composition of the board (one-tier or two-
tiers), the primary stakeholders who are able to exert influence on managerial decision-making 
(shareholders, employees, government, families, or banks), the importance of stock markets in the 
national economy, the presence or absence of an external market for corporate control, the level 
of ownership concentration, the time horizon of economic relationships, and directly relevant to 
us, the extent to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance. Weimer 
and Pape distinguish four types of corporate governance systems in which the relationship between 
compensation and performance goes from strongest to the weakest: the Anglo-Saxon systems, the 
Latin systems, the Germanic systems, and the Japanese system.  
In Anglo-Saxon systems, such as those in the US, the UK, Canada, and Australia, executive 
pay is usually directly related to the performance of the firm. Performance-dependent executive 
compensation components typically include share option plans as well as long-term restricted 
stock. Latin systems, in countries such as France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium, place less importance 
on performance-related executive compensation. There is one exception: France, where the 
percentage of executive compensation that is performance dependent is similar to that in the UK 
and Canada. Germanic systems, in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Finland use very limited amounts of performance-related 
compensation for executives. In Switzerland, performance-related pay is not uncommon, but its 
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significance is still relatively small. Finally, performance related executive compensation is not 
widespread in Japan. There seems to be little evidence that firms use performance dependent pay 
to align the interests of managers and shareholders. China is an anomaly in this taxonomy because 
it has a very strong culture like Japan but is increasingly dependent on the use of performance 
dependent pay. There has been a lot of research on executive compensation in China in particular, 
and I will discuss those papers later in a separate sub-section. 
The second approach is based on softer factors such as culture. As an example, Tosi and 
Greckhamer (2004) relate cultural dimensions (uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
individualism, and masculinity-femininity) developed by Hofstede (Hofstede 1980, 2001) to 
several dimensions of CEO compensation. Hofstede (1980) concludes that cultures face four basic 
problems involving: 1) individualism vs. collectivism (the relationships between the individual 
and the group), 2) power distance (the inequitable distribution of power), 3) the social implications 
of gender, and 4) uncertainty avoidance (the ability to tolerate uncertainty). Hofstede argues that 
each of his value dimensions reflects a particular culture’s solution to each societal problem.  
The pay dimensions that Tosi and Greckhamer investigate are total CEO pay, the 
proportion of variable pay to total compensation, and the ratio of CEO pay to the lowest level 
employees. Tosi and Greckhamer argue that the individualism dimension refers to whether 
individual or collective action is the preferred way to deal with issues. Drawing on Hofstede (1980, 
2001), in individualistic cultures such as the US, UK, and Canada, people tend to emphasize their 
individual needs, concerns, and interests over those of the organization. In contrast, the opposite 
is true for collectivist countries such as the Asian economies of Japan and Taiwan. In a collectivist 
society, the individual is expected to interact with members of his or her group. This affects both 
pay and working behavior. For example, in an individualistic society such as the US, workers may 
tend to shirk when tasks are assigned to the group as opposed to when they are assigned to 
individuals. Tosi and Greckhamer argue that an individualistic predisposition among workers will 
dominate when managerial compensation practices have tournament theory-like characteristics, 
reflecting a competitive rather than a cooperative spirit. 
Similarly, Tosi and Greckhamer argue that power distance, the degree to which differences 
in power and status are accepted in a culture, will affect the magnitude of CEO pay. Hofstede 
(1980, 2001) notes that some nations accept high differences in power and authority between 
members of different social losses or occupational levels, while others do not. For example, Israelis 
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and Swedes are very low in power distance while the French score relatively high. Tosi and 
Greckhamer argue that high power distance cultures will manifest higher levels of CEO pay. This 
is because organizations will attempt to maintain appropriate differentials between levels of 
employees and establish these differentials not only in absolute pay terms, but also as ratios. These 
differentials are not based on economic forces but on norms of social stratification.  
Tosi and Greckhamer obtain data from the annual Towers Perrin Worldwide Remuneration 
Reports published between 1997-2001. These reports provide information from 23 countries on 
the average compensation levels and the structure of compensation for the CEOs and three other 
executives in industrial companies with approximate annual sales of between $250-$500 million. 
They find that the different dimensions of CEO pay are primarily related to power distance, which 
implies that CEO pay in a culture is most reflective of the strength of the power structure in a 
society. They also find that total compensation and the ratio of variable pay to total pay is related 
to the individualism dimension. They argue that particular forms of CEO compensation do not 
mean the same thing in different cultures, but rather carry different symbolic connotations 
depending on the values dominant in a society. Thus, not only does the compensation structure of 
a firm within a culture have an economic meaning within organizations, but it can also be seen as 
an expression of deeper social values.  
A more recent paper that tries to bridge the gap between these two approaches is Bryan, 
Nash, and Patel (2015) who analyze how differences in national culture relate to cross-country 
differences in the structure of executive compensation contracts. They argue that though firms may 
design executive compensation contracts to reduce conflicts of interest between owners and 
managers, cultural context affects these conflicts of interest. Specifically, they investigate whether 
firms in countries that are culturally similar choose similarly designed executive compensation 
contracts. They use slightly different dimensions to Tosi and Greckhamer (2004), calculating a 
measure of cultural distance using the Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance dimensions from 
Hofstede (1980). Cultural distance is defined based on how values of each cultural dimension 
differ between U.S. and non-U.S. firms. They then test for a relation between cultural distance and 
compensation using data for a sample of 589 firms (from 39 countries) that issued American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) in the US during 1996–2009. Filing SEC Form 20-F which contains 
data on executive stock options, restricted stock, and cash-based compensation is a reporting 
requirement for foreign firms whose equity trades in the U.S. market through ADRs. They show 
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that cultural distance is strongly and significantly related to differences in the relative use of equity-
based compensation. Their comparison of U.S. and non-U.S. firms shows that differences in 
Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance are significantly related to variation in compensation 
structure.  
PAY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Whether we analyze cross-country executive compensation on the basis of quantitative 
factors or softer culture factors, the country which is closest to the US on either dimension is the 
United Kingdom (UK). In addition, given the relative ease of obtaining data in the UK, it is not 
surprising that a large amount of executive compensation research has been carried out in the UK.  
Conyon and Murphy (2000), in one of the most heavily cited papers on executive 
compensation in the UK, compare compensation to CEOs in the UK to their counterparts in the 
US. The US, UK, and Canada were the only three countries at the time that required the detailed 
disclosure of compensation practices for individual top executives. Disclosure rules in the UK 
were significantly expanded after 1997 and required disclosure of data comparable to those 
available for US executives (including details on share option grants and holdings). The primary 
data source is the annual report which is analogous to the proxy statement in the US. Conyon and 
Murphy find that compensation arrangements in both countries contain the same basic 
components. CEOs in both countries receive base salaries and bonuses paid based on accounting 
performance. CEOs also receive share options and participate in long-term incentive plans. 
However, after controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, Conyon 
and Murphy find that CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total 
compensation than their peers in the UK. The calculated effective ownership percentage in the US 
implies that the median US CEO receives 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared 
to 0.25% in the UK. They attribute the differences to greater share option awards in the US arising 
from institutional and cultural differences between the two countries.  
Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) revisit this comparison by examining risk-adjusted CEO 
pay in the US and UK, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming 
from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. As in the earlier paper, controlling for firm and industry 
characteristics, they find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also hold much higher stock and 
option incentives than U.K. CEOs. For example, after controlling for firm characteristics, U.S. 
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CEO pay in 2003 was about 1.4 times the pay of U.K. CEOs. However, the equity incentives for 
U.S. CEOs in 2003 were about 5.5 times greater than those of U.K. CEOs. They separate the total 
pay to a risk-averse CEO into a risk premium for bearing incentive risk plus “risk-adjusted pay,” 
which consists of compensation for CEO ability, compensation for CEO effort, and any rents the 
CEO obtains. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, they find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO 
pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. These results are inconsistent with 
the culture theory in that the cultural distance between US and UK firms is relatively low. Hence, 
it remains an open question why U.S. incentives are so much larger than U.K. incentives.  
Conyon, Peck and Sadler (2001) test whether tournament theory explains the pattern of 
executive compensation in the UK using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 
500 individual executives, in 1998. Tournament theory analyzes groups of agents who compete 
for a fixed prize and are rewarded based on their relative performance. The prizes are fixed in 
advance and the agents (tournament participants) expend effort to increase the likelihood of 
winning a prize. As in a sports game, what matters for winning the tournament is not the absolute 
level of performance, but how well one does in relation to the other competitors. One application 
of tournament theory is the competition to become CEO.  
Tournament models predict that where there are many job positions within a company, 
there will be an increasing compensation gap as individuals move up the hierarchical ladder. In a 
sequential elimination tournament, agents compete against each other at a given organizational 
level. On the basis of their relative performance, the winning (high-performance) agents are then 
promoted to the next organizational level, where they again compete against each other for further 
promotion, and so on. Motivation in the tournament is provided by the possibility of further 
(future) job slots in the hierarchy. The value of winning is not only the prize at that level but also 
includes the possibility to compete for larger prizes at higher levels. However, the option to 
compete in future rounds diminishes as an individual competitor moves up the organizational 
hierarchy. To substitute for the loss of the option to compete further, the firm may offer higher 
current compensation. Hence, tournament models predict that compensation is an increasing 
function of organizational level. In addition, tournament models predict that the tournament prize 
is increasing in the number of competitors. The reason is that each tournament participant 
implicitly gives up some of their expected salary associated with their marginal product or 
performance. This excess then becomes part of the overall tournament prize. To put this another 
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way, as O’Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1998) note, the more the number of vice presidents, the larger 
should be the observed gap between the CEO’s salary and bonus and those of the vice presidents. 
It is not always clear that tournament theory is as straightforward to apply as it might seem to 
appear. For example, while the CEO is arguably the highest post within the firm, it does not mean 
that this is the highest position the CEO can reach. Fee and Hadlock (2003) for example, show that 
executives who jump to chief executive officer (CEO) positions at new employers come from firms 
that exhibit above average stock price performance. Hence, it is unclear that the predictions of 
tournament theory that firms will substitute cash compensation for the loss in option value as 
executives move higher is really valid. Regardless, Conyon, Peck, and Sadler provide some 
evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business 
context. They find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level. In 
addition, the gap between CEO pay and other board executives appears to be positively related to 
the number of participants in the tournament. However, they also show that the variation in 
executive team pay has little role in determining company performance.  
PAY IN EUROPE 
Eriksson (1999) tests several propositions of tournament models on a data set containing 
information about 2,600 executives in 210 Danish firms during the 4-year period 1992-1995. The 
data is obtained from the confidential files of a Danish consulting firm and provide, in addition to 
annual compensation data, fairly detailed information about the individual characteristics of 
managers, their jobs, and the firms in which they are employed. Danish firms are different from 
firms in the UK and in the US. Most Danish firms are relatively small, to some extent, because of 
the small size of the country and its population. However, the average size of firms in Denmark is 
small also relative to the other Nordic countries. The large Danish firms are much smaller than 
those in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. As opposed to the Anglo-Saxon model described above, 
the corporate governance system is generally of the Germanic type, in which mangers are 
monitored by representatives of banks, large shareholders, and closely related firms. Finally, 
several Danish firms are closely held and are not publicly traded. Consequently, there is only a 
relatively small number of firms in the stock market. Eriksson examines if pay differentials 
between job levels are consistent with relative compensation. He finds that as managers move up 
the corporate ladder, pay differences increase, consistent with a tournament structure of pay. 
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Eriksson also investigates whether pay dispersion affected by the number of tournament 
participants, another characteristic examined by Conyon, Peck, and Sadler above. He finds that 
controlling for firm size, a greater number of contestants increases the winning prize, as predicted 
by tournament models. However, the magnitude of the effect is rather modest. What is interesting 
in this paper is that it documents similar differences in pay structure in a very different cultural 
and corporate governance model. None of these papers however, control for the demand side for 
corporate executives – the depth of the external labor market in which they compete. Again it 
remains an open question whether tournament incentives get stronger or weaker in the presence of 
strong external labor markets. 
PAY IN CANADA 
Turning to yet another Anglo-Saxon country, Zhou (2000) examines executive 
compensation at 755 Canadian firms over the period 1991-95. In Canada, all companies listed on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange and publicly traded in the province of Ontario (even firms that were 
not physically located in Ontario) were required to disclose top executives’ compensation under 
the new Ontario Securities Regulation, after 1993. The disclosure rules are very similar to the US 
rules. As reported for US firms, CEO compensation in Canada can be classified into four 
categories: salary, bonus, long-term incentive rewards, and benefits. Salary is the major component 
of executive pay in Canadian firms. The bonus is the annual variable component of remuneration 
or short-term incentive pay. Long-term incentive rewards include stock options, restricted shares, 
and long-term incentive plan payouts. Benefits include all other payments that cannot be 
adequately reported under any above pay components, such as payments for life insurance, 
contributions to a pension plan, imputed interest benefits for debt, tax subsidy, car and housing 
allowance, and so on. Consistent with previous studies, Zhou finds that CEO pay rises with firm 
size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn 
lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to performance, than is true for their 
counterparts in other industries.  
PAY IN CHINA 
Finally, a country which has seen a burgeoning of empirical research on compensation is 
China. The Chinese economy has reformed rapidly over the past few decades. Mengistae and Lixin 
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(2004) describe the reform process. Before the 1980s, there was little incentive and necessity for 
pay to vary very much across firms. Chinese SOEs were at the bottom in the chain of command of 
a central planning machinery. The enterprise director was not a business executive but a civil 
servant responsible for the implementation of a set of “plan targets” passed down by a national or 
regional planning hierarchy. The director was evaluated and compensated accordingly and came 
under the overseeing authority of the enterprise Communist Party Committee, the secretary of 
which had a greater say in the enterprise’s affairs than the director. Manpower in the economy was 
allocated between enterprises by central planners and compensation was set at nationally 
determined pay rates and benefit rules. Enterprises were required to remit all of their profits into 
the state budget.  
The reforms began with the state relinquishing part of its control over incomes generated 
by enterprises through a variety of profit retention schemes introduced between 1980 and 1984. 
An SOE would no longer be obliged to remit all of its profits to the state. Although it would 
continue to be required to make payments into the state budget, this would be in the form of a pre-
specified proportion of profits. The firm was allowed to retain a fixed proportion of the same quota 
and between 60% and 100% of profits above the quota for the purpose of financing its own 
investment and bonus schemes. Mandatory production targets were also replaced by a below-
capacity quota of output that the enterprise was required to produce according to the state plan, 
and the remaining capacity could be used to produce for the market outside of the plan. Profit 
retention and “output autonomy” schemes were introduced in various experimental forms to 
selected regions and were in force in most enterprises by the end of 1984.  
Toward the end of 1984, the government abolished profit remittance into the state budget 
and replaced it with a profit tax at a maximum rate of 55%. As before, the firm could now use the 
after-profit tax for investment, product development, bonus schemes, and welfare benefits. The 
balance of power shifted from the party secretary to the director, who was now the sole 
representative of the enterprise to outsiders and had authority in the area of personnel decisions, 
which until then was the preserve of the party committee. The change was necessary because the 
government implemented a set of different contract responsibility systems (CRS) during the same 
phase. These replaced the central planning hierarchy by contracts negotiated between the SOE and 
its supervising authority. Contracts typically lasted for a period of 3–4 years. They often specified 
minimum profitability, productivity standards, and investment levels that the enterprise had to 
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meet. As the signatory of the contracts, the enterprise director was personally responsible for 
fulfilling those obligations. In many cases the director also posted personal assets as performance 
bonds, and the median deposit was around thrice the average annual wage in China’s SOE sector 
at that time. Byrd (1992) finds that, in an apparent attempt to balance this assumption of personal 
risk by the director for enterprise performance, the director’s reward was allowed to exceed the 
pay of the average worker by as much as 10 times. 
Prior to the 1980s, the appointment, evaluation, and dismissal of directors of Chinese SOEs 
were also made by a central or regional government bureaucracy and often reflected political 
priorities of the controlling government. Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1995) argue 
that the reforms of the 1980s strengthened the managerial labor market by incorporating Western 
labor market incentives. Their data consists of a 10-year panel of observations on managerial 
compensation and corporate performance for approximately 400 SOEs, drawn from a survey 
carried out by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). They find that managerial 
turnover rates were comparable with those observed in developed market economies and appeared 
to be sensitive to enterprise performance. Managerial replacements were typically on shorter-term 
contracts and often subject to the posting of performance security deposits that were several times 
higher than the average annual salary for the industry. Changes in management usually followed 
poor performance by the former director and typically led to improvement in firm performance. 
Finally, managerial earnings significantly increased with enterprise profits and enterprise sales. 
Mengistae and Lixin (2004) use the same CASS database to examine the extent to which 
agency theory explains CEO compensation in Chinese SOEs during the 1980s. The basic pay for 
the executives was a function of the civil service grade that they occupied, which was largely fixed. 
While there was no contingent pay, incentives were provided by the bonus system, though they 
were still relatively weak. There were two main constraints. The wage budget for SOEs still had 
to be approved in advance by the former Ministry of Labor (MOL) to avoid paying a wage 
adjustment tax for the part exceeding the governmental standard wage bill. In addition, 
management in an SOE still did not have the ability to effectively hire and fire employees. In spite 
of this, Mengistae and Lixin find that CEO pay sensitivity decreases with the variance of 
performance and increases with the marginal return to executive action. While the elasticity of pay 
to sales is slightly smaller than that found for conventional firms in the West generally, Mengistae 
and Wong’s estimate of the semi-elasticity of pay with respect to profitability is reasonably 
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comparable with estimates for regulated industries in the United States (see for example, Joskow, 
Rose, and Wolfram, 1996 discussed later in this survey). 
Kato and Long (2006) argue that it was only after the pilot implementation of the yearly 
salary system in 1992 that substantive executive compensation reform really started to take off in 
Chinese SOEs. In the same year that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accepted “a market 
economy with Chinese characteristics” as the target for China’s economic reform and a modern 
corporation system resembling Western corporations as the goal for SOE reform, the State Council 
approved the Shanghai Hero Pen Company to try out the pilot yearly salary system for its top 
executives. By 1994, Beijing, Shenzhen, Sichuan, Henan, and Liaoning had also started their own 
pilot programs, followed by the national pilot program implemented in 100 large SOEs throughout 
the country. The compensation for top executives in the yearly salary system consisted of two 
parts: a fixed component (known as the base salary) that depends on both the average wage for 
ordinary employees and the size of the enterprise, and a variable component (known as the risk 
salary) that is linked to both the base salary and the performance of the firm in the year. The base 
salary is paid to executives on a monthly basis, while the risk salary (or at least a large part of it) 
is distributed at the end of the year. In other words, the pay-performance structure of the variable 
component in the yearly salary system is much like an annual bonus in the compensation package 
of a CEO working for a Western firm, and thus the yearly salary system corresponds to a typical 
cash compensation package in Western firms. 
As Tam (2000) notes, the reorganization of listed firms was modeled on U.S. corporations 
in an attempt to instill western-style discipline and incentives. For example, managers had more 
discretion in making business decisions and they are held accountable to stockholders rather than 
to the state and the political hierarchy. Pay levels were no longer derived from civil service rates 
and varied across firms. However, there are still several differences. Managerial compensation is 
decided by the board of directors without needing the approval of stockholders. In 1999, the 
government considered allowing listed firms to offer stock options to the CEO and other senior 
managers. However, though the CSRC chose two pilot firms to test run a stock option plan in early 
2003, this was not really implemented till 2006, possibly because there was no source from which 
to give shares to the executives who wish to exercise their options; treasury stock (share 
repurchases) was not allowed and any new issue of shares (to give to the executives) required 
regulatory approval, which was difficult to get. As far as perquisites goes, Kato and Long (2006) 
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document that the most common types of corporate perquisites in China include vehicle usage and 
housing subsidy. They estimate that vehicle usage amounts to 12% of cash compensation for 
Chinese executives. For the housing subsidy, they estimate a smaller amount of housing subsidy, 
ranging from 5% to 36% of Chinese executives’ cash compensation. Although perquisites were 
not negligible, cash compensation was the single most important component of total compensation 
for Chinese top executives. 
One important difference that affects pay in Chinese firms is the ownership structure. Many 
of the corporatized enterprises subsequently sold shares to the public that were listed on the stock 
market. However, in many cases the government retained a significant ownership stake, amounting 
to effective control. Between 2001 and 2005, the government introduced a plan to sell off the 
state’s remaining shares in listed firms. Consequently, in almost all Chinese listed firms, there is a 
dominant shareholder, either the state or a private individual, who has significant influence over 
the way a firm is run and on the appointment and pay of the CEO. Xu (2004) shows that, on 
average, the largest shareholder in a firm owns 43% of the issued shares, while the second largest 
owns less than 5%, implying that the largest shareholder usually has effective control of the firm. 
For the firms where the state continues to be the largest shareholder, the CEO is often a state 
bureaucrat who is seconded to the firm (and who returns to the state ministry from whence they 
came when their term as CEO ends). 
Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006, 2007) argue that the distinct types of ownership in China have 
different impacts on the use of incentive pay. They find that firms that have a state agency as the 
major shareholder do not appear to use performance related pay. In contrast, firms that have private 
blockholders or SOEs as their major shareholders relate the CEO’s pay to increases in 
stockholders’ wealth or increases in profitability. However, the pay-performance sensitivities for 
CEOs are relatively low. Cao, Pan, and Tian (2011) also examine the impact of ownership structure 
on executive compensation in China's listed firms, finding that the cash flow rights of ultimate 
controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the 
pay-performance relationship. They add one more type of owner to Firth, Fung and Rui, dividing 
their sample based on the controlling shareholder into SOEs, privately controlled firms, and state 
assets management bureaus (SAMB). As in Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007), they find that in SOE 
controlled firms, cash flow rights appear to have a significant impact on accounting based pay-
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performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based 
pay-performance relationship. However, in SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no 
relationship with either accounting or market based performance. They argue that CEO pay is 
inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market 
based performance. This is also consistent with Kato and Long (2006) who find that the effective 
adoption of the yearly salary system was hindered by state ownership. The new compensation 
system saw much faster adoption among privatized firms than among SOEs after it proved to be 
an effective incentive mechanism. According to a national survey conducted in 2002, the 
percentages of enterprises that had adopted this more progressive compensation system ranged 
from 15.2% for SOEs to 20.2% for collective firms and 41.4% for privatized firms. 
Conyon and He (2011) also confirm these findings in an extensive sample of 1,342 unique 
publicly traded firms on the two domestic Chinese exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) for the 
years 2001 to 2005. These firms account for approximately 98% of all listed firms over this period. 
Consistent with Firth, Fung and Rui (2006), they find that executive pay and CEO incentives are 
lower in state-controlled firms and in firms with concentrated ownership structures. Beyond Firth, 
Fung, and Rui however, Conyon and He go on to investigate the structure of the board in affecting 
pay. China operates a two-tier board system consisting of a main board of directors and a 
supervisory board. Traditionally, the state has huge influence on the appointment of board and 
supervisory board members. In 2002, the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC, 2002a) required firms to add independent directors to 
the main board of directors. Conyon and He find that firms with more independent directors on 
the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Finally, Conyon and He also compare executive 
pay in China to the USA. They document that significant differences in US-China pay persist even 
after controlling for economic and governance factors with US executive pay (salary and bonus) 
staying about seventeen times higher than in China.  
As noted above, state-controlled Chinese firms display a weak pay-performance 
sensitivity. However, a number of studies have shown that investor protection is stronger in Hong 
Kong than in mainland China. Ke, Rui, and Yu (2012) examine whether listing state-controlled 
Chinese firms in Hong Kong in the form of H shares (defined as firms that are incorporated in 
mainland China but listed in Hong Kong) or Red Chip shares (defined as firms that are 
incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong) can help improve the managerial 
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pay-for-performance sensitivity relative to that of state-controlled A share firms (listed in China). 
They argue that the bonding hypothesis, from the cross-listing literature, should mean that listing 
a foreign firm from a weak investor protection country on a stock exchange of a strong investor 
protection country helps improve the foreign firm’s investor protection and hence increase the 
managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity as well. Consistent with prior research, there is little 
managerial pay-for-performance sensitivity in state-controlled A share firms. Contrary to the 
bonding hypothesis however, they find no difference in their pay-for-performance sensitivity 
measures between H shares and A shares. The cash pay-for-performance sensitivity and the level 
of long-term managerial incentives are higher for Red Chip shares than for the other two firm 
types. They argue that mainland China’s institutional forces still dominate Hong Kong’s 
institutional forces in shaping the behavior of state-controlled H share firms. 
Overall, what is the bottom line for China? Bryson, Forth, and Zhou (2014) use linked 
employer-employee data for all China's public listed firms over the period 2001-10, and find top 
that executive compensation exhibits many of the traits familiar in the Western literature, although 
sometimes in a more muted way, and with some clear exceptions. They document for example, 
that compensation for top executives in China responds to market factors in much the same way 
as it does in Western economies, although the pay–performance elasticities are lower than those 
typically found in the US. The privatization process has contributed to growth in executive 
compensation, and there are now steep gradients in executive compensation within firms which 
are consistent with tournament prizes. Finally, they find a role for managerial power in executive 
pay setting, which is also not unfamiliar in the Western systems. Hence, today, China does not 
appear to be a significant outlier in the way executive compensation is set. 
CROSS-COUNTRY PAY COMPARISONS 
Bringing all the evidence across individual countries together, Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, 
and Murphy (2013) examine international evidence to analyze whether U.S. CEOs are indeed 
different from CEOs elsewhere, particularly if they are paid more. They use data from expanded 
disclosure rules to conduct an international comparative analysis of CEO pay in fourteen countries 
requiring detailed individual disclosure of CEO pay by 2006. They analyze compensation data for 
CEOs in over 3,200 U.S. and non-U.S. firms, representing nearly 90% of the market capitalization 
of publicly traded firms in these countries, covering firms from both Anglo-Saxon and continental 
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European countries, which as mentioned above, have significant differences in corporate 
governance arrangements. 
They argue that the conventional wisdom that US CEOs are paid much more than CEOs in 
other countries is wrong, documenting that the U.S. pay premium is economically modest: U.S. 
CEOs earn an average of 26% more than their foreign counterparts in 2006, far less than the 100% 
or 200% premiums documented in prior academic research. Compared with non-U.S. firms, U.S. 
firms tend to have higher institutional ownership and more independent boards, and these 
contribute to higher pay and increased use of equity-based pay. Shareholdings in U.S. firms also 
tend to be less dominated by “insiders” (such as large-block family shareholders), a factor 
associated with lower pay and reduced use of equity-based compensation.  
The major difference between the US and other CEOs is that U.S. CEOs receive a higher 
fraction of their compensation in the form of stock and options. Since risk-averse CEOs are likely 
to demand a pay premium for accepting the increased risk of equity-based pay, they estimate risk-
adjusted CEO pay, as in Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) discussed earlier in this survey. Risk 
adjustments eliminate observed U.S. pay premiums after controlling for differences in ownership 
and board structures. Burns, McTier, and Minnick (2015) also examine the international 
composition of executive compensation (specifically compensation in a set of 15 European 
countries) and its relation with investor protection and payout policy. They find a negative 
(positive) relationship between both option and restricted stock compensation and dividends 
(repurchases). However, when the incentive compensation is dividend protected, dividend payouts 
increase. Firms in weak investor protection countries pay higher dividends consistent with 
maintaining a reputation for distributing excess free cash flows. However, growth firms in weak 
investor protection countries reduce dividends (increase repurchases) in relation to increases in 
equity-incentive compensation. They argue that growth firms in weak investor protection countries 
using equity incentives as a substitute for dividends to reduce agency costs.  
Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2013) also examine the factors that contribute to 
the convergence of CEO pay practices internationally. They find that there is no significant 
difference in CEO pay between U.S. firms and non-U.S. firms exposed to international markets. 
Similarly, the difference is insignificant when U.S. firms are compared with non-U.S. firms that 
have a high fraction of foreign sales and internationally diverse boards. Finally, for 
“Americanized” non-U.S. firms exposed to U.S. capital markets (firms cross-listed in U.S. 
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exchanges and with a high fraction of shares held by U.S. institutions) and product and labor 
markets (firms that have acquired assets in the United States and firms with a high fraction of 
directors who also sit on boards of U.S. firms), the CEO pay is similar to that of U.S. CEOs. 
They argue that these non-U.S. firms implement U.S.-style compensation packages to 
attract global managerial talent, customers, and investors. Foreign firms attempting to attract 
executives in competition with equivalent U.S. firms will need to offer packages that are 
competitive with U.S. levels, including large grants of stock and options and high overall levels of 
expected total compensation. Moreover, companies cross-listed on U.S. exchanges benefit from 
“bonding” themselves to legal, regulatory, and capital market requirements of the United States 
(the bonding hypothesis, mentioned above). One of those mechanisms could be implementing 
U.S.-style compensation packages that align executive incentives more with shareholder interests 
through more equity-based pay, which could be important in attracting U.S. and other foreign 
minority investors.  
Overall, therefore, there appears to be an increasing uniformity about how executives are 
paid that transcends national, political, and cultural differences. This is reassuring because it allows 
us to search for factors that affect executive pay without constraining ourselves to particular 
systems. This is what we turn to in the next section. 
 
III. WHO SETS PAY? 
 
Executive pay is set by a number of players including the board, committees on the board 
including compensation committee, the shareholders, and regulators. In addition, pay is also 
affected by social and economic factors and the firm’s environment. In this section, I will discuss 
each of these in turn. I will defer the questions of how pay set by these players relate to firm 
performance and how compensation affects performance to the next section. 
 
THE BOARD 
 
The board of a company has a number of responsibilities of which selecting, monitoring, 
compensating, and replacing the CEO, is the most relevant for this survey. Typically, academics 
have assessed boards on how well they fulfil this responsibility. There are three strands of literature 
that addresses this issue. The first strand argues that certain types of boards actively act to set 
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executive compensation. The second argues that boards are not appointed entirely for economic 
reasons but also because of social reasons. These social factors may cause boards to be co-opted 
by management, and such co-opted boards will not place significant restraints on managerial 
compensation. The third strand of research argues that boards need not have direct effects on pay. 
Instead, they impact firm policy (such as pay disclosure policy) which indirectly affects pay. 
The first strand discusses above argues that boards are actively involved in setting 
compensation. Their effects can either be negative or positive. For example, a classified board 
(where the board is divided into separate classes, usually three, with directors serving overlapping 
multiyear terms; approximately one-third of all directors stand for election each year, and each 
director is reelected roughly once every three years) is likely to entrench management and hence 
reduce director effectiveness. In contrast, a board of directors that is independent of management 
is more likely to safeguard the interests of shareholders and minimize opportunism on the part of 
management. So this strand of literature examines specific characteristics of boards and relates 
them to executive compensation. Examples of these characteristics are the presence of anti-
takeover amendments, the overall composition of the board, the gender composition of the board, 
and CEO duality (whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board). 
Beginning with anti-takeover amendments, Faleye (2007) examines how classified boards 
affects executive compensation. His results indicate that firms with such boards provide 
significantly lower compensation incentives for their chief executives. Since he also shows that 
firms with classified boards underperform relative to firms that elect directors to annual terms and 
are less likely to fire their CEOs for poor performance, his results suggest that classified boards 
benefit CEOs at the expense of shareholders by shielding them and their compensation packages 
from the effect of poor firm performance.  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) examine the overall composition of the board. They 
use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the new rules of the major exchanges established in response to 
the corporate scandals in the United States in 2001 and 2002 as natural experiments that varied the 
structure and operations of boards. Among other requirements, these new rules mandated that a 
majority of board members on a single board should be independent, as should members of 
compensation, audit, and nominating committees. Chhaochharia and Grinstein compare changes 
in compensation between firms that were already complying with these requirements and firms 
that were not complying with them. To measure level of compliance, they focus on three board 
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structure variables: the requirement for a majority of independent directors on a single board, the 
requirement for an independent nominating committee, and the requirement for an independent 
compensation committee. They find that firms that did not comply with these requirements 
significantly decreased CEO compensation by around 17% in the period after the rules went into 
effect, compared to the complying firms. In particular, the one requirement that is strongly 
associated with a drop in compensation is the requirement that the majority of board members be 
independent, and that the significant relative drop in compensation comes from the decrease in the 
bonus and the stock-based compensation. Though this result was clear-cut and strong, 
unfortunately, it is not without controversy. Guthrie, Sokolowsky and Wan (2012) document that 
74% of the 17% drop is attributable to two outliers of the 865 sample firms studied by 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein. In addition, they find that the compensation committee independence 
requirement actually increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder 
monitoring. They argue that independent directors are not always effective in constraining CEO 
pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) examine how the gender composition of the board can affect 
compensation, among other firm outcome variables. Though women hold few corporate board 
seats, they find that female directors have a significant impact on board inputs and firm outcomes. 
In a large sample of US firms from 1996-2003, they find that female directors have better 
attendance records than male directors, male directors have fewer attendance problems the more 
gender-diverse the board is, and women are more likely to join monitoring committees. 
Interestingly, while directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more gender-
diverse boards, suggestive of a board that is more aligned with the interests of shareholders, there 
is no relation between gender diversity and CEO compensation. Adams and Ferreira suggest this 
is because CEO contracts are fairly complex. Hence the compensation committee is likely to spend 
considerable time and effort discussing their details. But because women are less likely to be 
appointed to the compensation committee than men, they do not have as much influence over the 
design of CEO compensation as their male counterparts. However, women are more likely to sit 
on the corporate governance and nominating committees, which are generally responsible for 
determining director compensation. Thus, Adams and Ferreira argue that it is not surprising that 
while the fraction of women on boards appears to affect director pay, it does not seem to be an 
important determinant of the structure of CEO compensation. 
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Conyon (1997) also examines the determinants of top director compensation in a sample 
of 213 large UK companies between 1988 and 1993. While Conyon finds that director 
compensation and current shareholder returns are positively correlated, he also finds little evidence 
of a link between directors’ pay (salary and bonus) and pre-dated shareholder returns. He finds 
some evidence that governance variables play a role in shaping top director pay. Companies which 
adopt remuneration committees are seen, in some circumstances, to have lower growth rates in top 
director compensation. Separating the roles of CEO and chairman, however, appears to play no 
part in shaping directors’ pay.  
Finally, Hallock (1997) also examines the composition of the board, specifically the impact 
of director interlocks on executive compensation. He shows that about 8% of CEOs in his sample 
(the 1992 Forbes magazine 500s list, a list of the 500 largest American companies in each of four 
different categories: sales, profits, assets, and market value) are reciprocally interlocked with other 
CEOs. In other words, the current CEO of firm A serves as a director of firm B and the current 
CEO of firm B serves as a director of firm A. Roughly 20% of firms in Hallock’s sample have at 
least one current or retired employee sitting on the board of another firm and vice versa. Hallock 
documents that CEOs who lead interlocked firms earn significantly higher compensation and to 
head larger firms. After controlling for these firm and CEO characteristics, the pay gap is reduced 
dramatically. However, when firms that are interlocked due to documented business relationships 
are considered not interlocked, the measured return to interlock is as high as 17%. 
Why is the board not that effective in constraining pay? One explanation is suggested by 
Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1995) who are among the first papers in the second strand of research, 
arguing that social influence may be responsible for significant increments in CEO compensation 
beyond what economic theories predict. They describe theories of small group dynamics and social 
influence to posit that the board of directors, while notionally independent, is likely to be 
influenced or captured by the CEO. Hence they argue that executives receive higher levels of 
compensation than performance or economic theories would predict. I will build on this particular 
explanation later in the survey. Another explanation is proffered by Westphal (1998) who 
incorporates the behavior of CEOs into an explanation of how boards of directors affect 
organizational outcomes. He examines archival data on corporate strategy, CEO compensation, 
board structure, and demographics, and carries out a survey of both CEOs and outside directors 
from 221 large- and medium-sized U.S. corporations. He finds that changes in board structure that 
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increase the board’s independence from management are associated with higher levels of CEO 
ingratiation and persuasion behavior toward board members, and this behavior, in turn, serves to 
offset the effect of increased structural board independence on corporate strategy and CEO 
compensation policy.  
As an example of the third strand of research, where boards set policy that affect pay 
indirectly, Laksmana (2008) examines whether board and compensation committee characteristics 
(her proxies for board governance quality), are associated with the extent of board disclosure of 
executive compensation practices. She develops a subjective disclosure index using 23 
compensation-related disclosures and shows that disclosure scores are inversely related to two 
measures of information asymmetry: bid-ask spread and return volatility, suggesting that greater 
compensation disclosure reduces information asymmetry. She also finds some evidence that 
boards with the power to act independently from management provide more disclosure. Board 
disclosure also increases with the amount of time and resources dedicated to board (compensation 
committee) duties. More specifically, boards with lower meeting frequency and those with fewer 
directors serving on them are associated with lower transparency on compensation practices.  
In contrast to Laksmana, Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) argue theoretically that better 
disclosure regimes can also aggravate agency problems and executive compensation. While 
increased information about the firm improves the ability of shareholders and boards to monitor 
their managers, the benefits of improved monitoring do not flow solely to shareholders: Managers 
with bargaining power will capture some of the increased benefit via greater compensation. Even 
without bargaining power, Hermalin and Weisbach argue that managerial compensation will rise 
as a compensating differential because better monitoring tends to affect managers adversely. In 
addition, increased monitoring can give management incentives to engage in value-reducing 
activities intended to make them appear more able (for example, substituting away from longer 
term investments, such as R&D, toward shorter term investments or actions that affect reported 
numbers sooner). At some level of disclosure, these costs could outweigh the benefits at the 
margin, so increasing disclosure beyond that level would reduce firm value. They argue therefore 
that mandated increases in disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO 
compensation and CEO turnover rates.  
Empirically, Hui and Matsunaga (2014) explore whether CEO and CFO compensation are 
related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst 
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forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy as measures of disclosure quality, they 
find that changes in the annual bonuses for both the CEO and CFO are positively associated with 
changes in disclosure quality. The relation is stronger for high growth firms, firms that have 
stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. They argue that 
their findings provide insight into the importance boards place on effective communication with 
investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and therefore provide them with contractual 
incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures.  
Sheu, Chung, and Liu (2010) and Chung, Judge, and Li (2015) both use data from Taiwan, 
a country in which the board members and executives of a firm often have friendly relations with 
one another. As in Laksmana (2008), Sheu, Chung, and Liu argue that firms with higher levels of 
board independence will tend to provide more comprehensive disclosure of compensation. 
Authorities in Taiwan chose to adopt a policy of gradual enforcement of compensation disclosure 
and Sheu, Chung and Liu argue that this implies that firms are provided with discretion with regard 
to any greater levels of transparency that they may choose to provide. They find that the market 
provides a higher valuation only to those firms which elect to voluntarily disclose comprehensive 
information on their compensation practices. However, where such disclosure is in excess of the 
minimum mandatory requirements, lower levels of transparency in the overall disclosure of 
compensation practices do not help in creating market value. Similarly, Chung, Judge, and Li 
(2015) find that excess executive compensation is negatively related to firm value but that 
voluntary disclosure practices moderate this relationship. Specifically, excess executive 
compensation has a positive effect on firm value when firms disclose comprehensive information 
voluntarily and that this effect is more pronounced in group-affiliated firms. Moreover, firms that 
provide comprehensive voluntary disclosure appear to alleviate agency problems more efficiently 
when their controlling shareholders have higher private benefit incentives or when these firms 
have higher quality corporate governance. 
 
THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE AND COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 
 
Boards are however, responsible for many other functions, only one of which is executive 
compensation. The specific board committee that is responsible for compensation is the 
compensation committee. Research has also investigated how the compensation committee (CC) 
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in particular affects executive compensation. Wade, Porac, and Pollock (1997) examine how the 
compensation committees of a sample of U.S. corporations from the S&P 500 justify their 
compensation practices to shareholders. They find that when companies have more concentrated 
and active outside owners, they are much more likely to justify their compensation practices by 
citing the role of compensation consultants as advisors in the compensation-setting process. They 
are also more likely to discuss the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests, and to 
downplay the firm’s accounting returns. Companies that pay their CEOs large base salaries are 
also more likely to cite the role of consultants, and, for those with dispersed ownership, to discuss 
shareholder alignment. High accounting returns lead companies to emphasize accounting 
performance in their compensation justifications, and to downplay market returns. High stock price 
volatility leads companies to de-emphasize market returns. 
Does the independence of the compensation committee affect CEO compensation? 
Unfortunately, there appears to be very little empirical evidence that the structure of the committee 
affects pay. Anderson and Bizjak (2003) examine whether greater CC independence promotes 
shareholder interests and whether the CEO’s presence on the CC leads to opportunistic pay 
structure. They take advantage of the 1992 SEC provisions that encouraged directors without ties 
to the firm to be more responsible for establishing executive pay by increasing disclosure 
requirements when corporate insiders serve on CCs. In addition, they also use the 1993 changes in 
the congressional tax code (that stipulated that (1) CCs must be composed solely of two or more 
outside directors and (2) performance-based executive pay in excess of $1 million is not tax 
deductible) as natural experiments that affected the composition of the CC. They find that CC 
structure significantly changed after the adoption of government regulation. Examining a random 
sample of 110 New York Stock Exchange firms from 1985 to 1998, they find that before the 
change in regulation, independent directors held over 59% of committee seats. By the end of their 
sample period (1998), inside directors are essentially absent from CCs and independent directors 
dominate the committee by holding 75% of the seats. However, in spite of the greater 
independence, they find little evidence that greater committee independence affects executive pay. 
Moreover, committees consisting of insiders or the CEO do not award excessive pay or lower 
overall incentives. They find no evidence that pay decreases or total incentives increase when 
CEOs exit the CC. Ezzamel and Watson (1998) argue that compensation committees simply pay 
executives at the going rate and that deviations from that rate will influence subsequent pay. In a 
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sample of large U.K. companies, they examine whether asymmetric responses to pay anomalies 
explain executive pay. They find that their pay anomaly measures are statistically related to 
subsequent pay and that there was significant nonlinear adjustment toward the going rate for 
underpaid executives.  
Compensation committees may also be influenced by external compensation consultants. 
Unfortunately, despite extensive research, with one exception, the extant literature on 
compensation consultants has found little evidence that hiring consultants actually leads to higher 
pay. There are two major reasons for the lack of evidence. First, the relationship between 
consultants and firms has typically been extremely stable over the time frame considered by most 
of these studies. Hence these studies have typically classified consultants on the ex ante likelihood 
that they will face conflicts of interest in providing advice on executive compensation. For 
example, Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist (2010) distinguish between consultants that provide 
compensation services alone and those that provide non-compensation related advice such as 
advice on pension plans, under the assumption that consultants providing other non-compensation 
related services will be economically dependent on revenue that is under the control of the CEO. 
However, they do not find either higher levels of pay or lower pay-performance sensitivities for 
clients of these potentially conflicted consultants. Murphy and Sandino (2010) distinguish between 
consultants that are hired by management and those that are hired by the board under the 
presumption that the former are likelier to depend on management favor. However, they find that 
pay is lower in US firms when the consultant works for management, rather than for the board. 
Studies in other countries, notably the UK, have also yielded mixed results (see for example, 
Conyon, Peck, and Sadler, 2009, and Goh and Gupta, 2010). The stability of the firm-consultant 
relationship has caused researchers to attribute the lack of results to omitted variables. For 
example, Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker (2012) argue that while CEO pay is indeed higher in 
clients of consultant firms than in non-consultant firms, this difference is driven by weaker 
corporate governance at the consultant client firms, not by the use of consultant firms. Murphy and 
Sandino (2014) document that firms with ex ante higher levels and more complex forms of CEO 
pay (before hiring consultants) are more likely to use consultants ex post to advise on pay.  
Chu, Faasse, and Rau (2017) use changes in disclosure rules announced by the SEC in 
2009 to address the question of whether compensation consultants enable higher CEO pay. The 
rules required firms that purchase other services from their compensation consultants to disclose 
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fees paid for both compensation consulting and other services. This exogenous requirement 
dramatically increased both the turnover of compensation consultants and the number of specialist 
firms. Chu, Faasse, and Rau argue that the disclosure rule change acted as a natural separating 
mechanism to separate firms who used consultants to optimally advise on pay from firms who 
used consultants to extract rents from shareholders. After the rule change, Chu, Faasse, and Rau 
find that client firms that switched to specialist consultants (and hence did not have to disclose 
payments to their consultants) paid their chief executive officers (CEOs) 7.4% more in median 
total compensation than a matched sample of firms that remained with multi-service consultants. 
Moreover, firms where CEOs enjoy a greater increase in pay this year are less likely to turn over 
consultants the following year. 
THE SHAREHOLDERS 
There are several avenues through which shareholders can directly affect CEO pay (instead 
of indirectly through the board of directors). For example, they can vote on compensation plans. 
Equity compensation plans are widespread and require shareholder approval, and votes on these 
plans are the most common subject of shareholder voting after director elections and auditor 
ratification. In addition, equity compensation proposals typically attract much higher levels of 
shareholder disapproval than most other company-sponsored proposals that are put to shareholder 
votes. Are these votes efficacious?  
Armstrong, Gow, and Larcker (2013) examine the effects of shareholder support for equity 
compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. They note that of the 619 management-
sponsored proposals rejected by shareholders between 2001 and 2010, nearly 30% were related to 
equity compensation plans. They examine binding shareholder votes - if shareholders reject a 
proposed equity compensation plan, the board cannot issue the options or shares that would have 
been authorized under the proposal – and find that measures of “excess” compensation and 
measures of shareholder dilution that are similar to those used by proxy advisors (e.g., ISS and 
Glass Lewis) and institutional investors (such as Fidelity Investments) are negatively related to 
shareholder support for equity compensation plans. However, there is little evidence that either 
lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans 
leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. In addition, 
in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to 
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propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Armstrong, Gow, 
and Larcker argue that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on 
firms’ incentive compensation policies. Their conclusion is echoed by Brunarski, Campbell, and 
Harman (2015) who examine non-binding say-on-pay votes. The Say-On-Pay (SOP) Bill was 
passed by the U.S. Congress in 2007 and was subsequently made part of the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) that was signed into law in 2010. The 
SOP provision that went into effect for most firms in 2011 requires boards to submit their executive 
pay packages to a mandatory (but non-binding) shareholder vote at least once every three years. 
The SOP vote requires that shareholders indicate either approval or disapproval of executive 
salaries, and every six years, shareholders are to be permitted to vote on the frequency of the SOP 
vote. Brunarski, Campbell, and Harman (2015) find that overcompensated managers with low SOP 
support tend to react by increasing dividends, decreasing leverage, and increasing corporate 
investment. They measure overcompensation as the difference between the actual compensation 
and the compensation predicted from the model in Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008). However, they 
find no evidence that management response to the vote affects subsequent vote outcomes. They 
also find that excess compensation increases for managers that were substantially overpaid prior 
to the SOP vote, regardless of the outcome of the vote. Thus, they conclude that, at least in the US, 
it does not appear that the SOP legislation has had the intended effect of improving executive 
contracting. 
However, the US is not the only country where say-on-pay became a policy response to 
the dramatic increase in executive pay in the late 2000s. Since 2007–8, numerous countries have 
either adopted say on pay schemes or strengthened existing ones, including Australia and the UK. 
The UK in particular, was almost the first country to adopt Say-on-pay type regulations, adopting 
them in 2003. In the UK, companies are required by listing rules to hold an Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) at least once every 15 months (Companies Act, 1985) but companies typically 
hold an AGM every 12 months. At the AGM, shareholders are asked to approve resolutions 
proposed by the board. Until 2003, votes on the remuneration report were on a voluntary basis 
only. From 2004, the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2002) required UK companies to hold a vote on the report of the directors’ remuneration 
committee, although this vote remained non-binding. 
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Ferri and Maber (2013) find that UK firms responded to negative say on pay voting 
outcomes by removing controversial CEO pay practices criticized as rewards for failure (e.g., 
generous severance contracts) and increasing the sensitivity of pay to poor realizations of 
performance. Since Ferri and Maber (2013) use data covering only the boom period until 2007, 
Gregory-Smith, Thompson, and Wright (2014) extend this study by analyzing the population of 
non-investment trust companies in the FTSE 350 over the period 2003-12 including the post-crisis 
years after 2008. They find that though executive remuneration and dissent on the remuneration 
committee report are positively correlated, the magnitude of this effect is small. Importantly, while 
dissent appears to play a role in moderating future executive compensation levels, this effect is 
restricted to levels of dissent above 10% and primarily acting upon the higher quantiles of rewards. 
They find no evidence of a structural break in the pay–dissent relationship after 2007. Hence, 
though shareholder dissent above a particular level may have an impact on executive 
compensation, in general, shareholder dissatisfaction does not seem to have much of an impact on 
pay. 
A second avenue through which shareholders can provoke direct action on executive 
compensation is by suing their board. While the primary reason for the lawsuit is to compensate 
shareholders for losses, by targeting directors in a class action lawsuit, shareholders are also 
holding the board responsible for poor decision-making or fraud in the company. A lawsuit 
directed toward the named board members may cause greater reputational losses to directors than 
lawsuits not aimed at directors. While outside board members rarely pay with personal funds 
(thanks to Director and Officer insurance) in director lawsuits, they may suffer reputation losses, 
including decreases in the number of other board positions, as well as time spent dealing with the 
lawsuit that could be spent monitoring and advising the firm. Hence, it is plausible that outside 
directors may have greater incentives to reform compensation and other corporate governance 
measures following the lawsuit. Crutchley, Minnick, and Schorno (2015) examine shareholder-
initiated lawsuits that specifically target the full board of directors for not protecting shareholders 
from securities fraud. They find that naming particular directors in a class action lawsuit based on 
securities fraud, on average, leads to increases in CEO incentive pay, but decreases in director 
incentive pay. These changes in compensation and corporate governance appear to lead to 
enhanced performance in the years following the lawsuit.  
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However, all shareholders are not alike. The literature has also examined whether 
particular types of shareholders have incentives to affect executive compensation. These 
shareholders include founders, venture capitalists, large blockholders, and institutional 
shareholders.  
Li and Srinivasan (2011) examine CEO compensation and retention policies in firms in 
which founders serve as directors with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). In their 
sample of US companies between 1996 and 2004 that are covered by the Compustat Execucomp 
database and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) directors dataset, they find that 
almost a quarter of the firms have their founders actively associated with the firm either as the 
CEO (13%) or as a member of the board of directors (12%). Li and Srinivasan focus on the latter.  
They find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other 
firms. For non-founder firms, the value of the average CEO’s annual total compensation (including 
stock and option holdings) increases by about $5.20 for a $1,000 increase in the market value of 
the firm. For firms with a founder-director, the additional PPS is $2.24. In addition, after 
controlling for other economic determinants of pay levels, CEOs of founder-director firms receive 
lower pay than CEOs in non-founder firms. In terms of economic magnitude, CEOs of founder-
director firms, on average, receive $329,000 less than CEOs of non-founder firms in annual 
compensation after controlling for other economic determinants of pay. Li and Srinivasan’s 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that all shareholders are not alike. In particular, boards 
with founder-directors are effective in providing more high-powered incentives in the form of pay 
and retention policies than the average US board.  
Cadman and Sunder (2014) show that influential incumbent shareholders provide 
managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders 
plan to sell their stock. In an IPO setting in which venture capitalists (VCs) represent short-horizon 
controlling investors with strong selling incentives after the IPO, they find that VCs’ short-term 
incentives influence CEO’s annual horizon incentives following the IPO. At the same time, 
institutional monitoring limits the influence of VCs on annual, short-horizon incentives. To 
preempt this disciplining by market participants, VCs grant equity prior to the IPO that correspond 
with their short horizons and result in shorter portfolio horizon incentives for the CEO after the 
IPO. After the IPO, since the balance of power shifts to institutional ownership, the compensation 
duration (measured by the length of the vesting period) lengthens significantly. Baranchuk, 
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Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) also report evidence consistent with Cadman and Sunder when 
they examine innovation in newly public firms. They show that newly-public firms combine 
deferred compensation with longer vesting periods and with short-term protection to encourage 
innovation. 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) examine if large blockholders play an important role in 
corporate policy choices including executive compensation policies. They construct a blockholder-
firm panel dataset to track all unique blockholders among large public firms (the S&P1500 
universe) in the United States. They run panel regressions in which corporate policy and firm 
performance variables are regressed on year and firm fixed effects, as well as time-varying firm-
level characteristics to control for observable and unobservable firm heterogeneity, and most 
important, blockholder fixed effects. They find that large shareholders have different investment 
and governance styles and in particular, differ in their attitudes toward CEO pay. However, the 
fixed effects of individual shareholders across different corporate policies appear to be 
significantly correlated. For example, blockholders associated with higher CEO pay have 
aggressive attitudes toward company growth. 
Finally, a number of papers have examined if institutional shareholders affect executive 
compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003) measure the influence of institutional investors through 
their ownership concentration in firms: the share of institutional ownership due to the five largest 
holders or a Herfindahl index of institutional fractional holdings. They find a strong positive 
relation between these measures of institutional concentration and the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of managerial compensation. They also find that firms with a higher concentration of 
institutional owners pay lower executive compensation, even after controlling for firm size, 
industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions 
serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. 
Additionally, clientele effects appear to exist among institutions for firms with certain 
compensation structures, suggesting that firms may adopt compensation structures preferred by 
some investors (for example, structures with greater pay for performance sensitivity) to attract 
these institutions as shareholders.  
Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) argue however, that institutional investors are not all 
alike. They develop a stylized model of a firm owned by three classes of shareholders with 
different monitoring technologies. Two potential monitoring shareholders (institutions) can assess 
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managerial performance at differing costs. The third class consists of other shareholders 
(individuals) who cannot monitor (i.e., for whom monitoring costs are prohibitive). They find that 
the PPS of managerial compensation increases in the concentration of active institutions’ 
ownership, but is not significantly related to the concentration of passive institutions’ ownership. 
This result is consistent with the active institutions (investment advisors and investment 
companies) facing lower costs of monitoring than the passive institutions (banks and insurance 
companies). 
Another particular type of institutional shareholder is a private equity sponsor. Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach (2013) study changes in CEO compensation contracts when firms transition from 
public ownership with dispersed owners to private ownership with strong principals in the form of 
private equity sponsors. The most significant changes are that a significant portion of equity grants 
performance-vests based on pre-specified measures and that unvested equity is forfeited by fired 
CEOs. Private equity sponsors do not reduce base salaries, bonuses, and perks, but redesign 
contracts away from qualitative measures. They use some subjective performance evaluation, do 
not use indexed or premium options, and do not condition vesting on relative industry 
performance.  
It is important to realize however, that institutional shareholders may also have their own 
interests that do not necessarily coincide with those of the other investors. Ashraf, Jayaraman, and 
Ryan (2012) examine the relation between mutual fund votes on shareholder executive 
compensation proposals and pension-related business ties between fund families and the firms. 
They find that fund families support management both when they have pension ties to the firm and 
when they do not. They conjecture that “management friendly” fund families get the most pension 
fund management business. 
REGULATION 
Regulation is often used to restrict executive compensation, especially in times of 
economic distress. For example, during the Great Depression, public commentators demanded 
curbs on executive pay in, complaining about “corporations in the red paying excessive salaries”1 
Firms were required to publicly disclose compensation, a requirement that was successively 
                                                 
1 See for example “Big salaries bring demand for curbs; Stiff taxes loom as result of report to the senate on high pay 
by corporations”, Special to The New York Times, March 05, 1934, Page 6.  
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tightened in subsequent reforms. Between 1971 and 1973, executive compensation fell under 
general wage controls imposed by the Nixon administration to curb inflation. After 1992, the 
Clinton administration taxed fixed compensation in excess of $1 million that was not performance 
related. In 2002, SOX added proposals to clawback CEO and CFO executive compensation if an 
accounting restatement was attributed to willful misconduct. In 2006, the SEC adopted significant 
changes to its executive compensation disclosure rules that mandate the information companies 
must disclose about executive pay packages in their annual proxy statements. Finally, the recent 
2008 financial crisis produced a number of proposals to reform executive pay as well as concrete 
legislative proposals.  
It is interesting to note that most governance requirements of laws such as SOX were 
available on a voluntary basis to firms before the laws were passed. If required governance is such 
a good thing, why don’t firms just do it without the necessity of a law? Why does regulation need 
to play a role in regulating executive compensation? Dicks (2012) notes that managers in firms 
observe the firm’s cash flow and can either choose give it to shareholders or divert it to personal 
uses. Monitoring the manager makes it more difficult for her to misbehave. Hence firms choose 
the optimal combination of incentive pay and monitoring to induce managers to behave. However, 
small firms find monitoring too expensive and solve the agency problem with only incentive pay. 
Large firms find monitoring cheap, so they prefer monitoring the manager closely and paying him 
little. Because large firms must pay managers enough not to leave the firm, small firms harm large 
firms by not monitoring enough. By mandating disclosure on compensation rules or enforcing 
clawback mechanisms, the regulation forces firms to increase monitoring. When a firm improves 
its monitoring, it can lower executive compensation, allowing other firms to also lower executive 
compensation. Hence corporate governance regulation has a positive externality on executive 
compensation. However, it is not Pareto-optimal. Because large firms can implement monitoring 
more cheaply than small firms, optimal governance regulation benefits large firms but hurts small 
firms.  
Acharya and Volpin (2010) make a similar argument. They model an economy in which 
firms can provide incentives either through compensation contracts or through improved 
governance. Firms with weaker governance offer managers more generous incentive 
compensation, which induces firms with good governance to also overpay their management. 
However, firms do not internalize the fact that opting for weaker governance and more incentive 
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pay increases CEOs’ outside options and therefore the economy-wide level of compensation. 
External governance regulations can be used to address this issue. 
Dittmann, Maug, and Zhang (2011) abstract away from externalities to consider firms in 
isolation. In their analysis, firms choose compensation structures without considering the effect on 
other firms. Because firms do not consider the impact on other firms, they anticipate needing to 
keep the current CEO and implementing the same effort level as before. Hence the new contract 
offered should provide the CEO with at least as much utility and effort incentives as before. They 
group restrictions on executive compensation into three categories: (1) restrictions on ex post 
realized compensation, (2) restrictions on the ex ante value of compensation, and (3) restrictions 
on specific components of pay. In their theoretical models, they show that many restrictions would 
have unintended consequences. For example, restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts are 
based on the notion that the total payout to the CEO when she leaves the firm and sells all her 
shares and options should not exceed a certain dollar amount in order to avoid public outrage. 
Restrictions of this type are in line with public demands, now law in some countries, that boards 
should “stress test” compensation plans to avoid ex post high realizations of pay. Since 
compensation that involves restricted stock or standard stock options is potentially unlimited, this 
type of cap can be implemented only with stock appreciation rights or phantom stock that includes 
a limited upside, but is otherwise identical to standard securities used to pay executives. One 
consequence of this type of restriction is that pay increases. If firms wish to prevent extremely 
large payouts for extreme performance, then incentive provision requires more high-powered 
compensation contracts for mediocre performance and therefore a higher risk premium. Similarly, 
restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. 
Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily 
circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on 
incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.  
Empirically, Goolsbee (2000) finds some evidence that executives anticipate and change 
compensation mechanisms to leave their pay relatively unaffected. He examines the 
responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation 
data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995. He shows that the higher 
marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income. The decline, however, is 
almost entirely a short-run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction 
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in taxable income. Breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows 
that the large short-run responses come almost entirely from a large increase in the exercise of 
stock options by the highest-income executives in anticipation of the rate increases. Executives 
without stock options, executives with relatively lower incomes, and more conventional forms of 
taxable compensation such as salary and bonus show little responsiveness to tax changes. 
Overall, therefore, papers have argued (considered in more detail the following sections on 
compensation peer groups) that the overall pay across all firms is important in setting individual 
firms pay structures. However, the literature has also argued that firms and executives act in 
isolation to change their compensation structures offered and demanded to keep the payout level 
constant when faced with restrictions on pay levels. In equilibrium, how much pay is affected by 
other firms and how much is set on the basis of individual firm-level characteristics?  
The empirical research has typically investigated how specific government regulation has 
affected compensation in general, and in specific industries without distinguishing these two 
channels. These specific changes in regulation are very useful because they are potential solutions 
to the endogeneity problems that plague corporate finance research. I discuss below some of these 
regulatory changes arranged by calendar time. I first discuss overall changes in regulation (that 
affected all industries) and then regulations that were industry-specific. 
REGULATORY CHANGES THAT AFFECTED ALL INDUSTRIES 
The earliest major regulation to have received extensive academic attention was the 1992-
1993 SEC mandated enhanced disclosure requirement on executive compensation and the 
Congress-enacted tax legislation limiting the deductibility of non-performance related 
compensation over one million dollars (Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m)). Perry and Zenner 
(2001) identify firms from the Execucomp database that were likely to be affected by the 
regulations – firms they call million-dollar firms (where the CEO either earned more than one 
million dollars in the prior year, or just less than a million (more than $900,000) in the prior year, 
or where the CEO earned annual cash compensation of more than a million dollars at least once 
over the 1992–1997 period). They find that the regulations significantly affected pay in that several 
million-dollar firms reduced salaries in response to 162(m). They also show that salary growth 
rates declined post-1993 for the firms most likely to be affected by the regulations, and that bonus 
and total compensation payouts were increasingly sensitive to stock returns after 1993, especially 
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for firms with million-dollar pay packages. Overall, after controlling for other factors affecting 
CEO incentives, the sensitivity of the CEO’s wealth to changes in shareholder wealth increased 
from 1993 to 1996 for firms most likely to be affected by the new regulations, with CEOs near or 
above the million-dollar compensation level. 
The second regulatory change was the mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) by the European Union (EU) and several other countries (e.g., 
Australia, South Africa) on January 1, 2005. IFRS was aimed at enhancing earnings quality and 
achieving a high degree of comparability of financial statements. The mandatory adoption of IFRS 
allows us to empirically examine the validity of the models in Dicks (2011) and Acharya and 
Volpin (2010), because it affected the contractual usefulness of accounting information in 
executive compensation allowing firms and investors to more precisely report and monitor 
executive performance. Before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, differences in accounting 
standards across countries may have prevented companies from using foreign peers in accounting-
based RPE. After the adoption of a uniform set of accounting standards, if compensation 
committees consider earnings to be more cross-country comparable, they are likely to increase the 
use of foreign peers in accounting-based RPE for determining executive compensation.  
Ozkan, Singer, and You (2012) examine how the adoption of IFRS affected the PPS and 
RPE of public firms from a sample of 15 European countries. RPE-based compensation contracts 
shield executives from the effect of common shocks that are beyond their control and, thus, provide 
them with incentives to exert effort. Ozkan, Singer, and Yue document a weak increase in 
accounting-based PPS in the post-adoption period, primarily driven by countries with large 
differences between IFRS and their previously adopted local accounting standards. There is 
however, a significant increase in accounting-based RPE using foreign peers after the adoption. 
Importantly, the increase in RPE is greater for firms with more foreign sales, and for those with 
lower availability of domestic peers of comparable size, suggesting that compensation committees 
perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher quality and comparability and hence 
changing the structure of pay accordingly.  
The third regulatory change was the increase in compensation disclosures mandated by the 
SEC rules adopted in 2006. The revised rules required a new ‘‘Compensation Discussion and 
Analysis’’ (CDA) section to be filed with the proxy and certified by the CEO and CFO. The new 
CDA section was required to provide an explanation and analysis of all material elements of the 
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company’s compensation goals, practices, and decisions for the CEO, CFO, three other highest-
paid executive officers, and the directors. The CDA disclosures had to be sufficiently precise to 
identify material differences in compensation policies and decisions for the five named individuals. 
The new rules also required companies to disclose specific quantitative or qualitative performance 
targets used to determine bonus payouts for executives, unless such disclosure would cause 
competitive harm by revealing trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information. 
Finally, they required a narrative description of any material factors necessary to understanding 
the summary compensation table and the plan-based awards table, significantly expanded 
disclosure regarding retirement benefits, change-in-control, and other termination compensation 
arrangements, and required firms to disclose the procedures and processes that the compensation 
committee used to set compensation policies and to determine executive and director 
compensation, to identify compensation consultants and to describe their role in determining 
executive and director compensation, and to define independent directors. To evaluate compliance 
with the new rules, the SEC conducted a comprehensive focused study of compensation 
disclosures for approximately 350 companies from proxies issued in early 2007. During a ten-
month period in 2007, specialists in the Division of Corporation Finance in the SEC evaluated 
each proxy statement and commented on issues with those disclosures. 
Robinson, Xue, and Yu (2011) investigate why firms choose not to comply with mandatory 
compensation disclosures and the effect of a subsequent focused enforcement action. Specifically, 
they analyze the critiques issued by the SEC for 336 of those firms to examine whether 
noncompliance is associated with excess CEO compensation (the actual compensation less the 
expected compensation given the performance of the firm), proprietary costs (the costs of revealing 
information about internal information to competitors), or previous media attention (where the 
firm has previously attracted negative scrutiny in the popular press). They find that disclosure 
defects are positively associated with excess CEO compensation and media criticism of CEO 
compensation during the previous year. They find no evidence supporting the contention that 
compensation disclosure defects are associated with proprietary costs. Furthermore, the level of 
disclosure defects identified by the SEC does not seem to be associated with a reduction in excess 
CEO compensation in the subsequent year. They argue that absent a direct influence on firm policy 
or the composition of the board of directors, neither negative media attention nor a focused SEC 
enforcement action is effective in disciplining CEO compensation. 
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The final regulatory change studied in the literature are the recent legislative and regulatory 
actions following the 2008 financial crisis. These actions, proposed by the SEC, the state of 
Delaware, and various US politicians, would limit executive pay. If the compensation process is 
rife with managerial rent extraction, Larcker, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2011) hypothesize that by 
placing restrictions on overall executive pay, these regulatory actions will be value-enhancing. 
However, if observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between 
shareholders and management, broad government actions that regulate such governance choices 
will destroy shareholder value. Consistent with the latter view, they find that the abnormal returns 
earned by firms following events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, 
decreasing in CEO pay. Specifically, they find an insignificant reaction to events relating to the 
regulation of executive pay. However, they find a negative relation between abnormal returns on 
the days of these events and CEO compensation. The higher the CEO’s compensation relative to 
industry and size peers, the more negative the reaction. They argue that these results are consistent 
with a value-maximizing view of current pay practices even for firms with extreme levels of 
compensation and that capping or regulating executive pay results in less efficient contracts and 
negatively affects shareholder wealth in these firms. 
REGULATORY CHANGES THAT AFFECTED SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES 
Research has also examined how pay is affected by regulation in specific industries. One 
of the most researched industries has been the banking sector. For example, Bebchuk and Spamann 
(2010) analyze how banks’ compensation structures in particular, produced incentives for 
excessive risk-taking and discuss how such structures should be reformed. First, they argue that 
though there is now wide recognition that pay packages focused excessively on short-term results, 
in banks, in particular, equity-based awards, coupled with the capital structure of banks, tie 
executive compensation to a highly levered bet on the value of banks’ assets. Because bank 
executives expect to share in any gains that flow to shareholders, but are insulated from losses that 
the realization of risks could impose on preferred shareholders, bondholders, depositors, and 
taxpayers, executives have incentives to give insufficient weight to the downside of risky 
strategies. Second, they argue that corporate governance reforms aimed at aligning executive pay 
arrangements with the interests of banks’ common shareholders - such as advisory shareholder 
votes on compensation arrangements, use of restricted stock awards, and increased director 
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oversight and independence - cannot eliminate this problem. In fact, the interests of common 
shareholders could be served by more risk-taking than is socially desirable. Accordingly, while 
such measures could eliminate risk-taking that is excessive even from shareholders’ points of view, 
they cannot be expected to prevent risk-taking that serves shareholders but is socially excessive. 
These conclusions are confirmed to some extent by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) who investigate 
whether bank performance during the 2008 credit crisis is related to CEO incentives before the 
crisis. They find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with 
the interests of shareholders performed worse but no evidence that they performed better. 
However, bank CEOs appear to have been caught out as well. They did not reduce their holdings 
of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely 
large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis. Hence, consistent with Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), 
CEOs with better incentives to maximize shareholder wealth may have taken risks that other CEOs 
did not. Ex ante, these risks looked profitable for shareholders. Ex post, these risks had unexpected 
poor outcomes. These poor outcomes are not evidence of CEOs acting in their own interest at the 
expense of shareholder wealth, though the question whether they were socially optimal remains to 
be answered. 
Regulated industries other than banks also suffer political restrictions on pay. Joskow, 
Rose, and Wolfram (1996) explore the effect of regulatory and political constraints on the level of 
CEO compensation for 87 state-regulated electric utilities during 1978-1990. They document how 
political pressures constrain top executive pay levels in this industry. CEOs of firms operating in 
regulatory environments characterized by investment banks as relatively “pro-consumer” receive 
lower compensation than do CEOs of firms in environments ranked as more friendly to investors. 
CEO pay is lower for utilities with relatively high or rising rates, or a higher proportion of industrial 
customers. Finally, the attributes of the commission appointment and tenure rules also affect CEO 
compensation. For example, CEOs of utilities that operate in states where the commissioners are 
elected are paid less than comparable CEOs of firms operating in states where the commissioners 
are appointed by the governor. 
Finally, the last question on regulation is the issue on who enforces the regulation. In a 
recent paper, Bird, Borochin, and Knopf (2015) study the role of the chief legal officer (CLO) in 
corporate governance. They note that the CLO shapes and enforces corporate governance, but is 
faced with a dual-role paradox that requires her to act as both monitor of corporate governance 
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and executive of the firm. Bird, Borochin, and Knopf study the role of the CLO under 
environments that are most likely to impact governance and affect the CLO’s role as monitor or 
facilitator. Specifically, using a securities class action lawsuit as a financial shock on large 
corporations, they measure changes in CLO value to the firm by computing the total and relative 
compensation of the CLO and other C-suite members. They find that while high opacity 
environments do not significantly impact CFO compensation, they are associated with higher 
relative compensation for the CLO. They suggest that this may be evidence of the CLO’s value as 
a monitor when the ability of principals to do such monitoring is compromised.  
SOCIAL AND EXECUTIVE FACTORS 
So far, we have examined the effect of formal institutional and legal features that affect 
executive compensation. In the last two sub-sections, I will discuss the effect of informal factors 
such as social, gender, and executive specific factors (this section) and the effect of the firm 
environment (next section) in setting executive pay. These factors, while informal, can be explicit 
(such as formal peer groups or network connections) or implicit (social ties or connections). 
PEER GROUPS 
One of the most important of the explicit factors that enter into pay is the compensation 
earned by peers. Is the effect of relative pay (relative to the CEO’s peers) as important as the effect 
of absolute pay levels in determining the power of executive incentives? Traditional principal-
agent theory argues that the answer is yes. This is because the primary means for shareholders to 
ensure that a manager takes optimal actions is to tie her pay to the performance of her firm. If the 
manager is risk averse, the use of high-powered incentives will be tempered by the extent to which 
the performance of the firm is affected by random shocks. However, if the shocks to firm 
performance are correlated across firms in an industry, then Holmström (1982) shows that the 
optimal incentive scheme compensates a firm's manager on the performance of her firm relative 
to those of other firms. There is mixed evidence however, as to the extent to which firms use RPE 
in their compensation contracts.  
In an early paper, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) argue that the usage of RPE need not 
be optimal. They model compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product 
markets and argue that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative 
97 
performance-based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. RPE 
filters out a common industry shock by placing a positive weight on the own firm’s performance 
and a negative weight on the industry’s performance. This negative industry pay-performance 
sensitivity implies that an executive will receive higher compensation if executives of other firms 
in the industry deliver lower returns to their shareholders. Although the relative performance 
evaluation contract reduces the executive’s exposure to risk, it provides incentives to take actions 
that lower industry returns. If rival firms in an industry are strategic competitors, then a 
compensation contract that filters out a common shock necessarily alters a manager's optimal 
strategic product market choices. Hence, the need to soften product market competition generates 
an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. 
Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to 
own firm performance. Aggarwal and Samwick find empirical evidence that the executive 
compensation is positively related to rival firm performance and this relationship increases in the 
degree of competition in the industry. 
Another problem is to determine what the relevant peer group is. In an early paper in this 
area, Porac, Wade, and Pollock (1999) note that by law, corporate boards are required to provide 
shareholders with annual justifications for their CEO pay allocations that contain an explicit 
performance comparison with a set of peer companies that are selected by the board. They collect 
information on the industry membership of chosen peers from a 1993 sample of 280 members of 
the Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500. They argue that boards anchor their comparability judgments 
within a firm’s primary industry, implying board peer definitions center around common-sense 
industry categories. At the same time, they also argue that boards selectively define peers in self-
protective ways, such that peer definitions are expanded beyond industry boundaries when firms 
perform poorly, industries perform well, CEOs are paid highly, and when shareholders are 
powerful and active. Albuquerque (2009) revisits this question, examining how the choice of peer 
group affects tests of relative performance evaluation (RPE), essentially joint tests of how 
incentives are granted and of what constitutes a peer group. She argues that previous tests that use 
just industry alone, for example, to classify potential peer groups, lack power to detect evidence 
that supports RPE because peer groups chosen by researchers are incorrect. The challenge in 
choosing a RPE peer group is to identify the set of firms that are exposed to common shocks and 
share a common ability to respond to those shocks. 
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If firms’ external shocks are best described by economy-wide shocks, then the relevant 
group of peers are the S&P 500 firms or the firms in some other market index. If external shocks 
are mostly industry-specific, industry peers might serve as better peers. However, if common 
external shocks affect some firms in the industry negatively and others positively, then average 
industry performance will fail to capture the external shock. In other words, if firms within the 
industry are sufficiently heterogeneous, then an industry index is a noisy measure of peer 
performance. Albuquerque posits that firms of different size are exposed to different shocks and 
face different constraints in responding to those shocks. Hence she constructs peer groups based 
on industry and size quartiles and shows that these two dimensions apparently show significant 
evidence in favor of the usage of RPE in CEO pay. In contrast, forming peer groups on industry 
plus other firm characteristics, such as diversification, financing constraints, and operating 
leverage does not support the usage of RPE. 
How do these implicit peer groups derived from industry-size match up with the actual 
peer groups used by firms? In 2006, executive compensation disclosure rules mandated by the 
SEC required firms to provide details on how performance targets - including relative performance 
targets - are used in setting executive pay. Gong, Li, and Shin (2011) take advantage of this 
regulatory requirement to examine the use of RPE in executive compensation contracts and the 
explicit selection of RPE peers in a sample of S&P1500 firms who first disclosed under these rules. 
They find that about 25 percent of their sample firms explicitly use RPE in setting executive 
compensation. However, matching on industry and size does not appear favor the use of RPE. 
They argue that a lack of knowledge of both actual peer-group composition and the link between 
RPE-based performance targets and future peer performance significantly hinder the implicit test 
based on industry-size quartiles from detecting RPE use. Firms exposed to higher common risk, 
operating in less-concentrated industries, having fewer growth opportunities, and hiring less-
wealthy CEOs are more likely to use RPE. These findings are in line with economic theories 
predicting that a firm’s use of RPE increases with the firm’s exposure to common risk (Rajgopal, 
Shevlin and Zamora, 2006) and decreases with the CEO’s self-hedging ability (Garvey and 
Milbourn, 2003). I will discuss these papers later in the survey (in the section on firm 
environments). 
Why do the actual peer groups differ from the implicit industry-size derived peer groups? 
Companies can potentially use compensation peer groups to inflate pay in three ways – they can 
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target pay at higher percentiles of the peer group pay distribution in order to benchmark pay against 
firms that have higher compensation, they can choose peer firms that are larger and have better 
performance, since compensation is correlated with firm size and performance, and finally, holding 
labor market factors constant, they can choose peer firms with higher compensation levels. Using 
data on disclosed peer groups for Execucomp firms in 2006-2007, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Nguyen 
(2011) find that although peers are largely selected based on characteristics that reflect the labor 
market for managerial talent, peer groups are constructed in a manner that biases compensation 
upward, particularly in firms outside the S&P 500. For example, around a third of the firms in the 
sample report using pay targets above the 50th percentile. For non-S&P 500 firms in particular, 
the median peer firms are approximately 25% larger in terms of sales revenue, and have total 
compensation that is approximately 16.5% higher than that of the sample firms.  
However, Albuquerque, De Franco, and Verdi (2013) argue against the interpretation that 
firms strategically choose peer groups that reward CEOs largely because of self-serving interests. 
They propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for 
unobserved CEO talent. They test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into 
talent and self-serving components. Specifically, they use the fitted value from a regression of the 
peer pay effect on CEO talent measures as a proxy for talent. CEO measures of talent are the 
historical abnormal stock and accounting performance, the market value of the firms that the CEO 
managed in the past, and the number of times the CEO is referred to in the business press. They 
use the fitted value from a regression of the peer pay effect on proxies for weak corporate 
governance (board structure, antitakeover provisions, and ownership concentration) as a proxy for 
self-serving behavior. They find that the association between a firm’s selection of highly paid peers 
and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent and does not appear to be driven by 
self-serving behavior at the firm. 
This war for talent explanation is also offered by Gao, Luo and Tang (2015) who find that 
companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especially equity-based pay, after 
losing executives to other firms. Based on over 500 job-hopping events from 1993 to 2011, they 
show that the pay raise is larger when incumbent executives have greater employment mobility in 
the labor market, when companies lose senior executives, and when job-hopping executives 
receive favorable job offers in their new firms. A company’s subsequent pay raise to incumbent 
executives after losing an executive reduces the differential between its pay and executive 
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compensation relative to its industry peer firms, and appears effective at retaining its incumbent 
executives after the pay raise.  
Bereskin and Cicero (2013) examine the level of compensation at firms that experienced a 
shock to their governance environment. Specifically, in 1995, the Delaware Supreme Court 
strengthened the ability of a target company’s management to “just say no” to a hostile takeover 
threat. As a result, the rules for resisting hostile takeovers were altered in an unexpected manner, 
and Delaware firms found themselves newly insulated from the corporate control market. Bereskin 
and Cicero show that CEOs at a subset of Delaware firms in which the managers likely gained the 
most security from the new laws extracted private benefits in the form of higher compensation. 
Specifically, they estimate an increase of over 30% in abnormal CEO compensation at the firms 
in which managers gained the most security. More interesting, the increased compensation spilled 
over to other firms who were likely to be competing with the entrenched Delaware firms for the 
same executive talent. They find, for example, a significant increase in the level of compensation 
at firms that are not incorporated in Delaware, but operate in industries with a substantial number 
of firms that were directly affected by the legal changes. The compensation contagion is observed 
with a lag and there is significant persistence in the higher pay, consistent with firms responding 
after their competitors’ compensation details are disclosed.  
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
A second informal channel that affects pay is largely implicit – the value of the social 
capital of the CEO. The literature has argued that social capital can be used either for rent-seeking 
or for increasing firm value.  
The first strand argues that a CEO with high social capital can extract abnormal rents from 
the shareholders. Social similarity and high status increases CEO influence over their 
compensation chairs, resulting in high CEO pay. Similarly, low-status compensation chairs 
(particularly those who are lower status than their CEOs) will be willing to approve higher 
compensation for their CEOs. As an early example, Belliveau, O’Reilly and Wade (1996) explore 
the effects of social capital, on CEO compensation in a sample of 61 CEO-compensation 
committee chairperson dyads. They collect social capital data from Who's Who in Finance and 
Industry, including career histories, board memberships, club affiliations, trusteeships, educational 
attainment, and names of educational institutions attended. They compute social similarity in terms 
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of the overlap between the backgrounds of a firm’s CEO and the chair of its compensation 
committee. Similarly, they compute social status as the total numbers of corporate board 
memberships, trusteeships, memberships in social clubs, and the prestige of the undergraduate 
institution attended by the CEO and the chair. They find that while social similarity does not 
influence pay, the chair’s absolute social capital and a CEO’s social capital relative to his or her 
chair's significantly increases CEO compensation.  
The second strand argues that social capital is strategically valuable to firms and thus 
should be reflected in executive compensation. One example of this strand is provided by 
Geletkanycz, Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001). In a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms, they show that 
the strength of the director network of the CEO (proxied by factors such as number of directorships 
with Fortune 1000 firms and the average net sales of each directorship) weakly positively 
influences pay. However, they go on to show that the effect of social capital is particularly strong 
in diversified firms, where the demand for strategic resources is likely to be higher. Engleberg, 
Gao, and Parsons (2013) update this study to examine roughly 2,700 CEOs of large public firms 
for the years 2000-2007. They reconstruct the CEO’s potential Rolodex using BoardEx, a 
proprietary database that reports (among other items) a CEO’s past or current business 
relationships, affiliations with charitable or volunteer organizations, boards on which the CEO has 
served, and past universities attended and proxy for the CEO’s connections using the sum of other 
external (outside the CEO’s firm) executives or directors related to the CEO through any of these 
channels. They find that CEOs with large networks earn significantly more than those with small 
networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases 
compensation by about $17,000 on average, and more so for “important” members, such as CEOs 
of large firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, 
which they take as evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay. A third 
paper that also argues that networks benefit the firm (and hence should be compensated for) is 
Butler and Gurun (2012) who show that mutual funds whose managers are in the same educational 
network as the firm’s CEO (what they term as educationally connected firms) are more likely to 
vote against shareholder-initiated proposals to limit executive compensation than out-of-network 
funds are. CEOs of firms who have relatively high levels of educationally connected mutual fund 
ownership have higher levels of compensation than their unconnected counterparts. They relate 
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compensation to both the abnormal trading performance of the connected investors in the firm and 
the perceived quality of firm management by the connected investors. 
NETWORKS 
Networks can affect compensation not only through links between the executives and 
outside investors but also through links between the directors or outside investors themselves. 
Renneboog and Zhao (2011) examine the relation between CEO compensation and networks of 
executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. 
They distinguish between two effects of networks - connections with (peer) companies through 
directorships enable a firm to gain access to information or they may help managers to increase 
their bargaining power in obtaining higher compensation. Renneboog and Zhao find that, in 
companies with strong networks (and presumably busy boards), the directors’ monitoring 
effectiveness is reduced, leading in turn, to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO 
compensation. Hwang and Kim (2009) extend the analysis from formal networks to informal social 
ties among directors. Specifically, they hand-collect data on boards at the Fortune 100 firms from 
1996 to 2005 and show that conventional measures of board independence, wherein a director is 
classified as independent if he has neither financial nor familial ties to the chief executive officer 
(CEO) or to the firm, neglect social ties such as mutual alma maters, military service, regional 
origin, academic discipline, and industry and hence considerably overstate the degree of 
independence at the board. They find that firms whose boards are conventionally and socially 
independent award a significantly lower level of compensation to their CEOs, relative to than firms 
whose boards are only conventionally independent. Similarly, CEOs whose audit committees are 
conventionally independent but socially linked (to the CEO) receive larger bonuses than otherwise 
equivalent CEOs whose audit committees are both conventionally and socially independent. 
INDIVIDUAL EXECUTIVE CHARACTERISTICS: REPUTATION, AGE, AND GENDER 
Finally, the last informal factor that affects compensation is characteristics that are specific 
to the executive. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) find that time-invariant manager fixed effects explain 
a significant proportion of the variation in executive pay. These manager fixed effects appear more 
important than firm fixed effects in explaining the level of executive pay. Compensation fixed 
effects are significantly correlated with management styles.  
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What specific factors drive the significance of these managerial characteristics in 
determining pay? One possibility is the prominence of the manager within the firm. Bigley and 
Wiersema (2002) examine how the power and orientations of newly appointed CEOs’ interact to 
influence a particular type of strategic change - that of corporate strategic refocusing. Newly 
appointed CEOs often take office just prior to major corporate-level strategic change initiatives 
and, thus, are likely to be heavily involved with organizational change efforts. They can use their 
power to support the status quo or engage in corporate refocusing. Bigley and Wiersema argue that 
this choice may depend on their experience as “heir apparent”, (defined as executives in the 
president or COO positions) which represents the extent to which they have been socialized to the 
CEO position by their predecessors. They find that power use is influenced by heir apparent 
experience in predicting the level of corporate strategic refocusing. High compensation and heir 
apparent experience decreases the extent to which CEOs will shake up the status quo. However, 
Bigley and Wiersema do not investigate whether becoming the heir apparent increases the 
likelihood of earning higher pay. Mobbs and Raheja (2012) examine this precise issue in 
comparing firms that promote a single executive and companies that conduct tournaments among 
inside managers to succeed the CEO. Single-successor firms give more pay-for-performance 
compensation to the designated successor, are more likely in firms or industries where firm-
specific human capital is more important to the CEO position, and where the supply of potential 
outside CEO replacements is limited. In addition, these firms are associated with lower CEO 
turnover sensitivity to firm performance.  
A second possibility is the prominence of the CEO in the external community. Wade, 
Porac, Pollock, and Graffin (2006) use the results from Financial World’s widely publicized 
certification contest, CEO of the Year, to investigate the impact of such contests on firm 
performance and executive compensation. Financial World ran an annual contest from 1975 to 
1996 ranking CEOs on factors such as general performance, performance during downturns, 
effective team work and contribution to the industry or community. They find that certified CEOs 
receive higher compensation than noncertified CEOs when performance was high but lower 
remuneration when performance was poor. Although certifications appear to generate positive 
abnormal returns when they are first announced, the longer-term impact of CEO certifications 
appears to be negative. However, the issue with this measure is that many of the criteria for the 
award are not independent of firm performance (and hence not attributable solely to CEO 
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characteristics). Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) attempt to specifically measure CEO narcissism 
using proxies such as the prominence of the CEO’s photograph in annual reports, the CEO’s 
prominence in press releases, the CEO’s use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews, and 
compensation relative to the second-highest-paid firm executive - to examine the effect of CEO 
narcissism on a firm's strategy and performance. In a sample of 111 CEOs in the computer 
hardware and software industries in 1992-2004, they show that narcissism in CEOs is positively 
related to strategic dynamism and grandiosity, as well as the number and size of acquisitions. They 
argue that narcissistic CEOs favor bold actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins or big 
losses, but that, in these industries, their firms’ performance is generally no better or worse than 
firms with non-narcissistic CEOs.  
The important question for this survey is whether this narcissism translates into pay. 
Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that it does. They show that compensation, status, and press 
coverage of managers in the United States follow a highly skewed distribution with a small number 
of “superstars” enjoying the bulk of the rewards. They classify CEOs as superstars based on 
whether the CEOs win prominent national awards such as those conferred by Business Week, 
Financial World, Chief Executive, Forbes, Industry Week, Morningstar.com, Time, Time/CNN, 
Electronic Business Magazine, and Ernst & Young. Award-winning CEOs subsequently 
underperform, both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-
winning CEOs. Importantly, at the same time, they extract more compensation following the 
awards, both in absolute amounts and relative to other top executives in their firms. They also 
spend more time on public and private activities outside their companies, such as assuming board 
seats or writing books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. 
The effects are strongest in firms with weak corporate governance.   
A third possibility is age and experience. Ryan and Wiggins (2001) analyze the influence 
of firm and managerial characteristics on executive compensation. They use the CEO’s age to 
proxy for the horizon problem. Specifically, both the youngest and oldest executives are faced 
with horizon conflicts. Older CEOs have incentives to choose projects that pay off before 
retirement while younger CEOs focus on short-term goals to build their reputations. Building on 
Kole (1997), Ryan and Wiggins suggest that firms use their compensation plans to mitigate myopic 
behavior, offering more equity-based incentives and lower cash bonuses to the youngest and the 
oldest managers. Hence there should be a convex relation between equity-based pay and CEO age 
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but a concave relation between cash bonus and CEO age. They find a concave relation between 
cash bonus and CEO age but oddly, a negative linear relation between option payments and age 
and a concave relation between restricted stock and age. 
A fourth possibility is the gender of the executive. Recent academic research has stressed 
the importance of gender in setting compensation levels.  In an early study, Lyness and Thompson 
(1997) compare career and work experiences of a small sample (around 50 each) of executives of 
both genders working as financial services executives in comparable jobs. Lyness and Thompson 
use archival information on organizational outcomes and career histories, and survey measures of 
work experiences. They find that several organizational outcomes, such as compensation, and 
work attitudes are similar across the two genders. However, they also find differences in authority 
and the composition of pay, with women having less authority, and receiving fewer stock options 
than men. Part of the differences may also be explained by differences in career paths followed by 
male and female executives. Lyness and Thompson (2000) investigate this possibility by 
comparing the career paths of matched samples of 69 female executives and 69 male executives. 
Career success, measured by organizational level and compensation, is positively related to 
breadth of experience and developmental assignments for both genders. Developmental 
experiences and career histories are similar for female and male executives, but men have more 
overseas assignments and women have more assignments with non-authority relationships. 
Turning to large sample evidence, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) find much starker raw 
differences between gender-based compensation in a large sample of Execucomp firms for the 
years 1992-1997. They find that women, who represent about 2.5% of the sample, earn about 45% 
less than men. However, consistent with Lyness and Thompson (1997) on the overall level of pay, 
Bertrand and Hallock find that around three-quarters of this gap can be explained by the fact that 
women manage smaller companies and are less likely to be CEO, Chair, or company President. 
After controlling for the younger average age and lower average seniority of the female executives, 
the unexplained gap falls to less than 5%. Finally, they show that between 1992 and 1997, women 
nearly tripled their participation in the top executive ranks and also strongly improved their relative 
compensation, mostly by gaining representation in larger corporations. Vieito and Khan (2012) 
update these results in a sample of S&P1500 listed firms during the period from 1992 to 2004. 
Consistent with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), they find that the gender gap in executive 
compensation decreases after the year 2000. Interestingly, firms continue to pay women, who may 
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be more risk averse than men, a similar proportion of risky compensation components, such as 
stock options and restricted stocks, as they pay to men. Overall, these studies appear to show that 
gender-based differences are not extremely significant in explaining differences in pay to 
executives in general. These papers do not however, separately examine CEOs.  
Bugeja, Matolcsy, and Spiropoulos (2012) do, by specifically examining gender-based 
differences in CEO pay. They do not find any association between CEO pay and gender in either 
their total sample or in a sample matched using propensity scores to control for firm characteristics. 
This lack of significance holds for total pay, salary, and bonuses. They conclude that women who 
rise through the “glass ceiling” to the level of CEO are remunerated at similar levels to their male 
counterparts. However, in a recent working paper, Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Tåg (2016) find 
intriguing contrasting evidence in Sweden. They use large-sample micro-level data Swedish 
corporate executives and their personal characteristics to study gender gaps in CEO appointments 
and pay. They document that the gaps are sizeable – ranging from around a fifth for CEO 
appointments to a quarter for pay. They attribute at most about an eighth of the gaps to observable 
gender differences in executives’ and their firms’ characteristics. They argue that male and female 
executives sharing equal attributes neither have equal opportunities to reach the top, nor are they 
equally paid. Whether these results are unique to Sweden or whether they are attributable to the 
lack of micro-level data in other countries remains to be investigated. 
 
FIRM ENVIRONMENTS 
 
So far, we have examined how specific firm level factors (such as peer group composition 
and pay) affect executive compensation. But this leaves unanswered the question of whether 
general market conditions (that affect all firms) affect compensation. Do firms separate the market 
wide component of firm returns from the compensation package?  
Agency theory predicts that market indexation of compensation is optimal because 
executives cannot affect the overall market by their actions and it is costly for an executive to bear 
the relative risks. For example, in a practitioner piece, Rappaport (1999) notes that during the bull 
market’s run at the end of the last century, even below-average performers reap huge gains from 
stock options when the market is rising rapidly. He recommends replacing conventional stock 
options with options that are tied to a market or peer index. Below-average performers would not 
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be rewarded under such plans; superior performers could, depending on the way plans were 
structured, receive even more. However, as documented previously, these recommendations never 
caught on. CEO pay packages are not typically market indexed, appearing to reward managers for 
stock price increases due to general market trends. The literature has offered two hypotheses to 
explain the lack of market indexation.  
In the first hypothesis, general market movements also increase the CEO’s marketability. 
Oyer (2004) posits that not indexing compensation by market performance is optimal if the CEO’s 
reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy's fortunes. 
Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) empirically find support for this argument in a sample of 
S&P 500 CEOs over the period 1993-2001. They argue that the CEO’s outside opportunities 
depend on his talent, as proxied by the CEO’s financial press visibility and his firm's industry-
adjusted return on assets (ROA). They find that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to industry-
wide and market-wide performance is systematically higher for CEOs with greater press visibility 
and superior industry-adjusted ROA during the prior 3 years. Their results are consistent with the 
view that industry-wide and market-wide shocks increase demand for CEO talent outside the firm, 
which in turn, forces some firms to increase compensation levels to retain their more talented 
CEOs. 
In the second hypothesis, firms do not need to index compensation by market movements 
because executives can themselves index their private portfolios to undo excess market risk. 
Garvey and Milbourn (2003) follow Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) in decomposing firm risk 
into its systematic and idiosyncratic components. They find that idiosyncratic risk has a significant 
negative effect on pay sensitivities, while the coefficient on market risk is insignificantly different 
from zero. In other words, market risk appears to have little effect on the use of stock-based pay 
for the average executive. However, younger and less wealthy managers may have difficulty 
insuring themselves against market risk because their mobility is lower. Garvey and Milbourn find 
that market risk is an important determination of the pay-performance relationship for younger 
managers. Firms do not appear to treat market risk as important for the wealthiest managers in 
their sample, but the pay of the least wealthy managers removes approximately 80 percent of their 
market risk. 
Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008) examine a different societal environment that influences 
executive compensation – societal opinion (through the press). Specifically, they examine the 
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press’s role in monitoring and influencing executive compensation practice using more than 
11,000 press articles about CEO compensation from 1994 to 2002. They find that negative press 
coverage is more strongly related to excess annual pay than to raw annual pay, suggesting a 
sophisticated approach by the media in selecting CEOs to cover. Negative coverage is also greater 
for CEOs with more option exercises, suggesting the press engages in some degree of 
“sensationalism.” However, Core, Guay and Larcker (2008) find little evidence that firms respond 
to negative press coverage by decreasing excess CEO compensation or increasing CEO turnover. 
Executive compensation can also be linked to other general firm specific factors that are 
unrelated to either performance or effort. In particular, a group of papers links compensation to the 
size of the firm. The relation between pay and size was first documented in an early paper by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990b). They define pay-performance sensitivity as the change in CEO 
wealth associated with a one-dollar change in shareholder wealth. They estimate pay-performance 
sensitivity by regressing first differences of CEO compensation on first differences of the market 
value of the firm. This approach implicitly assumes that the sensitivity is independent of the market 
value of the firm. However, when Jensen and Murphy partition their sample based on market value, 
they find smaller firms offer more powerful incentives.  
To explain Jensen and Murphy’s result on firm size, Schaefer (1998) argues that CEOs 
need to use more effort (or need to be more talented) to manage small firms than large firms. 
However, since the variance of shareholder wealth is also increasing with size, a larger firm that 
increases its executive’s pay-performance sensitivity reduces the total certainty equivalent by more 
than a small firm. It would be efficient for a large firm to do this only if the value created by the 
resulting increase in executive effort more than offsets the loss due to executive risk aversion. He 
goes on to examine the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive 
compensation depends on the wealth of the firm's shareholders and finds that pay-performance 
sensitivity appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size, where 
size is measured by either market capitalization or assets. Pay-performance sensitivity for 
executives working for the same firm also appear to have the same properties as CEO pay-
performance sensitivity. 
Gabaix and Landier (2008) offer a simpler explanation of why firm size matters so much. 
They develop an equilibrium model of CEO pay in which CEOs have different talents and are 
matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO’s pay depends 
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on both the size of his firm and the aggregate firm size. While CEO talent shows a very small 
dispersion, a striking increase in firm size dispersion leads to dramatic differences in CEO 
compensation. For example, they show in the baseline specification of the model’s parameters, the 
sixfold increase of U.S. CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 can be almost fully attributed to the 
sixfold increase in market capitalization of large companies during that period. In an update, 
Gabaix, Landier, and Sauvagnat (2014) examine the Gabaix-Landier model in the hold-out period 
2004-2011, a period not part of the original sample. They find the ex ante executive compensation 
closely tracked the evolution of average firm value over the holdout period. During 2007-2009, 
for example, firm value decreased by 17%, and CEO pay by 28%. During 2009-11, firm value 
increased by 19% and CEO pay by 22%. 
Beyond size, the literature is smaller, though papers have linked compensation to other 
firm-specific factors including leverage, diversification, the general strategic orientation of the 
firm, and its environmental policy. I discuss each in turn below. 
Why should leverage be linked to compensation? The idea is that the firm’s use of debt is 
related to the compensation structure through its bankruptcy status. Titman (1984) argues that 
customers, workers, and suppliers of firms that produce unique or specialized products are likely 
to suffer high costs in the event of liquidation. In particular, in a setting where employees have 
firm-specific human capital, the fact that bankruptcy can impose significant costs on employees 
(by reducing the value of their human capital) can significantly reduce the attractiveness of debt 
to the firm.  
Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) test whether human capital costs are a determinant 
in the firm’s capital structure by analyzing the relation between the observed firm capital structures 
and CEO compensation, as well as the relation between observed capital structures and the average 
wages of their work forces. They show that leverage has a significantly positive impact on cash, 
equity-based, and total compensation of CEOs. The compensation of new CEOs hired from outside 
the firm is positively related to prior-year firm leverage. In addition, leverage has a positive and 
significant impact on average employee pay. The incremental total labor expenses associated with 
an increase in leverage are large enough to offset the incremental tax benefits of debt. Overall, 
they argue that labor costs limit the use of debt. However, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 
(2006) take the opposite view. They relate the firm’s credit rating to the strength of its corporate 
governance, finding that weak governance (as proxied by the number of blockholders, CEO power, 
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takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock 
ownership, and board expertise) can result in firms incurring higher debt financing costs. To 
answer the question of why some firms are willing to bear these higher debt costs by being 
unwilling to practice good corporate governance, they conjecture that CEOs of these firms extract 
rents from firms with weak corporate governance in the form of excess compensation and are 
unwilling to give those rents up. They document CEOs of firms with speculative-grade credit 
ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree than their counterparts at firms with investment-
grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why some firms operate with weak governance. 
The puzzle is why these executives do not appear concerned about potential bankruptcy status as 
in Titman’s model. One way to reconcile these two findings is by noting that Chemmanur, Cheng 
and Zhang’s results do not apply to firms where employees do not have firm-specific human capital 
and there is a difference in the two samples of firms. 
Similarly, Rose and Shepard (1997) examine the relation between CEO compensation and 
firm diversification over 1985-1990, finding that the CEO of a firm with two lines of business 
averages 13% more in salary and bonus than the CEO of a similar-sized but undiversified firm, 
ceteris paribus. They argue that their results are due to the matching of higher-ability CEOs with 
firms that are more difficult to manage - the compensation premium is invariant to CEO tenure, 
and incumbents who diversify their firms earn less than newly hired CEOs at already-diversified 
firms. 
Rajgopalan and Finkelstein (1992) analyze how the general strategic orientation of the firm 
affects its compensation policy. They relate compensation to the availability of multiple options 
to the firm, how routine managerial tasks are, whether there is a clear relation between effort and 
outcomes and whether the outcome can be measured easily. If the firm’s activities are heavily 
regulated for example, they conjecture that firms would pay a salary with little incentive 
components. In contrast, in a deregulated period, they would pay compensation that is more closely 
tied to firm outcomes.  In a sample of 50 electric utility firms across two time periods covering a 
total of 10 years (periods corresponding to regulated and deregulated environments in the 
industry), they find that firms with more discretionary strategic orientations offer greater 
compensation, more outcome-based compensation plans and greater proportion of outcome-based 
cash compensation than firms with less discretionary strategic orientations. Similarly, after 
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deregulation, firms increased pay levels, and paid more in the form of outcome-based 
compensation plans than before deregulation. 
Finally, a few papers relate compensation to the environmental policy of the firm. Berrone 
and Gomez-Meijia (2009) hypothesize that, in polluting industries, good environmental 
performance increases CEO pay; that environmental governance mechanisms strengthen this 
linkage; that pollution prevention strategies affect executive compensation more than pollution 
control after the fact; and that long-term pay increases pollution prevention success. They find 
some support for each of these hypotheses. However, firms with an explicit environmental pay 
policy and an environmental committee do not reward environmental strategies more than those 
without such structures, suggesting that these mechanisms play a merely symbolic role. 
 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF PAY  
How does compensation policy affect the firm? The primary reason for designing executive 
compensation is to affect firm performance. So the most important question is whether 
compensation really affects performance of the firm and vice versa – whether the shareholders, 
boards, and other players discussed in the previous section change policy (for example by firing 
the manager) after observing performance. In the following subsection, I first discuss the relation 
between compensation and firm performance, our most important issue.  
What happens if performance is not as desired? The papers discussed in the second 
subsection below argue that the risk of getting fired acts as a possible alternative to cutting pay. 
The risk of getting fired is a risk borne by managers who in turn, demand additional compensation 
to insure them against the risk of being mistakenly fired. The third subsection examines whether 
the level of compensation or its structure have any additional real consequences for the firm 
beyond just its effect on performance. It examines how compensation affects firm policy on 
investment, cash holdings, payout structure, pension plans, and socially responsible initiatives. 
Finally, in the last subsection, I discuss one unwanted firm-level consequence – the effect of 
compensation policy on earnings and performance manipulation and actions taken by managers to 
reduce risk to themselves. 
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FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
One of the earliest and most influential papers in this area was Murphy (1985). Murphy 
examines the first side of the coin – does an increase in firm performance increase executive 
compensation? The answer is yes. Writing before the release of Execucomp data, Murphy gathers 
corporate proxy statements from 105 firms in the Fortune 500 between 1964-1981 for a total of 
501 executives and regresses compensation paid on the performance of the firm, as measured by 
shareholder return and growth in firm sales. He finds that executive compensation is strongly 
positively related to corporate performance.  
Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang (1996) focus on the type of performance compensation is 
supposed to affect. They examine the sensitivity of CEO compensation to different performance 
measures and argue specifically that the sensitivity of compensation to performance is directly 
related to the presence of investment opportunities for the firm. They predict stronger associations 
between compensation and performance for firms with greater investment opportunities. They also 
predict greater use of market-based, rather than accounting-based, performance indicators as a 
basis for incentive payments when investment opportunities are substantial components of firm 
value. As in Murphy (1985), they obtain proxy statements by a mail request to over 4000 firms in 
1992 and 1993. Since they need first differences for their independent variables, their final sample 
consists of changes in compensation paid to CEOs of 1,249 publicly-traded U.S. firms. As proxies 
for investment opportunities, Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang run a factor analysis on sixteen 
variables that proxy for investment opportunities including measures of market-to-book assets, 
market-to-book equity, Tobin's Q, E/P, R&D/assets, R&D/sales, net property, plant, and 
equipment/market value of assets, variance of return on total market value, investment/revenue, 
and the variability of earnings per share. They then regress changes in compensation on the firm’s 
annual return, its ROE, investment factor and interaction terms between returns and investment. 
They find that the interaction terms, in particular, strongly explain compensation, suggesting that 
the presence of investment opportunities significantly affects the sensitivity of CEO compensation 
to firm performance.  
The problem, however, is that not all investment is good. For example, the rent extraction 
explanation for compensation suggests that managers who have private benefits of investment and 
are entrenched can over-invest to the detriment of shareholder value. Aggarwal and Samwick 
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(2006) develop a model wherein managers choose the level of investment. Managers can derive 
private benefits from investment, so that their utility is increasing in the level of investment. 
Managers are empire-builders and continue to choose investment projects even after all positive 
net present value investments have been taken. However, investment may also be costly for 
managers. For example, the disutility of investment may come from bearing oversight 
responsibilities for that investment. In general, when firms expand existing facilities or start new 
product lines, managers are required to do more—there is simply more activity to manage. If 
managers have private costs, they will forego some positive net present value investments in order 
to lessen the amount that they have to do. Given these assumptions, managers will overinvest when 
they have private benefits and underinvest when there are costs to investment. Therefore, the 
optimal incentive contract for the manager should reduce both the over- or underinvestment 
problem.  
Empirically, Aggarwal and Samwick regress Tobin’s Q and investment on PPS of the top 
management team, using a set of exogenous parameters that are related to the firm’s operating 
environment (the variance of firm performance and the productivity of investment), and show that 
investment is increasing in incentives. Further, firm performance increases with incentives at all 
levels of incentives. Taken together, they argue that these results are inconsistent with theories of 
overinvestment based on managers having private benefits of investment and more consistent with 
managers having private costs of investment and, more generally, models of underinvestment. 
Morgan and Poulsen (2001) use a different, more direct, method to link compensation to 
firm performance. They analyze what happens to share prices at S&P 500 firms between 1992-
1995 when managers sponsor compensation plans linking pay to performance. They find that 
shareholders gain at the announcement of the plans, especially when the plans are directed toward 
the firm's top executives. The proposing firms are those that can most benefit from the plans, given 
their asset type and agency considerations. For example, high-investment opportunity firms, where 
it is especially difficult to define appropriate future managerial actions, are more likely to propose 
pay-for-performance compensation schemes. Despite negative features in some of the plans, 
shareholders overwhelmingly vote for them. They are more likely to vote in favour of the plan 
when the firm has greater investment opportunities and less likely when the plan has negative 
characteristics such as when it dilutes shareholder stakes. 
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The conclusion that pay is positively related to performance is however, not 
unambiguously clear. Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2016) use large sample data on CEO pay from 
Execucomp and find evidence that CEO pay is negatively related to future stock returns for periods 
up to three years after sorting on pay. Firms that pay their CEOs in the top ten percent of excess 
pay earn negative abnormal returns over the next three years of approximately -8%. The effect is 
stronger for CEOs who receive higher incentive pay relative to their peers and stronger for CEOs 
with greater tenure. They argue that their results appear to be driven by high-pay related CEO 
overconfidence that leads to shareholder wealth losses from activities such as overinvestment and 
value-destroying mergers and acquisitions. 
Another popular stream of research investigates not the overall level of pay, but the 
composition of pay. In particular, it examines components of executive compensation, specifically 
option payments, to analyse its relation with future performance. For example, Mehran (1995) 
builds on Murphy (1985) by examining first, the structure of incentive compensation, rather than 
its level, and second, the relation between compensation, the firm’s ownership structure, and the 
composition of its board of directors in a sample of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 
1979-1980. He investigates whether compensation is positively related to ownership structure and 
whether firm performance is positively related to pay. He finds evidence in favor of both. 
Specifically, he runs two OLS regression models where he regresses compensation structure on a 
number of independent variables, most importantly, the ownership structure and control (as 
proxied by the percentage of equity held by managers, percentage of equity held by all outside 
blockholders, and the percentage of outside directors). He also regresses firm performance on 
compensation and ownership structure. He finds that firm performance is positively related to the 
percentage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-
based. Equity-based compensation is used more extensively in firms with more outside directors. 
Firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders use 
less equity-based compensation. Turning to the other side of the coin, whether compensation 
affects performance, Mehran documents that firm performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q and by 
return on assets, are positively related to the percentage of executive compensation that is equity-
based, and firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers. 
Overall, he argues that the form, rather than the level of compensation, is what motivates managers 
to increase firm value. 
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Another heavily-cited paper in this stream is by Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) who 
estimate the relation between ESO grants to the top five executives and future earnings to examine 
whether incentive alignment or rent extraction by top managers explains option granting behavior. 
They document that the future operating income associated with a dollar of Black-Scholes value 
of an ESO grant is $3.71. To understand the source of these positive payoffs, they then parse out 
ESO grant values into components predicted by economic determinants of option grants (growth 
opportunities, and cash and dividend constraints), governance quality (the division of power 
between the shareholders and managers, the relation between CEO and the board of directors, and 
the number of board meetings), and a residual grant value and argue that the payoffs to ESOs 
appear to be driven predominantly by the economic determinants of option grants. The relation 
between ESO grant values and proxies for the quality of governance variables provide little support 
for the rent extraction hypothesis. Kato, Lemmon, Luo, and Schallheim (2005) find similar 
evidence in a sample of Japanese firms. In May 1997, the Japanese Commercial Code was 
amended to allow firms to begin granting stock options as compensation to top management and 
employees. Nearly 350 firms adopted option-based compensation plans between 1997 and 2001. 
These options typically have five-year lives and are out-of-the-money by about 5% at the grant 
date. They find that firms exhibit abnormal stock returns of about 2% around the announcements 
of plan adoptions. They also find improvements in operating performance while dividend policy 
and volatility remain unchanged post-adoption. They argue that well-designed incentive 
compensation plans create shareholder value. 
Other papers have discussed the pay-performance relation in specific types of firms. For 
example, Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) (discussed earlier in Section II), examine the 
determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-
level managers, and non-exempt employees of "new economy" firms. Their exploratory tests 
indicate that lower than expected grants and/or existing holdings of options are associated with 
poorer performance in subsequent years. Similarly, Fahenbrach and Stulz (2011) (discussed in 
detail in Section III), investigate whether the reasons banks performed so poorly during the recent 
credit crisis is because their incentives were poorly designed before the crisis. Apparently not. 
Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. 
Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis. Dial and 
Murphy (1995) drill into a single firm, General Dynamics. In 1991, after the Cold War era, General 
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Dynamics faced declining demand in an industry with projected excess capacity. It engaged a new 
management team which adopted an explicit corporate objective of creating shareholder value. 
The company tied executive compensation to shareholder wealth creation, using a Gain/Sharing 
Plan that paid large cash rewards for increases in the stock price. Subsequently the managers 
implemented a strategy that included downsizing, restructuring, and exit and also paid themselves 
large bonuses. Paying large executive cash bonuses amid layoffs ignited controversy. However, 
by 1993 shareholders realized gains approaching $4.5 billion, representing a dividend-reinvested 
return of 553%, leading Dial and Murphy to argue that appropriately structuring incentive pay can 
cause even firms in declining industries to create value.  
An alternative approach, more common in the strategy than the finance literature, examines 
the relation between compensation to the entire top management team (TMT) and firm 
performance. Carpenter and Sanders (2002) for example, suggest that firm performance is 
positively related to the total TMT member pay when TMT pay is aligned with shareholder 
interests. They define alignment along two dimensions – external (long-term pay components of 
TMT pay) and internal (the residual of TMT pay regressed on CEO total pay and the complexity 
of managerial tasks with complexity proxied by firm size, R&D intensity, and product and 
geographical diversification). They find that CEO pay drives TMT pay, and TMT compensation 
in turn, predicts performance (return on assets and Tobin’s Q). Siegel and Hambrick (2005) argue. 
in addition, that pay disparity within the TMT negatively affects firm performance. They use three 
years of data on publicly traded technologically intensive (measured by the R&D/sales ratio) firms 
from a proprietary database obtained from a compensation consulting firm. They argue that firms 
with high R&D/Sales ratios require multiway information processing and collaboration among 
senior executives of a firm, and that this collaboration diminishes when large pay disparities exist. 
They find that TMT pay disparity is more detrimental to subsequent performance of high-
technology firms than low-technology firms.  
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011) build on Siegel and Hambrick by investigating how 
the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) (the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive 
team captured by the CEO), affects the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The 
dataset is taken from Execucomp over the period from 1993-2004 and is hence considerably deeper 
than the Siegel and Hambrick dataset. Though the empirical implications are similar, the 
underlying mechanisms of the underlying papers are different. Siegel and Hambrick argue that 
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fairness considerations reduce collaboration within teams when pay disparities exist. Bebchuk, 
Cremers, and Peyer argue that the CPS reflects the presence of agency problems – it measures the 
relative importance of the CEO, as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extract rents. 
They find that the CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q. CPS also appears to be related to firm behavior and performance. It is correlated with 
lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions 
announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such 
announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the 
month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns 
accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases.  
Firm performance does not necessarily matter only to shareholders. Dezső and Ross (2012) 
examine the effect that vested option holdings have on the cost of loans obtained by the firm. They 
argue that while traditional finance theory holds that managers with option-laden incentive 
contracts may favor equity at the expense of debt, risk-averse managers may be more likely to 
retain vested in-the-money options only if they have private information that their firms’ risk-
adjusted performance will be better. It follows that vested option holdings should be positively 
associated with credit quality. Consistent with this, they find that vested option holdings are 
negatively related to the pricing of loans obtained by the firm, especially for informationally 
sensitive loans. The option holdings also predict higher cash flows and credit ratings, a greater 
distance to default, and lower equity volatility. 
Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, and Arrfelt (2008) examine the influence of CEO equity-
based compensation on strategic risk taking by the firm. They measure strategic risk as the output 
of a factor analysis of three strategic risks: R&D spending, capital expenditures, and long-term 
debt. They find evidence that CEO equity-based compensation significantly influences strategic 
risk, but that this influence is more nuanced and complex than conventional treatments of executive 
compensation assume. In particular, different forms of equity-based pay exhibit dissimilar 
influences on strategic risk and that their influence changes as their value and vesting status 
change. Cash-based forms of pay moderate the incentive properties of equity-based pay, indicating 
that cash-based pay may affect how executives perceive risks associated with equity pay. Finally, 
stock price volatility and board actions each also moderate the incentive effects of equity-based 
pay.  
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TURNOVER 
 
In this subsection, I will not focus on management turnover in general. That is a huge area 
of research and I will not do more than scratch the surface here. Instead, I discuss specifically the 
interaction between turnover and pay. This is a hugely challenging issue since managers are rarely 
explicitly fired and econometricians have to infer whether the turnover is voluntary or forced. 
Therefore, most of the papers in this area examine the relationship between turnover and pay when 
the firm performs poorly, without actually determining whether the turnover is forced or not.  
The first question is what happens if performance drops in spite of managerial effort? One 
obvious outcome is that poorly performing managers will be dismissed. But what is the effect on 
pay? One plausible hypothesis is that compensation changes and management turnover are 
substitutes - they are both used to control top management, they should be triggered by similar 
determinants (changes in the firm’s stock price performance) and that they should have similar 
consequences for firm policy. 
In one of the earliest papers to investigate the substitute hypothesis, Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) use surveys appearing in Forbes magazine during 1977-1980 which identify CEOs and 
their compensation, creating a sample of 597 CEOs. In a regression with the real rate of change in 
pay as the dependent variable, they find that the coefficient of stock price performance as measured 
by the abnormal stock return is positive and significant, especially for younger executives (younger 
than 64 years). In addition, the probability of a change in CEO is inversely related to abnormal 
stock price performance. Gao, Harford, and Li (2012) update Coughlan and Schmidt by studying 
extreme pay cuts (where a CEO’s pay is reduced by at least 25% from the prior year) in Execucomp 
firms over a sample period from 1994-2005. Poor firm performance predicts a pay cut or dismissal. 
In firms with strong corporate governance, the likelihood of receiving a sharp pay cut following 
poor performance is higher. Importantly, the factors leading to a pay cut are quite similar to those 
leading to a dismissal. CEOs also appear to respond to a pay cut in ways that are similar to changes 
that new CEOs make following a forced turnover. They decrease investment and leverage and 
improve performance. Further, pay-cut CEOs who do engineer a turnaround see their pay restored 
to normal levels through abnormally high pay-for-performance sensitivity following the pay cut. 
Efendi, Files, Ouyang, and Swanson (2013) examine if pay is restructured following 
corporate governance scandals, specifically following option backdating allegations. They find 
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that it is. The likelihood of forced turnover in both the CEO and CFO positions is significantly 
higher for firms in the aftermath of option backdating than in matched control samples. The forced 
turnover rates for CEOs and CFOs are similar and several times higher than normal. The displaced 
managers are further punished by the managerial labor market, as they are much less likely than 
control firm managers to be rehired at comparable positions. Backdating firms also restructure 
CEO compensation to rely less on stock options. Finally, higher turnover also extends to the 
General Counsel.  
Peters and Wagner (2014) examine if executives rationally ask for greater compensation 
when boards are likely to make mistakes in incorrectly attributing poor firm performance to 
executive lack of effort when industry conditions are poor. They find that CEOs of companies 
experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, 
industry risk is not associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. They 
document that CEO turnover risk is significantly positively associated with compensation. They 
reject an alternative entrenchment model according to which powerful CEOs have lower job risk 
and at the same time secure higher compensation. 
Finally, Alderson, Bansal, and Betker (2014) examine the compensation the new incoming 
CEO negotiates following CEO changes (both voluntary (retirements) and involuntary (dismissals 
and deaths)). The average new CEO is provided with the same level of vega as his predecessor, 
but has a significantly lower delta. The decline in relative price sensitivity creates incentives to 
implement riskier policy choices, which are subsequently borne out in the investment and 
financing decisions of the firm. Alderson, Bansal, and Betker attribute the change in policy to 
limitations in the firm’s ability to manage the competing roles of managerial share ownership as a 
source of both incentive alignment and risk aversion. The optimal contracting approach argues that 
firms should offer a package of options and stock grants which, in conjunction with the manager's 
existing shareholdings, form an optimal combination of volatility and price sensitivity. Managerial 
share ownership creates a direct link between manager wealth and valuable corporate-level 
investment, producing an alignment of incentives that motivates managers to maximize the stock 
price. However, stock ownership also causes the wealth of the manager to change as the value of 
the firm fluctuates. In the presence of such price sensitivity, and in conjunction with significant 
amounts of non-diversifiable human capital, a risk-averse manager avoids risky investment and 
financing policies because her expected utility of wealth is reduced by the potential for downside 
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outcomes. As the tenure of the successful CEO lengthens, her holdings of stock may increase to 
the point that the risk aversion effect dominates the incentive effect. The results in this paper 
suggest that there are limits to either the willingness or the ability of the firm to mitigate high levels 
of risk aversion caused by direct stock ownership, thereby causing the departure of the CEO to be 
significant in terms of resetting incentives. 
 
FIRM POLICY 
 
Does the level of compensation or its structure have real consequences for the firm beyond 
performance? In this subsection, I show how compensation has affects a range of policies for the 
firm including investment, cash holdings, payout structure, pension plans, and socially responsible 
initiatives.  
In one of the earliest and most heavily cited of these papers, Larcker (1983) examines 
whether compensation affects firm investment, specifically, the association between the adoption 
of performance plans and changes in corporate capital investment. When compared to similar non-
adopting firms, he finds that firms adopting performance plans exhibit significant growth in capital 
expenditures following the performance plan adoption. He attributes this to the fact that 
performance plans are tied to the long-term performance of the firm, thus extending the length of 
managerial horizons for investment decisions and making it more likely that managers undertake 
long-term projects with positive NPV. Gaver and Gaver (1993) approach this question differently. 
They compare a sample of growth firms (defined using a factor analysis approach based on six 
variables including the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of assets, the ratio 
of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, the ratio of R&D expenditures to the 
book value of assets, the earnings/price ratio, the variance of the total return of the firm, and the 
frequency that the firm is included in the holdings of growth-oriented mutual funds) to a sample 
of non-growth firms. They find that growth firms have significantly lower debt/equity ratios and 
exhibit significantly lower dividend yields than non-growth firms. Growth firms also pay 
significantly higher levels of cash compensation to their executives and, consistent with Larcker 
(1983), have a significantly higher incidence of stock option plans than non-growth firms. 
However, inconsistent with Larcker (1983), controlling for firm size, Gaver and Gaver find that 
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the incidence of bonus plans, performance plans, and restricted stock plans does not differ between 
growth and non-growth samples. 
Another area that has been investigated by researchers is the effect of compensation 
incentives on cash and leverage. Liu and Mauer (2011) examine the effect of CEO incentives on 
corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to bondholders. As noted earlier, equity-based 
compensation can have adverse risk-taking incentive effects (through the vega of the compensation 
structure) on the interests of bondholders, with equity-incentivized CEOs investing in risky assets 
that transfer bondholder wealth to shareholders. Liu and Mauer go on to investigate whether 
bondholders endeavor to mitigate or protect themselves from the possible negative consequences 
of these choices. For example, bondholders could choose to protect themselves by requiring 
covenants that impose minimum liquidity standards or firms could choose to maintain excess 
liquidity to blunt the effects of incentive compensation on the cost of debt. Liu and Mauer find a 
positive relation between vega incentives and cash holdings, and a negative relation between vega 
and the value of cash to shareholders. The likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is 
also increasing in CEO vega incentives. They argue that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking 
in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.  
Cash holdings are sometimes treated as negative debt. Lewellen (2006) investigates how 
leverage affects CEOs through its impact on stock volatility. Stock-based compensation exposes 
managers to firm-specific risk, giving them an incentive to keep debt levels low. She examines 
how the firm’s mix of stock and option compensation affects managerial incentives to raise or 
lower debt and tests whether these incentives help explain observed financing choices for a large 
sample of 1,587 large U.S. companies during the period 1993–2001. She finds that the volatility 
costs of debt can be large for executives exposed to firm-specific risk and for a range of parameters, 
higher option ownership tends to increase, not decrease, the volatility costs of debt. Empirically, 
she shows that, conditional on the decision to raise outside funds, firms whose CEOs have stronger 
incentives to decrease leverage are more likely to issue equity than debt. She also shows that 
executives who experience an increase in volatility costs are less likely to subsequently increase 
leverage.  
Duru, Iyengar, and Zampelli (2012) investigate the other side of the coin to Lewellen 
(2006), specifically examining if the firm’s leverage decision causally affects its CEO bonus plans. 
They show that highly levered firms are more likely to use ROA over ROE or ROE-based 
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accounting performance measures to determine executive bonuses. The reason is because the 
greater the leverage, the higher is the ROE for a given ROA, as long as the ROA is greater than 
the after-tax cost of interest. Therefore, while a CEO with an ROE based compensation scheme 
has incentives to increase ROE by taking on more low-cost debt, ROA-based compensation 
schemes are not associated with any such incentives. In addition, they find that firms with fewer 
debt covenants, higher interest rates on debt, and a greater proportion of executive pay in the form 
of stock options are less likely to adopt ROE-based measures for use in CEO bonus plans. As in 
Liu and Mauer (2011), they argue that conflicting interests between stockholders and bondholders 
encourage firms to tie executive pay to performance metrics like ROA instead of ROE.  
A third area that has received attention is the impact of compensation policy on payout 
policy. Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on 
unvested restricted stocks grants. Companies are not required to clearly report this additional 
dividend component as part of an executive's compensation package. Examining all S&P 500 firms 
over the period 2003-2007, Minnick and Rosenthal (2014) find that more than half of the dividend 
paying firms allow this practice and these firms have higher dividend payout ratios than those not 
allowing this type of compensation policy.  
Young and Yang (2011) examine the link between firm repurchase activity and the EPS 
performance conditions in executive compensation contracts for a large sample of UK firms from 
1998-2006. In the UK, besides executive bonus plans that routinely condition rewards on EPS 
performance, executives’ long-term incentives including options and restricted stock also 
frequently employ EPS vesting conditions. In addition, UK Company Law required repurchased 
shares to be cancelled immediately. Young and Yang argue that this made repurchases a costly 
device for offsetting ESO-related EPS dilution because issuing new shares is administratively 
costlier than reissuing treasury stock. Therefore, U.K. firms with ESO programs typically 
established a wholly owned trust company to repurchase and reissue shares on their behalf. 
However, under U.K. GAAP, shares held by ESO trusts are excluded from the EPS calculation 
until shares vest unconditionally. Since ESO shares are purchased solely to fund share-based 
compensation plans and because ESO purchases do not meet the legal definition of a stock 
repurchase, Young and Yang can therefore distinguish between repurchases driven by dilution 
concerns and repurchases driven by other factors. They find a strong positive association between 
repurchases and EPS-contingent compensation arrangements. Repurchasers experience larger 
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increases in total payouts; the positive association between repurchases and cash performance is 
more pronounced for firms with EPS targets in the presence of surplus cash; undervalued firms 
with EPS targets are more likely to signal mispricing through a repurchase; and repurchasers with 
EPS conditions are associated with lower abnormal accruals.  
A fourth area under investigation has been the area of pension policy. Eisdorfer, Giaccotto 
and White (2015) examine the impact of pension policy on the dividend policy of the firm. They 
argue that managers with high pension holdings are less likely to adopt a high dividend policy that 
can risk their future pension payouts. Using a hand-collected actuarial pension dataset, they show 
that dividend payments are significantly lower when manager compensation relies more heavily 
on pension payouts. In addition, higher compensation leverage and inside debt have a significant 
negative effect on dividend payments net of stock repurchases; and the negative effect of pension 
on dividends is significantly weaker when pensions are protected. Anantharaman and Lee (2014) 
examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect how managers view risk 
in pension plans. The employee beneficiaries of a firm’s defined benefit pension plan hold claims 
on the firm similar to those held by the firm’s debtholders. Beneficiaries are entitled to receive a 
fixed stream of cash flows starting at retirement. The firm sponsoring the plan is required to set 
aside assets in a trust to fund these obligations, but if the sponsor goes bankrupt with insufficient 
assets to fund pension obligations, beneficiaries are required to accept whatever reduced payouts 
can be made with the assets secured for the plan. Stockholders of firms approaching a state of 
distress, therefore, have incentives to underfund pension plans. Underfunding plans amounts to 
promising future benefits without funding them and is effectively increases leverage by borrowing 
from employees. However, while diversified stockholders have incentives to increase firm risk at 
the expense of debtholders, most corporate decision making is in the hands of managers, who 
prefer less risk than stockholders, out of concern for their reputation, undiversifiable human 
capital, or private benefits of control. Equity-based compensation increases the sensitivity of 
managers’ wealth to stock price performance (delta), and so aligns managers closer to 
stockholders, but could also lead managers who are under-diversified in firm-specific wealth to 
avoid risk. Options add convexity to managers’ payoffs and, by increasing the sensitivity of 
managerial wealth to firm risk (vega), can offset the risk-avoiding tendencies introduced by delta 
and by reputation or human capital concerns. If pension funding and investing choices are 
attributable at least partly to managerial incentives, Anantharaman and Lee argue that we would 
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expect to find more risk shifting in firms in which top managers have high vega. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, they find that risk shifting through pension underfunding is stronger with 
compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high 
wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for CFOs than for CEOs, suggesting 
that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is 
also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings 
show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy.  
Compensation incentives have also been shown to impact the firm’s acquisition decisions. 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) argue that paying managers with equity incentivizes 
them to make better acquisition decisions. They document a strong positive relation between 
acquiring managers’ equity-based compensation and stock price performance around and 
following acquisition announcements in a sample of 1,719 acquisitions made by US firms over the 
period 1993-1998. Compared to low equity-based compensation managers, managers with high 
equity based compensation pay lower acquisition premiums, acquire targets with higher growth 
opportunities, and make acquisitions engendering larger increases in firm risk. The opposite side 
of an acquisition decision is an outsourcing decision. Hall and Liedtka (2005) argue that incentives 
created by CEO stock options and overall compensation mix significantly influence decisions to 
outsource their large-scale information technology (IT) assets and staff. They show, albeit in a 
small sample of 51 firms that announced their decisions to outsource all or a large portion of their 
IT function during the 1993-2001 period, that CEO stock option grants are positively related to the 
decision to outsource IT assets.  
Yet another area of firm policy that is affected by compensation is the firm’s hedging 
policy. Rogers (2002) examines how managerial risk-taking incentives affect the degree to which 
the firm uses derivatives, specifically interest rate or foreign currency derivatives, to hedge risk, 
in a sample of 850 firms chosen randomly from the SEC’s EDGAR database in 1994. He shows a 
negative link between CEO risk-taking incentives and the amount of derivative holdings. Houston 
and James (1995) examine the same issue in one specific industry, banking. They find that, on 
average, bank CEOs receive less cash compensation, are less likely to participate in a stock option 
plan, hold fewer stock options, and receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the 
form of options and stock than do CEOs in other industries. In addition, they find a positive and 
significant relation between the importance of equity-based incentives and the value of the bank's 
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charter. They argue that compensation policies do not promote risk-taking in banking. However, 
while this result may be valid for the broad cross-section of banks, DeYoung, Peng, and Yan 
(2013) argue that it is not correct for specific time-periods, in particular, the period around 2000, 
when industry deregulation expanded banks’ growth opportunities. They show that contractual 
CEO risk-taking incentives (as measured by delta and vega) increased at these banks during this 
period. CEOs responded positively to these incentives, especially at the larger banks best able to 
take advantage of these opportunities. High-vega banking companies exhibited higher amounts of 
both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk, generated a larger percentage of their incomes from 
nontraditional banking activities, invested a larger percentage of their assets in private (i.e., 
subprime or otherwise nonconforming) mortgage securitizations, and invested a smaller 
percentage of their assets in traditional on-balance-sheet business lending. 
The final type of firm policy I discuss here is the impact on corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives. This topic is typically not covered by finance journals but is heavily cited in the 
ethics literature. McGuire, Dow, and Argheyd (2003) document that there is little relationship 
between CEO incentives and strong corporate social performance. Corporate social and 
environmental performance is measured by ratings by Kinder, Lindenberg, and Domini, and 
Company (KLD), a multidimensional Corporate Social Performance database. They find some 
evidence that salary and long-term incentives have a positive association with weak social 
performance. Similarly, Mahoney and Thorne (2005) examine the association between long-term 
compensation and CSR for 90 publicly traded Canadian firms. They find a relationship between 
the long-term compensation and total CSR weakness as well as the product/environmental 
weakness dimension of CSR. There are no clear causal mechanisms in either paper however, so it 
is unclear whether the relationship is indeed causal or whether it is an association. 
 
EARNINGS MANIPULATION 
 
In this last subsection, I discuss an unwanted firm-level consequence flowing from 
compensation policy – its effect on earnings and performance manipulation and actions taken by 
managers to reduce risk to themselves. While compensation policies can incentivize managers to 
select income-increasing accounting procedures, they can also contain incentives to select income-
reducing accounting procedures. For example, bonus contracts may permit funds to be set aside 
126 
for compensation awards when earnings exceed a specified target. If earnings are so low that no 
matter which accounting procedures are selected, target earnings will not be met, managers have 
incentives to further reduce current earnings by deferring revenues or accelerating write-offs, a 
strategy known as ‘taking a bath’. This strategy does not affect current bonus awards and increases 
the probability of meeting future earnings’ targets. In one of the earliest papers in this area, Healey 
(1985) analyzes the format of typical bonus contracts, examining in particular, their accounting 
incentive effects. He finds that accrual policies of managers are related to the specific income-
reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, and changes in accounting procedures by managers 
are associated with adoption or modification of their bonus plans. Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan 
(1995) use confidential compensation databases provided by two human resources consulting 
firms to challenge Healey (1985). Like Healey, they find that managers appear to manipulate 
earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum. However, unlike Healy, they do 
not find evidence in favor of Healey’s taking a bath hypothesis - that managers manipulate earnings 
downwards when earnings are below the minimum necessary to receive any bonus.  
When do managers manipulate earnings? Oyer (1998) answers this question by examining 
the effect of seasonality on compensation paid to salespeople and executives. These contracts 
typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay. These agents therefore 
have incentives to manipulate prices, influence the timing of customer purchases, and vary effort 
over their firms’ fiscal years. Using data from the 1984-1988 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), Oyer shows that agents appear focused on performance over the fiscal year. 
In addition to varying with the calendar business cycle, manufacturing firms’ sales are higher at 
the end of the fiscal year, and lower at the beginning, than they are in the middle. Similarly, Zhang, 
Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, and Khanin (2008) analyze data compiled from Execucomp and a U.S. 
General Accounting Office restatements database, and find that CEOs are more likely to 
manipulate firm earnings when they had more out-of-the-money options and lower stock 
ownership.  
Who has the most influence on earning management? Jiang, Petroni, and Wang (2010) 
examine the association between CFO equity incentives and earnings management. Because the 
CFOs’ primary responsibility is financial reporting, Jiang, Petroni, and Wang argue that CFO 
equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings management. 
Consistent with their conjecture, they find that the magnitude of accruals and the likelihood of 
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beating analyst forecasts are more sensitive to CFO equity incentives than to those of the CEO in 
a sample of the S&P 1500 firms covered by Execucomp between 1993 to 2006.  
Earnings management is not the only avenue through which managers can protect 
themselves from shortfalls in earnings. Managers can also exercise stock options prior to 
disappointing earnings forecasts in the post-earnings period. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) analyze 
why top-level executives chose to exercise a large number of stock option awards in the period 
1992-2001. They document that abnormally large option exercises predict stock return future 
performance and argue that this predictive ability represents private information about 
disappointing earnings in the post-exercise period. Specifically, abnormally positive earnings 
performance in the pre-exercise period turns to disappointing earnings performance in the post-
exercise period, and that this pattern comes as a surprise to even sophisticated market participants 
(financial analysts). They also find that the disappointing earnings in the post-exercise period 
represent a reversal of inflated earnings in the pre-exercise period. Collectively, they argue that 
the private information used by top-level executives to time abnormally large exercises follows 
from earnings management so as to increase the cash payout of exercises. Ofek and Yermack 
(2000) suggest another way for managers to insulate themselves. They investigate the impact of 
stock-based compensation on managerial ownership by examining year-to-year changes in stock 
and option ownership in 1993, 1994, and 1995 for 8,516 top managers in 1,646 companies of all 
sizes. Equity compensation succeeds in increasing incentives of lower-ownership managers, but 
higher-ownership managers negate much of its impact by selling previously owned shares. When 
executives exercise options to acquire stock, nearly all of the shares are sold. Ofek and Yermack 
argue that once managers reach a certain ownership level, they actively rebalance their portfolios 
when boards award equity compensation. 
Finally, compensation policy has been argued to be associated with outright fraud. Harris 
and Bromiley (2007) for example, obtain a sample of firms with income restatements from the 
U.S. General Accounting Office in 2002-2003. They find that two factors substantially increase 
the likelihood of financial misrepresentation: extremely low performance relative to average 
performance in the firm’s industry, and high percentages of CEO compensation paid as stock 
options.  However, this conclusion is not supported by later research. For example, Erickson, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) compare executive equity incentives of firms accused of accounting 
fraud by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1996-2003 with two 
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samples of firms not accused of fraud. They measure equity incentives for the top five executives 
at each firm, focusing specifically on the expected change in value of the executives’ stock and 
option portfolio to a 1% stock price change but find no consistent evidence that executive equity 
incentives are associated with fraud. Similar conclusions are reached by Armstrong, Jagolinzer, 
and Larcker (2010) who examine whether CEO equity-based holdings and compensation provide 
incentives to manipulate accounting reports. Using propensity-score matching within a broad 
sample, they do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and 
accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting 
environments. Instead, they find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently 
at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.  
One way to reconcile these findings is to examine the time-varying or cross-sectional 
propensity for managers to take misstate financial statements. Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 
(2007) investigate why there was a rash of restated financial statements at the end of the 1990s 
market bubble. They find that the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly 
when the CEO has very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options. Misstatements are also 
more likely for firms that are constrained by an interest-coverage debt covenant, that raise new 
debt or equity capital, or that have a CEO who serves as board chair. Similarly, Carver, Cline, and 
Hoag (2013) examine the relative power of founding CEOs in setting their own compensation 
policies during the executive stock option back-dating scandal in the year 2000. They construct a 
sample of 182 firms accused of backdating option grant dates based on reports prepared by The 
Wall Street Journal, Glass, Lewis & Co., and the securities law firm Kahn Gauthier Swick, LLC 
and examine whether managerial power, specifically that of a founding CEO, influences the 
decision to backdate. They find that it does - the presence of a founder CEO increases the 
likelihood that ESOs are backdated by 22% and these founder-led firms strongly underperform 
relative to a matched sample of non-backdating firms.  
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the 
firm’s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. Armstrong, Larcker, and Ormazabal (2013) 
argue that if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity 
risk, the delta of the compensation scheme will have two countervailing incentive effects: a 
positive reward effect and a negative risk effect. However, the vega will have an unambiguously 
positive incentive effect. Jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and 
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portfolio vega, they find evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that 
the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta.  
Finally, a last stream of research examines the impact of executive compensation on private 
securities litigation. Peng and Röell (2008) document that incentive pay in the form of options 
increases the probability of securities class action litigation. In addition, there is an abnormal 
upward earnings manipulation during litigation class periods and that insiders exercise more 
options and sell more shares during class periods, but that this activity is largely driven by pre-
existing option holdings of the managers.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Research on executive compensation is one of the fastest growing areas of finance. In this 
survey, I have discussed four major sections. First, I discuss the theory behind executive 
compensation – why it is designed the way it is. The literature has typically focused on either the 
composition of pay or the level of pay. The optimal contracting approach focuses on the 
composition of pay. It examines different components of pay and their relative importance in 
incentivizing executives to either increasing shareholder value in general or to increase the 
likelihood of specific activities. The alternative rent extraction approach focuses on the level of 
pay and argues that managers use their relative power over their monitors to demand compensation 
that is too high for the activities they perform.  
In the second section, I discuss how executive compensation is structured. I note that the 
overall structure of compensation has remained constant over time though the importance of each 
type of component has waxed and waned over time. For example, options were almost entirely a 
feature of the 1990s and are now being supplanted by restricted stock and performance shares. 
Many of these changes are driven by regulatory changes and in the third section, I discuss who 
sets this structure. Besides regulatory changes, I also note the influence of several other factors on 
pay including the board, shareholders, the compensation committee, social factors and firm 
environments. The final section examines the consequences of pay in particular on its performance. 
The evidence on whether good performance positively affects pay is clear. It does. Firms that 
perform well pay their executives more. The evidence on whether pay is excessive relative to the 
level of performance or whether it is asymmetric (executives are rewarded in good states of the 
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world but not punished in bad states of the world) is less so. Finally, I discuss other consequences 
for the firm in terms of real policy effects driven by compensation.  
What are the major unresolved issues in compensation policy? First, comprehensive though 
this survey may appear, as Figure 1 shows, it represents the mere tip of the iceberg. Compensation 
policy represents an unstable equilibrium between shareholder demands, managerial desires and 
societal needs. The structure and impact of compensation policy will change over time as one or 
the other of these parties gains relative power. The issue with most studies on pay is that they focus 
on one or two components of compensation without explicitly controlling for the others. For 
example, in section II, besides a salary and cash bonus, executives are also compensated in the 
form of options and restricted stock, severance pay, pensions, perks, and (especially in recent 
periods) clawback provisions. However, papers examining incentives provided to executives 
usually focus on the incentives provided by option or stock-based pay without controlling for risk-
mitigation components such as pensions or severance pay. Does the payment of severance pay or 
a pension reduce the delta or vega effects from stock options? The data on all the components is 
increasingly easily available, so not considering the entire spectrum of pay components is difficult 
to justify.  
Second, while a great deal of attention has been paid to economic determinants of pay, 
little attention has been paid to behavioural implications of pay. Executives have an intuitive sense 
of what fair pay for them should be. This sense may be based on what other executives have been 
paid at other industries, the degree of effort they are exerting or on other social and economic 
factors. Being underpaid is likely to trigger different behavioural consequences from being 
overpaid. Consider the papers discussed in the subsection on management turnover that examine 
whether compensation changes and management turnover are substitutes. If these two are 
substitutes, a poorly performing manager can either be fired or his compensation cut sharply. As 
an example, Wells Fargo chairman and CEO, John Stumpf, retired as Chairman following a 
scandal involving customer accounts at Wells Fargo in 2016. There were wide-spread reports that 
the board was considering clawing back compensation from Stumpf without firing him. Though 
Stumpf did retire, it is debatable whether he would have felt motivated to put in as much effort had 
his pay been clawed back while being allowed to stay as Chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo. 
Intuitively, if an executive feels that her salary is “unfairly” reduced, the level of motivation (either 
through delta or vega) she gets from her pay is unlikely to be the same as if her pay was constant 
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(or if it increased). The emphasis on economic determinants of pay and its consequences means 
that there are very few papers that analyze the implications of pay structure using behavioural 
models (such as prospect theory). Similarly, there are few models that examine the implications of 
pay as a consequence of social environments that the executive moves in. While these social 
environments also form expectations of what fair pay should be, they are rarely considered in the 
compensation literature. 
Third, a huge issue with the compensation literature (like most of corporate finance 
research) has been endogeneity. Endogeneity has been a particularly challenging area for 
compensation research since there are few natural experiments that handle endogeneity. I discuss 
regulatory changes that have formed the basis for natural experiments in section III. It is important 
to emphasize however that regulatory changes are not necessarily true natural experiments. Most 
regulatory changes are not introduced in a vacuum. They are introduced precisely to solve issues 
with compensation policy and create other problems. For example, consider the SEC disclosure 
rule change in July 2009, when the SEC proposed (and subsequently enacted in December 2009) 
additional disclosure rules requiring firms that purchase other services from their compensation 
consultants to disclose fees paid for both compensation consulting and other services. If the 
consultants were retained to solely provide advice on pay, fees did not have to be disclosed. The 
change in policy was supposed to address the conflicts of interest faced by clients of multiservice 
compensation consultants, as the significant fees associated with additional services provided by 
the same firm were suspected of biasing the consultant to favor executives. As Chu, Faasse, and 
Rau (2017) show however, the compensation consultant industry reacted rapidly to this rule 
change, with a significant number of multiservice consultants choosing to spin off specialist 
compensation consulting practices in or after 2009. The compensation to these consultants did not 
have to be disclosed since they only provided advice on pay. The change in policy hence did not 
have much impact on executives who were determined to extract rents from shareholders. In this 
case, the 2009 SEC disclosure rule change was not a natural experiment – it was issued to address 
specific problems with compensation policy and was directed at firms that the SEC believed were 
particularly prone to this problem. In medical terms, this would be akin to targeting a particular 
medicine towards particular patients and drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of the medicine 
by the behavior of the patients relative to non-patients. If the patients were not randomly selected, 
this tells us very little about the efficacy of the medicine.  
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Overall, executive compensation is a fascinating area for research. Despite an enormous 
number of papers in the area, they have typically almost always been couched in a standard 
principal-agent approach that has stayed constant for nearly four decades. Academics have 
examined the usual suspects in this approach – governance models (the composition of a board, 
the number of outside directors on the board, the compensation committee, ownership structure), 
firm size, leverage, and other standard factors in analyzing pay. The papers usually attempt to 
focus on one component of pay but without controlling for other components of pay that may 
change simultaneously. Finally, they typically use regulatory or environmental changes as natural 
experiments to address endogeneity without examining why those changes occurred. All these 
issues imply that the future of pay research remains bright. 
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